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This thesis interrogates traditional understandings of race within Zimbabwean nationalism. It 
explores the interactions between socio-cultural identities and belonging in black African 
nationalist thinking and politics, and focuses on the formative decade between the emergence 
of mass African nationalist political parties in 1957 and the widespread adoption of an anti-
white violent struggle in 1966. It reassesses the place of non-black individuals within African 
anti-settler movements. Using the chronological narrative provided by the experiences of 
marginal non-black supporters (including white, Asian, coloured, and Indian individuals), it 
argues that anti-colonial nationalist organisations during the pre-Liberation War period were 
heavily influenced by the competing racial theories and politics espoused by their elite 
leadership. It further argues that the imagined future Zimbabwean nations had a fluid and 
reflexive positioning of citizens based on racial identities that changed continuously. Finally, 
this thesis examines the construction of racial identities through the discourse used by black 
Zimbabweans and non-black migrants and citizens, and the relationships between these 
groups, to contend that race was an inexorable factor in determining belonging. 
 Drawing upon archival sources created by non-black 'radical' participants and 
Zimbabwean nationalists, and oral interviews conducted during fieldwork in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe in 2015, the research is a revisionist approach to existing academic literature 
on Zimbabwean nationalism: in the words of Terence Ranger, it is not a nationalist history 
but a history of nationalism. It situates itself within multiple bodies of study, including 
conceptual nationalist and racial theory, the histories of marginal groups within African 
nationalist movements, and studies of citizenship and belonging. It seeks to critically 
approach the ideologies and practices of Zimbabwean nationalism, and to interrogate the role 
race played in defining the imagined Zimbabwean nation, her citizens, and her politics. It also 
provides much-needed detail into the under-examined histories of minority racial groups and 
their relationships to early Zimbabwean nationalist parties. The conclusions drawn 
demonstrate that identities and participation within Zimbabwean nationalism were inherently 
affected by overarching concepts of biological race and skin colour, and that Zimbabwean 
nationalism was reciprocally shaped by these factors as well. 
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Introduction 
 
In October 2014 (the same month that work on this thesis began), a funeral was held 
for a white Zimbabwean named Paul Brickhill. During the service, the opposition 
Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union's (ZAPU) President Dumiso Dabengwa gave a 
scathing indictment at the lack of recognition Brickhill had been afforded for his role 
in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. As members of ZAPU's intelligence branch during 
the liberation war, both Paul and his brother Jeremy had been active combatants in 
the fight against white minority rule on the African continent, alongside thousands of 
black Zimbabweans. Yet in Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF's Zimbabwe of 2014, 
Dabengwa lamented there was: 
 
[...] no place for individuals such as Brickhill because the ZANU-PF official 
history finds it inconvenient to admit that there were white Zimbabweans who 
contributed to the liberation struggle. [...] Our official history cannot face 
inconvenient truths and that is because the truth reminds us of the non-racial, 
free, and democratic Zimbabwe we still have to achieve.1 
 
Although the erasure of non-black participation was not as total as Dabengwa 
asserted, race in Zimbabwean nationalism obscured the fact that non-black people 
were fundamentally involved in the liberation struggle. In the thirty-eight years since 
independence, the Zimbabwean state has officially recognised only five non-black 
individuals for their contributions to the liberation struggle.2 Of the hundreds of other 
non-black participants who suffered in the name of Zimbabwean nationalism, there 
are no formal memorials. As Blessing-Miles Tendi explains, the 'Patriotic History' of 
Mugabe's Zimbabwe asserts that there 'are no "good" white people' in the story of 
Zimbabwe's liberation.3 Despised by many former white Rhodesians for betraying 
their race and marginalised by black Zimbabweans for being a part of the ruling 
                                               
1 'Dabengwa lashes at Zanu PF's liberation narrative', New Zimbabwe (18 October 2014) 
2 John Conradie, Stuart Hargreaves, Kantibai G. Patel, Kiki Divaris, and Guy Clutton-Brock.  
3 Blessing-Miles Tendi, Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Politics, Intellectuals, and 
the Media (Oxford, 2010), p.128 
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white minority, the white radicals who worked for African rule are depicted as a 
footnote to the struggle between black Africa and white settler colonialism. This 
racial prism defines citizenship in contemporary Zimbabwe and claims to the nation, 
with nationhood being inexorably tied to race. 'The land is still in the hands of white 
people and they are not Africans. These whites who think they are Zimbabwean, we 
will just deport them back to Britain,' proclaimed Chenjerai 'Hitler' Hunzvi (former 
Chairman of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association) in 2000.4 
 Yet this was not always the case. Zimbabwean nationalism initially emerged 
as an ideology of inclusiveness, non-racialism, and tolerance for all individuals with 
shared ideals of African advancement and an end to racial discrimination. It was led 
by prominent multi-racialists5 with a multitude of non-black friends, and saw white, 
Asian, Indian, and coloured men and women elected to office in local branches. 
Many of the leadership envisaged the Zimbabwean nation as a complete antithesis of 
the racialised Rhodesian state, permitting any person to be treated equally regardless 
of race, ethnicity, gender, or politics. The various non-black populations residing in 
Rhodesia were to be included in the nation building efforts, as the country belonged 
to them as much as the African majority. For several years between 1957 and 1964, 
nationalist parties and their leaders embraced non-black participation as an indication 
that the imagined Zimbabwean nation was to be truly non-racial at all levels.  
 How, and when, and why Zimbabwean nationalism's stance on race shifted so 
dramatically remains largely misunderstood. Academics point to the Liberation War 
as the decisive factor in instigating a racialised ideology but the reality is that the 
adoption of an anti-white discourse had occurred well-before the first shots were 
fired at the Battle of Sinoia in 1966. 
 
Intent and Key Questions 
                                               
4 Quoted in David Blair, Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in 
Zimbabwe (London, 2002), p.74 
5 The distinction between multi-racialism and non-racialism is discussed on p.53 
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This thesis is about a significant moment in the history of the Zimbabwean nation. It 
is about the individuals, organisations, and politics that drove the formative 
development of a Zimbabwean national consciousness in between 1957 and 1965. It 
is a study of multiple concepts (identity, race, nation, citizenship, community, and 
belonging) and it explores these themes during the pursuit of an independent African 
state. It uses one element of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement as the means of 
doing so: the non-black radicals in the struggle. By examining the mentalities, 
ideologies, and composition of the white, Asian, Indian, and coloured radicals who 
found themselves playing an extraordinarily involved role in the African struggle, I 
challenge how the post-colonial political community in an independent Zimbabwe 
came to be construed, particularly as it pertained to race. 
 This 'non-racial nationalism' encompasses the interplay between race, nation, 
and citizenship within Zimbabwean nationalism, but the focus on this small group of 
non-black participants also addresses a critical omission in existing understandings 
of the construction of the Zimbabwean nation. There has been little investigation into 
the role played by these non-black radicals as a group and as individuals in the 
nationalist struggle and their impact on Zimbabwean nationalist thinking. In light of 
this absence, this thesis therefore considers the non-black participants in the 
nationalist struggle as an integral element of early Zimbabwean nationalism as well 
as a distinct group of individuals with their own beliefs, desires, and identities. 
Furthermore, their presence and actions provide a crucial way of examining the 
meaning of race in Zimbabwean nationalism in both a practical and rhetorical sense. 
This framework of non-black participation facilitates an understanding of the 
competing versions of the Zimbabwean nation imagined by various elements of the 
African political elite. 
 One consequence of employing a narrative focusing on the non-black radicals 
is an almost inevitable corresponding emphasis on the elites of the Zimbabwean 
nationalist movements as opposed to the many who comprised the majority of 
politically active black Zimbabweans. This is a product of the rarefied level at which 
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most of the interactions between black nationalists and non-black radicals occurred 
and in the debates around a post-colonial political community in Zimbabwe, it is the 
elites who had the loudest voices. Yet this narrow focus on the elites and the non-
black radicals does not mean there is no benefit for understanding how ordinary 
African's approached race and Zimbabwean nationalism. As John Iliffe showed 
across central and southern Africa, there was a dialectical exchange of ideas between 
the elites and the masses, with each group acting on the other, and both acting on the 
movement as a whole.6 The actions and attitudes of the political leaders are set 
within the context of a growing political mobilisation that encompassed students, 
urban workers, peasants, and an emergent African middle class, all of whom 
influenced the development of a Zimbabwean nationalism. It is this broader 
environment within which the non-black radicals and their black African 
counterparts that I intend to include as part of my analysis. 
 The use of a nation-state framework for this research is also deliberate. 
Studies of African nationalism have seen a growing and worthwhile collective effort 
to employ a transnational or regional focus in recent years. Scholars have considered 
the migration and interactions of people, ideas, and commonalities that went beyond 
nationalities as drivers of political and social upheaval across national borders. This 
thesis is no different. There is an inherent transnationalism in the concept of non-
black foreign-born members in an African nationalist struggle, as there are in the 
concepts of race and post-colonial African socio-political reconstruction. The 
prominent non-black radicals who made significant contributions to the liberation 
struggle in South Africa (and to a lesser extent Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya) 
overlapped with those in Zimbabwe in actions and ideologies. The impact of events 
and ideas elsewhere on the continent had a key impact on the Zimbabwean story. 
Zimbabwean nationalism's connections to the ideologies and political movements 
elsewhere in Africa calls for comparisons with the debates about post-colonial 
community construction in other settler states and former British colonies. Doing so 
                                               
6 John Iliffe, Africans: the history of a continent (Cambridge, 1995), pp.249-253 
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is the most appropriate way to shed light upon how questions of citizenship and 
belonging dealt with race within Zimbabwe itself. 
 Yet Zimbabwean nationalism also lends itself to a nation-state focus. The 
arena for the struggle in the eyes of most Zimbabwean nationalist leaders appeared to 
be the first and foremost the state as it had been imagined and constructed by white 
settlers since 1890. This was particularly the case from the early 1960s, by which 
time the majority of the neighbouring African states had achieved independence from 
their colonial metropoles and post-colonial borders consolidated. In the resulting 
circumstances, Zimbabwean nationalists found themselves facing an increasingly 
resilient white Rhodesian state facing encirclement by independent African nations. 
The rhetoric and discourse of the nationalist elites and the non-black radicals mostly 
emphasised a national focus for the struggle, albeit situated in the context of a 
transnational arena. Zimbabwean nationalist ideology carried an intent of creating a 
nation synonymous with the state and so the fundamental questions being asked 
revolved around what would make the Zimbabwean nation, who would belong to it, 
and on what basis. There was an emphasis on the conditions for citizenship of the 
imagined Zimbabwean nation and it is this debate which demands a national focus. 
 
Definitions and Terminology 
 
The two central concepts within this thesis ('race' and 'nationalism') require defining 
in order to frame the arguments made. Race is a highly contested term and one which 
has become increasingly significant in  debates during recent years.7 Academics have 
sought to examine abstract theories of race in various societies from a variety of 
                                               
7 Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, Racism (Oxford, 1999), p.5. See also Jean-Francois 
Bayart, The Illusion of Cultural Identity (Chicago, 2005); Mahmood Mamdani, Define and 
Rule: Native as Political Identity (Johannesburg, 2012); Floya Anthias & Nira Yuval-Davis, 
Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour, and Class and the Anti-Racist 
Struggle (London, 1992); and Étienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: 
Ambiguous Identities (London, 1991) 
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standpoints.8 These studies have highlighted three common points: the fluidity of 
racial identities, the reflexive nature of race as a concept, and the social construction 
inherent in any employment of race.9 Race is subject to the social, cultural, and 
political environment in which it is employed, all of which have a significant impact 
on the meaning attached to it. In contemporary society, race is most commonly used 
to describe physiological and cultural distinctions between humans as a means of 
identifying and classifying genetic heritage, geographical residence, physical 
appearance, and cultural adherence. When used in non-academic discourse, race is 
frequently employed as a means of describing someone's place of birth or 
membership to a specific group of others with shared perceived racial traits. 
Colloquially, it is skin colour that tends to supersede all other supposed identifiers, in 
what Alan Burns called 'colour prejudice.'10 
 Yet scholars and intellectuals have sought to challenge the idea of unalterable 
physical characteristics as being the defining features of an individual's race, 
preferring to instead highlight the attitudes, beliefs, and ideals that a person comes to 
identify with during their life. The American anthropologist and co-founder of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, W.E.B. Du Bois, 
defined race in 1897 as being the product of 'common language, common ancestry, 
common history, and common strivings'. Du Bois contended that race could be 
identified without any reference to biological characteristics as a factor in 
distinguishing racial groups.11 Other scholars have argued that shared religious or 
societal beliefs are sufficient to create a racial identity, particularly in the case of 
Judaism and Islam (including in Zimbabwe), whilst Rogers Brubaker and Frederick 
                                               
8 See for instance Philomena Essed & David Theo Goldberg, eds., Race Critical Theories: 
Text and Context (Oxford, 2001); Caroline Knowles, Race and Social Analysis (London, 
2003); Alice Bloch & John Solomos, Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century (Basingstoke, 
2010); and Máirtín Mac an Ghaill, Contemporary Racisms and Ethnicities: Social and 
Cultural Transformations (Buckingham, 1999) 
9 See Joshua Glasgow, A Theory of Race (New York, 2009) 
10 Alan Burns, Colour Prejudice (London, 1948), p.16 
11 Robert Gooding-Williams, 'Outlaw, Appiah, and Du Bois's "The Conservation of Races"', 
in Bernard Bell, Emily Grosholz, and James Stewart, eds., W.E.B. Du Bois on Race and 
Culture (New York, 1996),p.44, 50 
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Cooper have even criticised the concept of 'identity'.12 The sheer breadth of traits that 
can be seen as classifying an individual's race are apparent from the scholarship on 
racial theory and racial philosophy.13 As a result there are no 'unambiguous, water-
tight definitions of ethnicity, racism and myriad terms in-between.'14 
 Compared to South Africa, there have been only a few concentrated studies 
of race and racial theory in Rhodesia. Dane Kennedy and Morris Hirsch have written 
on Rhodesian racial identities and relationships (mostly from the perspective of the 
white community),15 Claire Palley and Busani Mpofu have explored the explicit 
racial discrimination of the Rhodesian state (touched upon by George 
Karekwaivanane as well),16 and David McDermott Hughes, Yuka Suzuki, and Rory 
Pilossof have looked at racial formation in post-colonial Zimbabwe.17 The use of 
racial descriptors like black, white, African, or European are particularly complicated 
given the meanings attached to these terms in Rhodesian history. Race in the 
Zimbabwean context ardently retained biological connotations and was clearly 
                                               
12 Ephraim C. Mandivenga, Islam in Zimbabwe (Harare, 1983); Craig R. Prentiss, ed., 
Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity: An Introduction (New York, 2003); and 
Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', Theory and Society, Vol.29, 
No.1 (2000), pp.1-47 
13 See Rodney D. Coates, Abby L. Ferber, & David L. Brunsma, eds., The Matrix of Race: 
Social Construction, Intersectionality, and Inequality (London, 2018): & Tina Patel, Race 
and Society (London, 2017) 
14 Ali Rattansi & Sallie Westwood, eds., Racism. Modernity and Identity (Cambridge, 1994), 
p.53 
15 See Dane Kennedy, Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern 
Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Durham, 1987): and Morris. I. Hirsch, For Whom the Land?: An 
Assessment of Multiracial Southern Africa - The Factors and Trends, The Ways and Means 
(Salisbury, 1967) 
16 Claire Palley, ‘Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation under the 
Rhodesia Front from 1963-1969’, Race and Class, Vol.12, No.1 (1970), pp.15-47: Busani 
Mpofu, '"Undesirable" Indians, Residential Segregation, and the Ill-Fated Rise of the White 
"Housing Convanters" in Bulawayo, Colonial Zimbabwe, 1930-1973', South African 
Historical Journal, Vol.63, No.4 (2011), pp.553-580; & George Karekwaivanane, The 
Struggle over State Power in Zimbabwe: Law and Politics since 1950 (Cambridge, 2017) 
17 David McDermott Hughes, Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of 
Belonging (New York, 2010), ch.6; Yuka Suzuki, The Nature of Whiteness: Race, Animals, 
and Nation in Zimbabwe (Seattle, 2016); and Rory Pilossof, The Unbearable Whiteness of 
Being: Farmers' Voices from Zimbabwe (Cape Town, 2013) 
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defined on the basis of skin colour, much as it had been during the colonial era. From 
its foundation, the white Rhodesian state had constructed a nation where skin colour 
acted as the defining means of categorisation and citizenship, with little room for 
ambiguity about an individual's membership of a specific race - what Mahmood 
Mamdani called the 'race option' of colonial rule.18 Racial identities in colonial 
Zimbabwe used skin pigmentation as both an explanation and a precursor for those 
social characteristics identified by Du Bois: common language, ancestry, history, and 
strivings. It was this physical manifestation of race and the question of skin 
pigmentation which became the colloquial definition of race, as well as the legal and 
codified one.  
 Despite being intimately dependent upon the concept of biological race, the 
rhetoric of the white Rhodesian state also employed geography alongside skin colour 
as the dominant racial descriptors. Until the 1969 Constitution changed the official 
classifications, the six largest racial groups in Rhodesia were legally defined as 
Europeans, Africans, Asians, Indians, Chinese, and Eurafricans, and these terms 
were often preferred in official literature to those based on skin colour.19The concept 
of clearly delineated communities was seen as necessary to the functioning of the 
hierarchical Rhodesian society, particularly given the racial segregation that affected 
almost every aspect of daily life, so utilising terms based on geographic heritage 
reinforced these Eurocentric notions of racial superiority.20 The result is that in 1950s 
and 1960s Rhodesia, the terms black, white, and coloured were used alongside and 
interchangeably with African, European, Indian, and Asian dependent upon personal 
preference and politics.21 
                                               
18 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary African and the Legacy of Late 
Colonial Rule (Princeton, 1996), pp.93-95 
19 Palley, ‘Law and the Unequal Society', p.17 
20 Kennedy, Islands of White, ch.3. See also Luise White, Unpopular Sovereignty: 
Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization (Chicago, 2015), pp.32-35 
21 I have chosen not to capitalise the terms 'black', 'white', and 'coloured' throughout this 
thesis as they are social constructs reflecting racial groupings and are not tied to proper 
nouns in the same way as Chinese, Indian, or Asian. 
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 This thesis uses the racial adjectives black and white in preference to African 
and European to reflect the fact that not all of those with white skin in colonial 
Zimbabwe identified with the European colonial ideals, nor did all of those 
supportive of African politics have black skin. Blair Rutherford, whose work on 
black farm workers in Zimbabwe drew its definition from skin colour as a racially 
divisive category, noted just this issue: 
  
The adjectives "white" and "black" are commonly used in Africa to denote 
people whose ancestry lies in Europe or sub-Saharan Africa respectively. There 
is a tendency in academic literature to treat these labels as more "natural" 
indices of human differences (i.e. of phenotypal variation) than, say, biological 
"races" and thus somehow not culturally constructed […]. Although I will not 
place quotation marks around these terms in the remainder of the text, I want to 
stress that this does not mean that they are somehow outside of culture any 
more than the terms "European" and "African".22 
 
It is crucial to note these were the terms used in self-definition by those being 
studied. There were few Zimbabwean equivalents to Steve Biko or Robert Sobukwe 
who put pen to paper during the struggle and in clear terms laid out their stance on 
non-black participants in the struggle and the place of biological race within their 
ideologies. Ndabaningi Sithole's declaration in 1959 that 'African nationalism is 
directed against European domination, and not again the white man' was one of the 
notable exceptions.23 Yet the stances of the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders can be 
ascertained from other sources, discussed later in this introduction. The Zimbabwean 
nationalists self-identified as black Africans and their supporters as white, Asian, 
Indian, Chinese, and coloureds respectively. There was no hesitancy to utilise these 
racial categories to define their own identities, either during the struggle or in the 
years after. The conception of racial identities as being tied to skin colour or 
geographic origins was adopted by the Zimbabwean nationalists, the non-black 
radicals, and the Rhodesian state during the period in question with only minor 
                                               
22 Blair Rutherford, Working on the Margins: Black workers, white farmers in postcolonial 
Zimbabwe (Harare, 2001), p.5 
23 Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism (London, 1959), p.24 
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debate. Race was contested only where there was uncertainty regarding citizenship 
rights, particularly regarding racial minorities like Asian, Indian, or coloured 
individuals. Since Zimbabwean nationalists utilised the discourse and rhetoric of the 
Rhodesian state regarding race, they inherited the same ambiguities inherent in the 
socio-political structures of the Rhodesian state. Such adoption highlighted both the 
general salience and the necessity of challenging racial thinking as Sithole explained, 
'African nationalism is, paradoxically, the child of white supremacy'.24 As will be 
seen in later chapters, 'blackness' would come to play a significant role in the 
formation of a Zimbabwean nationalist consciousness and concepts of citizenship for 
the imagined Zimbabwean nation. 
 Zimbabwean conceptions of nationalism also require defining and this thesis 
is an attempt to do just that. It is worth emphasising the current approach to studying 
Zimbabwean nationalism because it provides insight into how this thesis seeks to 
tackle the main questions regarding race and citizenship. In many respects this 
research is about how the Zimbabwean future was being envisaged by various 
different parties, at different times, in response to different stimuli and catalysts. A 
Zimbabwean case study provides a useful comparison to the spate of the recent 
literature on nation making in Africa precisely because of the existence and agency 
of established white, coloured and Asian settlers in the territory. Furthermore, the 
Rhodesian state was strongly entrenched, a factor that heavily influenced both the 
imagined future Zimbabwean nation and citizenship. Zimbabwean nationalists were 
forced to integrate racial minorities with established claims on the land and an 
inherited political structure, complete with historic and traditional obligations to 
citizens of the colonial state.25 
 The notions of citizenship espoused and the characteristics of these citizens 
both rely heavily on understanding what role race and racial identities played in such 
debates. Rogers Brubaker's work is influential for understanding contrasting types of 
                                               
24 Ibid., p.37 
25 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, pp.90-94 
11 
 
national identity and the proscription of group and individual rights within a nation, 
particularly the concept of 'inside-outside' relationships. 
 
If insiders are defined positively - as members of a family, clan, association, 
organization, or state - outsiders are defined negatively and residually. They 
are excluded not because of what they are but because of what they are not - 
because they are not recognized or acknowledged as insiders.26 
 
Brubaker takes this argument further, contending that through what he terms 
'presumptive connections', a person's parentage, place of birth, biological ancestry, 
and social status are seen by national leaders as indicative of ties to a nation 
state.27Ascertaining how the African nationalist movement perceived foreign, non-
black individuals and their place in the Zimbabwean nation is crucial. Similarly, the 
concept of national identity is brought into play as an analytical tool on the basis that 
citizenship and national identities are subject to change dependent on place of 
residence, shared ideological beliefs and other voluntary characteristics. These non-
black radicals were never termed 'nationalists' by the Rhodesian state as a refusal to 
see beyond racial divisions. Instead they were described as supporters or 
sympathisers and kept external to Zimbabwean nationalism. As Brubaker explains, 
'citizenship is an abstract, formal construct. In principle it has nothing to do with 
ethnocultural nationality or with any other immediately interpretable markers and 
identifiers of everyday life.'28 Whether this was the case in imaginings of the 
Zimbabwean nation in the late-1950s and early-1960s provides a crucial line of 
investigation in this research. 
  Other themes of national theory and identity politics are examined, including 
some that have recently been tackled by recent work of Africanist scholars working 
on different regions and societies. Academics including Jean Allman, Justin Pearce, 
and Kate Skinner have emphasised the role of competing nationalisms in the 
                                               
26 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (London, 1992),  
p.29 
27 Ibid., p.92 
28 Ibid., p.30 
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construction of post-colonial nation states.29 Others like Emma Hunter, James 
Brennan, and Miles Larmer have highlighted the construction of nationalist thinking 
and racial identities in opposition to existing state structures, including the popular 
debates surrounding concepts of 'democracy', 'representation', and 'citizenship' within 
their own specific national contexts.30 Key themes raised include the persistence of 
racial categories from colonial society, the clashes between individual autonomy and 
state unity, and the conditions for political membership of the created nation-states. 
All highlight the importance of reframing broad concepts within specific national 
discourses and a longue durée approach to African nationalism.31 
 The competing nationalist visions of the future espoused by different groups 
are another key theme of this research. As Miles Larmer argues, nationalism 
provides a framework for assorted factions to express societal discontent and 
establish their claims to a national identity.32 In the Zimbabwean context, specific 
elements of the nationalist movement would come to dominate the discourse both 
intellectually and politically, just as the nationalist elements of African politics had 
come to dominate other African political movements. Frederick Cooper's assertion 
that majority rule and a majority nationalist government were not the only outcomes 
available to colonial societies during the transition from colonial to post-colonial 
states is a useful counter to the teleology of nationalist historians.33 As will be seen 
                                               
29 Jean Allman, The Quills of the Porcupine - Asante Nationalism in an Emergent 
Ghana (Madison WI, 1993); Justin Pearce, Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola, 
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31 James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley, 1971) 
32 Miles Larmer, 'Studying African nationalism as nationalism', Keynote Address at the 
Researching Africa Day 2017, Oxford University, 4 March 2017 
33 Frederick Cooper, 'An Antinationalist Anticolonialism: Politics in French West Africa, 
1945-1960', paper presented at the Council on African Studies Lecture Series, Yale 
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throughout this thesis, majority rule in Zimbabwe itself seemed unlikely and was 
contested for the first several years of the nationalist movement. Meanwhile other 
routes through decolonization were proposed, including liberal multi-racialism 
expressed through compromise and cooperation with the white Rhodesian state, and 
trade union-led, class-based socialist reform. The analysis presented rejects the idea 
of a homogenous and inevitable Zimbabwean nation as having been imagined by the 
black political elites of the mid-twentieth century. Instead it will present a complex 
and constantly evolving Zimbabwean nationalism which was simultaneously an 
academic and political phenomenon, situated in theory and realised in practice, 
conceptualised by intellectuals and utilised by popular mass movements. 
 
Historiography 
 
This thesis does not neatly fit into a single category of Zimbabwean historiography. 
It makes contributions to a wide ranging library of academic work, much of which 
has been written by and for distinct disciplines including sociology, anthropology, 
and history with diverse reasons and objectives in mind. By asking what non-black 
participation in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement meant in terms of citizenship 
and debates about belonging, I critique the relationship between racial identities and 
nation building that is depicted in the existing work. Furthermore, because of this 
emphasis on non-black radicals within the context of the Zimbabwean nationalist 
movements, this thesis is deliberately situated between two particular perspectives on 
the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. These conflicting standpoints revolve around a 
binary academic paradigm of white Rhodesians or black Zimbabweans.  
 One group of scholars engage from the perspective of the white Rhodesian 
state, giving the role of the protagonist to white Rhodesians and relegating the black 
Zimbabweans to a background position of opposition, to be dealt with by white 
politicians, soldiers, and civilians in defence of their nation. Contained within this 
coterie are the academics whose focus is on the Rhodesian political landscape and 
the actions of the Rhodesian government, including Larry Bowman, Morris Hirsch, 
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Elaine Windrich, and J.R.T. Wood.34 Others explore the attitudes and actions of the 
white Rhodesian population; W.G. Eaton, Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, Dane 
Kennedy, Alois Mlambo, Graham Kinloch, and Cyril Rogers and C. Frantz, amongst 
others.35 Yet throughout this extensive historiography, there have been only a few 
examinations into the dissident elements of white society and these few 
investigations have been dominated by a focus on the broad grouping of 'liberal' as 
opposed to 'radical' whites.36 Kate Law, Dickson Mungazi, and Ian Hancock all shed 
light on the non-conformist whites and their impact on the Rhodesian state, yet all 
neglect the role of the white radicals who actively participated in the African 
nationalist cause.37  
Hancock's research in particular purports to present an all-encompassing 
account of white criticism to the Rhodesian state and successfully recognises the 
important divisions within white non-conformity. Yet it pushes the white supporters 
                                               
34 Larry Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State (Harvard, 1973): 
Morris I. Hirsch, Focus on Southern Rhodesia, the Constitution and Independence: an 
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1962) 
36 Although explained more thoroughly on p.87-89,‘radical’ whites in the Rhodesian context 
refers to those activists for independence and nationalist causes that went beyond multi-
racial liberalism. The term encompasses the anti-colonial intelligentsia, non-racialists, and 
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37 Kate Law, Gendering the Settler State: white women, race, liberalism and empire in 
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Africa: Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd (Westport, 1999): and Ian Hancock, White 
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of African nationalism to the margins and glosses over those who identified more 
strongly with African-led nationalism than white multi-racial liberalism. Partly this is 
due to Hancock's stringent methodological approach of situating resistance to white 
minority rule within the framework of white society, since such restrictions leave 
little space for those who removed themselves from their compatriots and acted more 
in keeping with black nationalist agendas than white dissidence. This restrictive 
focus was re-addressed somewhat in post-1980 writing which presented more 
insightful accounts of white society's heterogeneous nature, notably David Caute's 
portrayal of the heterogeneous mentalities of whites in Rhodesia.38 Yet even in 
Caute's outstanding work, the radical elements of non-black societies (white, Asian, 
coloured, Indian) remain hidden, their voices, contributions, and impact muted. 
There is little comprehension as to why these individuals sided with the nationalists 
as opposed to the white liberals, and even less understanding about the role their own 
identities played in explaining their actions. The marginality of these individuals for 
a variety of reasons (including their sexuality, race, religious beliefs, political 
ideologies, or social status) shed light on these questions and yet they remain 
underexplored.  
 Given the non-black radicals' political beliefs and the exclusion from their 
own societies they suffered, situating them as a component of African nationalism 
permits a more thorough investigation into their actions and influence than if they are 
viewed simply as an extraneous group of dissent within their own communities. This 
field of research shifts the focus to the black Africans in Rhodesia and their efforts to 
secure independence through various means against the intransigent white state. The 
majority of this literature has been reviewed in detail by Brian Raftopoulos, Tinashe 
Nyamunda, Terence Ranger, and Jocelyn Alexander and there is no need to reprise it 
here.39 However it is worthwhile to briefly summarise the key texts and their themes 
                                               
38 David Caute, Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia (Harmondsworth, 1983) 
39 See Brian Raftopoulos, 'Problematising Nationalism in Zimbabwe: A Historiographical 
Perspective', Zambezia, Vol.27, No.2 (1999), pp.115-134; Tinashe Nyamunda, 'Insights Into 
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and to highlight the gaps, shortcomings, and conceptual failings with which this 
thesis engages. There are five academic trends that have shaped the current paradigm 
regarding Zimbabwean nationalism.  
 First, those works produced around the 1960s in the service of Zimbabwean 
nationalism as a means of providing what Terence Ranger called 'a usable African 
past to the nationalist struggle'.40 Alongside Ranger were the works of Zimbabwean 
nationalists Ndabaningi Sithole and Eshmael Mlambo.41 These were not histories of 
nationalism but 'nationalist histories'. The authors saw history as ideology and 
employed this history as politics in the service of a distinct and defined Zimbabwean 
nationalism to serve 'the agenda of the day', in the words of Enocent Msindo.42 
 Seeking to challenge these ideological histories were the Marxist school of 
social and economic academics that emerged during the 1970s, led by Giovanni 
Arrighi, André Astrow, Ian Phimister, and Charles Van Onselen.43 This group 
focused on theories of development and underdevelopment as a response to the 
inability of new nations throughout Africa to achieve real economic and social 
liberation. Their work was predominantly focused on class and increasingly critical 
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of the largely pro-capitalist attitudes within the nationalist movements, as well as the 
failures of African nationalism to address the underlying issues within Rhodesian 
society. 
 As Zimbabwe secured its own independence in 1980, a third academic cohort 
emerged who produced the 'official histories' of Zimbabwean nationalism as a means 
of legitimating the newly-elected ZANU-PF. Most notable was the work of David 
Martin and Phyllis Johnson, which ignored the contributions to the struggle of most 
non-ZANU elements and become the main historical text for all Zimbabwean 
secondary schools.44 In response to the selective narrative and unified depiction of 
the nationalist movements, there was a counter-turn to histories which sought to 
complicate and disaggregate the liberation struggle through distinct collectivities 
such as class, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, or labour. Highlighting the existence of 
struggles within the struggle were Norma Kriger, David Lan, Terence Ranger, David 
Maxwell, Joanne McGregor, and Jocelyn Alexander, all of whom downplayed the 
role of a central ideology and emphasised the agency of ideas other than nationalism 
to highlight the heterogeneity of the liberation movements.45 
 By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the combination of ZANU-PF's third 
decade of rule and a series of socio-economic crises saw a new generation of 
scholars began to focus on the history and legacies of the liberation struggle as 
context for the contemporary situation. Brian Raftopoulos and Timothy Scarnecchia 
explored the origins of authoritarianism within the nationalist movements from the 
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perspective of the present.46 Angus Selby, Joost Fontein, Rory Pilossof, Bridget M. 
Mupfuvi, and Jocelyn Alexander conversely examine how fundamental societal 
questions that had persisted throughout the liberation struggle (in this case land), 
have become politicised in post-independence Zimbabwe, and how these themes 
have been employed as political tools.47 The use of history as socio-political 
legitimacy and the manipulation of Zimbabwean nationalism was more recently 
expanded upon by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Preben Kaarsholm and Blessing Miles 
Tendi.48 
 The relationship between citizenship and nationalism in Zimbabwe has 
further been assessed in the work of Sara Dorman, Sarah Chiumbu, Bridget M. 
Mupfuvi, and Jocelyn Alexander.49 All four highlighted the importance of 
controlling the historical narratives, and how far claims to the memory of the 
liberation struggle have become an intrinsic part of Zimbabwean socio-political life. 
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More importantly, they raise important discussions about the ideological role of 
characteristics as markers for belonging or exclusion within a nation. This approach 
has recently also been emphasised by Miles Larmer and Baz Lecocq.50 Their concept 
of 'competing nationalisms' (in which some ideologies collapse, others survive by 
adapting) provides a better understanding of African nationalism's role in state 
construction and citizenship by highlighting the complexities and heterogeneity of 
African political agendas. All of these authors also address the distinctions of 
authority and legitimacy provided by membership or allegiance to a specific ideology 
in the contemporary situation, and the role of uncertainty and competition in defining 
a nation and its citizens. 
 This idea of competing nationalisms is crucial to this thesis. Non-racialism 
was one of the alternative forms of Zimbabwean nationalism that would ultimately 
lose out to an ideology focused on black identity politics. Nevertheless, the existence 
of a non-racial ideology and of non-black radicals within the movement forced the 
dominant nationalist theories to address the ideas of race and national belonging. 
Compared to studies into apartheid South Africa, the role of race in constructing a 
national identity remains severely understudied in existing literature on colonial 
Zimbabwe. David Everatt's research on the theme of non-racialism in the early days 
of the anti-apartheid movement presents the counterpart to this thesis.51 Andries Du 
Toit, Saul Dubow, George Frederickson, Shula Marks, Stanley Trapido, Kenneth 
Hendrickse, and Julie Frederikse have also provided thorough and comprehensive 
insights into the role race played in the development of black South African 
nationalism during the anti-apartheid struggle.52 As with their work, it is the non-
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black radical actors that provide the cohesion needed to integrate white dissent with 
African nationalism in the Zimbabwean context as the visible manifestations of racial 
policy and thinking. 
 
Sources and Research Methodology 
 
The single most valuable sources surveyed were the extensive diaries of a non-black 
participant in the liberation struggle during its early years, the University College of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (UCRN) lecturer John Reed. His daily entries - frequently 
running to a half-dozen or more pages - provide the foundation for the chronological 
narrative adopted by this thesis. A British academic in English literature, Reed 
emigrated to Southern Rhodesia in 1957 to take up a teaching position at the newly 
established university. Described by his brother as 'always a man of the left',53 Reed's 
diaries are a unique source charting the experiences of a white supporter of African 
nationalism and record in detail the evolution of racial thinking and concepts of 
citizenship within Zimbabwean nationalist movements. The immediacy of the 
entries, combined with Reed's special position as one of only a handful of white 
supporters permitted access to the most prominent leaders, provide an insight into the 
period's events and ideological developments that no other sources provide. In this 
regard, it is an invaluable source. As Ruth Watson notes, a good diary not only 
enables 
 
the detailed reconstruction of an individual life, it also illuminates the lives of 
people with whom the diary writer interacted. A richly detailed diary sustained 
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over a long period can reveal a cultural and social world, enabling the 
biographer to write a history of much more than just one person.54 
 
Reed's diaries afford just that ability and are thus utilised at length. Yet a reliance on 
the diary of a single person is not without issue. Reed is a compelling writer (a 
consequence of his literary profession) but he is also an individual recording events 
from his own perspective. Throughout his time in Rhodesia, Reed struggled with 
difficult issues like his own sexuality, periods of depression, serious disagreements 
with friends and colleagues, doubts over his contributions to the African struggle, 
and the pervasive threat of imprisonment for his actions and political views. His 
vivid accounts often overshadow the fact that he was fundamentally a man trying to 
survive in a society where he felt an outcast and thus desperately sought belonging 
through other means, such as his political activities. All of this impacts upon the 
content of the diaries themselves.  
 In her work on African colonial diaries, Ruth Watson asks: 'central to using 
diaries as historical sources, but often ignored, is the question of audience. Who 
reads diaries and for whom are they written?'55 With Reed this is never clear. At 
times it appears that he views the diaries as a deeply personal endeavour, a means of 
facilitating his own mental stability, admitting he finds it difficult to recall even the 
preceding day's events if they were not recorded on paper. Occasionally he seems to 
acknowledge some unspecified future reader. In June 1961, he wrote: 'this diary is 
full of lies. Slack habits of thought. Evasion. Fatigue. Perhaps I ought to go through 
and cross out in red ink everything that I know is false, or which is a deliberate under 
or overstatement, designed to mislead.'56 Reed was writing for a purpose (to record 
his existence at each moment of his life) and as comparisons with other accounts of 
the period indicate, he was far from infallible.  
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55 Ibid., p.816. See also Jocelyn Alexander, 'Political Prisoners' Memoirs in Zimbabwe: 
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 Despite these thoughts of editorialisation, Reed never did follow through, 
leaving the diaries almost entirely untouched.57 The only obvious edits are seen in 
the self-censoring of the names of romantic interests or of individuals involved with 
the more elicit parts of the African struggle; likely a response to the risks Reed noted 
he was taking in keeping the diaries, particularly during times of heightened police 
interest in the Rhodesian white radicals. Twice (in 1959 and in 1963), Reed admitted 
that the Rhodesian intelligence services would almost certainly be reading his entries 
at some point in the future and wryly noted their potential reactions to the content.58 
Nevertheless he kept writing. In the ten years of diaries examined for this thesis, 
Reed deliberately stopped only once, for similar fears of discovery. He lasted less 
than a month before beginning again to record his daily life, noting when he did that: 
'the habits of a lifetime are hard to break, even though I risk trouble through them 
being found.'59 
 One means of countering the restrictions of Reed's diaries is to compliment 
them with carefully selected other sources from a variety of perspectives and origins. 
The majority of those surveyed are primary archival sources created during the 
period under examination. Some of the archives like the Ian Smith cabinet papers or 
documents from the Southern Rhodesia Ministry of Information provide the 
Rhodesian state's perspective on the nationalist movement. Others were created by 
the nationalists or the non-black radicals themselves, including correspondence 
between and within the nationalist leaders and non-black radicals. South African and 
Rhodesian newspapers provide a valuable source for ascertaining the salience and the 
general public's attitude to events. Newspapers not only provide the information from 
which the general public make their opinions, but also decide which topics will 
become prioritised amongst the public agenda. As Maxwell McCombs explains, 
‘through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, editors and news 
                                               
57 As bound books, missing pages would be easily noticed, and the misspellings and crossed 
out words show these were first drafts and not transcribed copies. 
58 Reed, 'Tuesday 8 May 1959', Diary, Vol.79; and Reed, 'Friday 12 November 1963', Diary, 
Vol.90 
59 Reed, 'Monday 4 April 1966', Diary, Vol.102 
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directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most 
important issues of the day.’60 Newspapers, however, also have a dialectical 
relationship between with society which permits conclusions to be drawn regarding 
the public opinion on a salient issue and providing context for the debates around 
race and citizenship.61 
 Alongside Reed's diaries, archival documents, and newspapers, the next 
largest set of sources surveyed were autobiographies and memoirs produced by the 
primary actors involved in Zimbabwean nationalism during these early years. Non-
black radicals like Peter Mackay, Fay Chung, Terence Ranger, and Guy Clutton-
Brock, and black nationalists including Joshua Nkomo, George Nyandoro, James 
Chikerema, Enoch Dumbutshena, and others, have all produced accounts of the 
period ex post facto. Most explicitly or implicitly articulate how these individuals 
and others articulated racial thinking within the nationalist movement, as well as 
documenting the events that occurred. Taken in corroboration with the archival 
sources, the personalised nature of autobiographies, memoirs, and interviews provide 
an invaluable insight into how ideas of race and racialism were created on an 
individual level and the realities of integrating these themes into Zimbabwean 
nationalist ideology. They are also a unique standpoint from which to understand the 
memory of specific topics from different perspectives, shaping the 'ways in which 
African's socio-cultural history [and] trans-cultural memory [...] are produced, 
perceived and consumed.'62 As a combination of fact, fiction, history and narrative, 
autobiographies becomes a representation of an individual's story as well as one facet 
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61 John E. Richardson, Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse 
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of the broader community within which the author existed.63 Questions of legitimacy 
and appeals for recognition were bolstered through autobiographical works by those 
outside of the dominant authoritative positions, such as former ZAPU leaders. 
Autobiographies by ordinary nationalists such as Joshua Mpofu or Phinias-Mogorosi 
Makhurane also provide an opportunity to present an alternative historical narrative 
to the 'official' one, as authorised and created by the state and its ruling elite.64 
 One notable point about these sources is that they were mostly generated by 
elites and consequently have both strengths and weaknesses due to this focus.65The 
most glaring weakness is the significance attached to the non-black radicals 
themselves. Most ordinary black nationalists had little interaction with non-black 
supporters. When the white radicals John Reed and Terence Ranger attended a 
nationalist rally in January 1961, they were heckled by the African crowd who 
refused to believe they were members of the nationalist party.66 Meanwhile, the 
nationalist leadership socialised with non-black radicals on a regular basis, and were 
often on first name terms. This disconnect means that the influence of the non-black 
radicals on the movement as a whole is inflated. 
 In order to rectify this elite focus somewhat, I conducted targeted interviews a 
range of individuals including black nationalist supporters, non-black radicals, and 
white Rhodesian liberals, moderates, and conservatives active between 1957 and 
1966. These interviews took the form of semi-formal conversations, structured in 
part with important questions, but left largely to develop as the informant sees fit. In 
doing so, it made it possible for nuances of the topic to be revealed without 
unnecessary direction and permitted the interviewee to speak more freely than an 
                                               
63 Melissa Levin & Laurice Taitz, 'Fictional Autobiographies or Autobiographical Fictions?' 
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intensely structured interview would allow. These interviews, combined with 
previously unexplored primary sources, provided the bedrock of this research, and it 
is upon their foundations that the other primary sources and secondary literature are 
situated.  
 
Thesis Layout 
 
The thesis takes a narrative approach, tracing the evolution of racial and nationalist 
thinking in the specific moments in Zimbabwe's history. The use of a narrative 
foundation is intrinsic to the research itself.67 Narrative has an explanatory power and 
is particularly important in understanding the fluid nature of Zimbabwean 
nationalism during this period. A narrative approach provides the best framework for 
an analysis of the concepts as well as the actors, and ensures that the debates and 
actions of individuals and groups are situated properly. As Frederick Cooper 
succinctly put it in his remarkable study of citizenship in French Africa:  
 
Because one can take for granted neither continuity nor change in any actor's 
way of thinking and arguing, I have brought out certain arguments that recur 
consistently as well as those that shift, incrementally or sharply. [...] We can 
easily miss the kinds of approaches that political actors were pursuing. We 
know some turned into dead ends; the people involved did not.68 
 
It is impossible to trace in full every actor present and every event the occurred 
during even the short period surveyed by this thesis. A narrative approach permits 
the use of examples to represent the main themes expressed by the individuals and 
the movement as a whole without being teleological in the analysis. Many significant 
events in the history of Zimbabwean nationalism are diminished or passed over in 
favour of others and the same applies to individual actors. Yet the overall picture is 
stronger because of the strength of the specific examples selected. 
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 The thesis is divided into six chronological chapters. The first chapter 
explores the origins of Zimbabwean nationalism in the pre-1957 socio-political 
landscape of colonial Zimbabwe. It focuses on four preconditions which prove 
influential in understanding the nationalist leaders’ conceptions of race, nationalism, 
and citizenship in later years: childhood influences, the role of education, the multi-
racial liberalism of the 1950s, and finally the localised African political protest 
groups that preceded the SRANC. The emergence of a national African political 
movement in September 1957 was just one possible culmination of a long and 
uncertain socio-political development and it is crucial to recognise that the SRANC's 
policies did not form in a vacuum but were formed from a multitude of precursor 
groups and organisations. 
 The period surrounding the formation of the SRANC forms the basis of 
chapter two. The role of non-black supporters during these early days was significant 
but there remained an overlap between liberals and radicals that makes the clear 
distinctions of the 1960s between such groups more difficult to state. The conflict 
within the early nationalist movement over the role of non-blacks in the struggle and 
in the imagined Zimbabwean nation are also explored, and concepts of race and 
'blackness' provide much of the fuel for these arguments. The chapter traces the rise 
and fall of the SRANC in the face of a restrictive white government, and the impact 
this repression had on the racial nature of the struggle as it developed. 
 The third chapter focuses on the disorganisation that came to define the 
SRANC's successors, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Zimbabwe 
African Peoples Union (ZAPU), and the contradictions between words and actions 
that enveloped their attitudes to race and citizenship. Differences between the 
leadership and the ordinary members became increasingly apparent, particularly in 
the reception given to non-black supporters during times of unrest. The NDP and 
ZAPU were arguably the most successful of the nationalist parties during this period 
of 'open nationalism' but they were also the first to suffer from vocal elements calling 
for an anti-white form of nationalism. The legacy of these sentiments would persist 
in the following years as the white state's increasingly repressive actions made clear 
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that racial cooperation needed serious reassessment to achieve the goal of majority 
rule. 
 Chapter four examines the attitudes and experiences of the predominantly 
Salisbury-based non-black nationalists in the wake of ZAPU's banning. The 
continuing role of the UCRN as an arena for these vocal and prominent members of 
the struggle against the white state is also investigated. The internal strife amongst 
the black Zimbabwean nationalists during 1963 is shown to generate a significant 
discussion with regards to their stance on non-racialism and race within the struggle, 
at even the most elite levels. The rise of the Rhodesian Front (RF) and its 
increasingly intolerant stance towards those few who assisted the nationalists in their 
still largely non-violent fight provides the backdrop to this chapter. 
 Following on from that period, the penultimate chapter focuses on the 
escalation of violence by the nationalists and the white state in 1964. This shift 
provides a key component in understanding why identities of race became 
increasingly dominant in discussion of nationhood and citizenship. The resurgence of 
racial segregation in Rhodesian society combined with a clear division between the 
racial groups' political ideologies in the nation, made for a challenging situation for 
non-black radicals. Furthermore, as a popular cultural nationalism made itself felt, 
black identity politics became increasingly dominant within the Zimbabwean 
nationalist rhetoric at the expense of non-racial ideals. Yet until this point, the non-
black radicals had remained largely uninvolved with the violent side of the struggle. 
 The final chapter explores how and why the activities of the non-black 
supporters changed during 1965. Uncertainty is the key theme underpinning this 
discussion. The fractured conceptions of race and Zimbabwean nationalism, not only 
between ZANU and ZAPU but within the parties themselves, led to conflicting 
understandings for the place of non-black radicals within the newly radicalised 
nationalist movements. The strengthening of the white state around the issue of 
majority rule and independence from Britain (which resulted in the UDI of 
November 1965) is also examined for the impact it had on the white radicals into. 
The chapter and the thesis conclude with the declaration of UDI by the RF 
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government; an event which marked the end of peaceful non-black radicalism within 
the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. 
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Chapter 1 
Alternative Trajectories: the context for race in 
Zimbabwean nationalism, c.1890-1957 
 
Introduction 
 
Given the strength of nationalist thinking in Zimbabwe's politics since 1957, it is 
difficult to envision a situation in which a black-consciousness nationalism did not 
become the paramount political ideology of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe. 
Yet at no point during the early years of organised African political opposition was it 
inevitable that the Zimbabwean anti-colonial movement would come to be 
represented by a group of African elites espousing a nationalist agenda. The 
emergence of the nationalist Southern Rhodesian African National Congress 
(SRANC) in 1957 instead of one of the competing ideologies was dependent upon a 
unique set of precipitants. Trying to explain why mass Zimbabwean nationalism 
emerged when and in the form it did involves assessing these many precursory 
elements, as several scholars have already done.1 All highlight the role of the 
multiple preceding movements and their collective impact on the development of a 
political nationalist ideology. The summary from this literature is best explained by 
Alois Mlambo. 
 
While towards the end of the period an African political consensus eventually 
emerged, initially the anti-colonial struggle took different and sometimes 
conflicting forms, as each social grouping – alien and indigenous urban 
                                               
1 See Alexander, McGregor, & Ranger, Violence and Memory: Kriger, Zimbabwe's Guerrilla 
War: and Scarnecchia, Urban Roots 
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workers, the rural population, the emerging middle class – sought to advance 
its own interests.2 
 
 The influence of competing claims also applies to the concept of racial thinking. 
Race is an incredibly complex concept and it is especially difficult to explain how 
the formation of racial ideas takes place given the wide variety of factors that go into 
the construction of personal beliefs. It is even more difficult in the Zimbabwean case 
where few sources exist that specifically record the understandings of a racial 
concept by black Africans during the first half of the twentieth century. The limited 
academic work dealing with this subject is highly problematic. Vernon Johnson, for 
example, argues that there was no racial consciousness amongst black Africans in 
Zimbabwe prior to 1923, and only a limited comprehension of a racial identity prior 
to 1957. Yet he cites little evidence to back up these claims, using black nationalism 
as the sole indicator of racial thinking and describing the existing social sentiments 
as 'ethnically' based (i.e. revolving around Shona or Ndebele identities).3 This 
argument deliberately relegates to inconsequential positions all other articulations of 
racial consciousness during the pre-1957 colonial era that were not based in a 
nationalist ideology. As with the pre-SRANC basis of Zimbabwean nationalist 
thinking, the black consciousness element of post-1950s nationalism had its 
foundations in earlier groups and doctrines and it is crucial to understand not only 
why but how racial abstractions developed in response to these earlier conceptions. 
 This first chapter therefore tackles both nationalist thinking and racial 
formation prior to the formation of the SRANC in 1957. It highlights the ways in 
which four specific precursory influences defined the specific ideas contained within 
mass Zimbabwean nationalism and the movement's leadership. Part one examines 
the impact of mission school education on the attitudes of those raised within it. It 
                                               
2 Alois S. Mlambo, 'From the Second World War to UDI, 1940-1965', in Brian Raftopoulos, 
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addresses the influence of white missionaries on the social and political conceptions 
of race for those young black Africans who would become significant actors in the 
nationalist political movement. The second section explores how these views on race 
were subsequently shaped by further education or work abroad in South Africa, 
Europe, or the USA, and the ramifications that a non-Rhodesian environment had on 
the burgeoning African elite's mindset and actions as they returned to Rhodesia in the 
1940s and 1950s. 
 The final two parts detail the socio-political environment in Rhodesia during 
the entry of these elites into politics. They highlight the importance of racial attitudes 
in explaining the decisions of politically conscious Africans to participate either in 
white liberal multi-racial organisations, localised African political protest groups, or 
(occasionally) both. Neither the influences of multi-racialism nor those of African 
protests can be properly understood without reference to each other. Despite them 
often being afforded widely different places in the narrative of Zimbabwe's liberation 
struggle (the former as a part of what Hardwicke Holderness called the failed 'liberal 
effort'4, the latter within Misheck Sibanda's 'foundations of mass nationalism'5), both 
are equally important in explaining the attitudes to race that dominated the SRANC 
and its successors. Multi-racialism as an idea existed largely as a reactionary balance 
to the actions and demands of the African organisations which had sprung up since 
the turn of the century, including both trade unions and local representation or protest 
groups.6 Consequently they are considered in tandem as two-aspects of the same 
narrative. 
  
i. The Role of Childhood: parents, mission schools, and missionaries 
 
                                               
4 Hardwicke Holderness, Lost Chance: Southern Rhodesia 1945-58 (Harare, 1985), p.6 
5 Misheck J. Sibanda, 'Early Foundations of African Nationalism', in Canaan Banana, ed., 
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Robert Cary and Diana Mitchell have examined in detail the early lives and 
education of most of the nationalist leaders,7 and there emerge a number of common 
experiences that emphasise the importance of childhood on the development of a 
nationalist ideology amongst these leaders.8 According to the American Quaker 
George Loft who assisted detained nationalists in 1959, two factors distinguished the 
elites from ordinary black Africans: 'their relatively younger age, averaging thirty-
three and a half years' and that 'their primary education had been confined to their 
home colony's missionary schools, with high school in South Africa.'9 Scholarship 
has highlighted the importance of childhood in the development of racial thinking, 
and the ways in which many of the future Zimbabwean nationalists came to regard 
race and the concept of national belonging and citizenship is apparent from these 
individual's own accounts, including several specific themes.10 
 First, there are repeated assertions of an inherited social awareness relating to 
the manner of Rhodesia's colonisation in the 1890s. Many nationalist leaders situate 
their adolescent political awakening within the framework of a colonised people's 
mentality. In what Hayden White describes as the need 'to fashion the sequence of 
events into a story of a particular kind', the African nationalist leaders employed their 
social histories as oppressed people to produce a 'formist tragedy', justifying their 
own understandings of racial identities through the narrative of Rhodesia's creation.11 
The influence of Terence Ranger's early work undoubtedly played a part in setting 
this agenda, arguing as it did that the mid-twentieth century African struggles were a 
                                               
7 Robert Cary & Diana Mitchell, eds., African Nationalist Leaders in Rhodesia: Who's Who 
(Bulawayo, 1977) 
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continuation of the primary resistance movements of the 1890s.12 Many of the 
African nationalist leaders were well aware of Ranger's work, as it was undertaken 
with the objective of providing the nationalist movements of the 1960s with a 
tangible and usable historical footing, and particularly given Ranger's interactions 
with the nationalist elites after 1957.13 Nevertheless, accounts from the early 1960s 
(well before the publication of Ranger's work) contend that there were Africans 
already using their history as justification for the racial and political beliefs.14 For 
instance, the Canadian journalist Patrick Keatley wrote in 1963 that 'politically 
conscious' Africans are 'hungry today for history, one may even say ravenous. Call it 
self-defence, pride, or what you please; it is none the less a hard political fact.'15 In 
the absence of an established academic framework, they turned to their personal or 
familial histories to provide this information. 
 The decision to frame their motivations as part of the narrative of a colonised 
people was a deliberate one by the nationalist leadership. It reflected both a desire to 
justify their actions during the time of activity, but also a deliberate ex post facto 
construction of a collective memory brought about by later events. Highlighting the 
connection between the primary resistance movements of the 1890s and their politics 
half-a-century later provides what Michel Foucault terms a 'countermemory', in this 
case to the dominant narrative peddled by the white Rhodesian state.16 Thus when 
Joshua Nkomo used his autobiography (published in 1984) to explain his attitude to 
white Rhodesians, he was situating his beliefs in a broader context. 'These were the 
pale people, the Europeans, Amakhiwa. I understood almost without being told that 
                                               
12 See Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia: & Terence Ranger, 'Connexions between 
"Primary Resistance" Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa: 
I & II', Journal of African History, Vol.9 (1968), pp.437-453, & 631-41 
13 See Terence Ranger, Writing Revolt: An Engagement with African Nationalism, 1957-67 
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14 See Sithole, African Nationalism, pp.156-159 
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(Harmondsworth, 1963), p.58 
16 See Michel Foucault & Gilles Deleuze, 'Intellectuals and Power', in D.F. Bouchard, ed., 
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they had taken something from us. Later I discovered that what they had taken was 
our country,' he wrote.17 Apart from the association between skin colour ('pale 
people') and national belonging, the immediate ascription of the white colonisation 
being the loss of a 'country' as opposed to the land itself, served to tie racial 
belonging to a non-historical nation. Alois Mlambo describes the pre-colonial 
Zimbabwe region as 'not yet a nation in the sense of unified political, economic and 
cultural unit consisting of people who all shared a common history and values',18 yet 
that did not prevent a retroactive creation of a unified pre-colonial Zimbabwean 
nation by the nationalist leadership and academics like Terence Ranger. More 
importantly, this nation had been one of black Africans, thus Rhodesia as it existed 
was a country debased by the white settlers. As Saul Dubow shows in his study of 
segregation in South Africa and Jocelyn Alexander demonstrates in the Zimbabwean 
context, the relationship between national understandings of belonging and racial 
identities are routinely emphasised through the ownership of land itself.19 Claims to 
the land thus became an important element of the racial formation and national 
consciousness that Zimbabwean nationalism would later embrace. 
  Considering the 'specifics of the language used', it is important to examine 
why Zimbabwean nationalism was tied to the earliest days of childhood for the 
nationalist leaders.20 The majority of the elites were from the first generation of black 
Africans to have been born after the white settlers had consolidated their control of 
the region. All of the SRANC's 1957 executive were born between 1910 and 1935 
and their knowledge of the colonisation process was subsequently derived from older 
immediate family who could recall the pre-colonial situation and contrast it to life 
under white rule. The new generation of African leaders consequently attempted to 
connect their own struggles against white rules with those of their ancestors who had 
                                               
17 Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (London, 1984), p.16 
18 Alois Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe (Cambridge, 2014), p.29 
19 See Saul Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-
1936 (London, 1989); and Alexander, The Unsettled Land 
20 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New 
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been involved in the primary resistance efforts. This was a means of buttressing their 
own claims to legitimacy in what Joost Fontein terms a 'performance of the past.'21 
These elites were born into a world where the state was clearly delineated along 
racial lines but were exposed to older generations with memories of primary 
resistance movements. The younger generations utilised these narratives as a means 
of justifying challenges to the current status-quo. Joshua Mpofu (a ZAPU branch 
leader and one of the first leaders of ZAPU's militant groups in 1963) opens his own 
autobiography with exactly this argument: 
 
I have to start off with mentions of my parents, because it was owing to their 
influence that I internalized some of the fundamentals of how my country was 
colonized by Europeans. [...] My father witnessed, and got bruised running 
away from the very first (1893) European invading army that overran his 
country when he was young, and resulted in the demise of African rule 
overnight.22 
 
Again the mention of a pre-colonial country and references to forceful seizure of the 
nation emphasise the subjugation attached to the black African identity. Moreover, 
the fundamental changes in the ruling authorities emphasised to young Africans how 
society had changed more broadly with colonial rule. This included the belief that to 
succeed in white Rhodesian society required obtaining an 'upward mobility' through 
religion, education, domesticity, and other cultural traits stemming from the society 
of the colonial state.23 Frantz Fanon's theories on the external construction of 
identities for racially oppressed groups is crucial to this belief. Black men and 
women defined their race not through their own understandings, but through the 
definitions forced upon them by white settlers and rulers.24 Justification for the 
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adoption of western cultural traits by the African elites were thus registered long 
before their entry into either the mission schools or places of higher education. 
Discussing his father's enrolment in a mission school around 1900 and the 'new 
transformative institutions that emerged', Joshua Mpofu notes '[my father] was 
scarcely aware that the "new" life he had experienced would pass to his offspring as 
a mixed bag.'25 
 The themes of parental influence and first-hand experiences of racial 
discrimination against themselves or their families are the second principal tropes 
raised by nationalist leaders to explain their beliefs. In contrast to the colonisation 
stories of the 1890s which were distant and derivative accounts of how the racial 
situation in Rhodesia had arisen, personal encounters with discrimination acted as a 
more immediate stimulant. The affairs were exaggerated by the distinct lack of 
regular contact between rural black Africans and the white Rhodesian population, 
ensuring any interactions were keenly remembered. As Joshua Nkomo explained, 'in 
the reserves we very rarely saw a white man,'26 and furthermore those interactions 
that the future leadership did see were viewed through the lens of their childhood. As 
children, they witnessed but were not necessarily part of the interactions with white 
Rhodesians and they therefore watched their familial authority figures bearing the 
brunt of the discrimination. In the highly-patriarchal Shona and Ndebele cultures in 
which the fathers particularly played a significant role,27 seeing their male family 
members mistreated and discriminated against at the hands of white Rhodesians had 
a profound impact on the psyche of young black Africans and their understanding of 
how race tied into their place in the Rhodesian nation. Stanley Parirewa (a key figure 
in the early nationalist movements) revealed that 'it was an unpleasant experience at 
the hands of White authority which his father suffered in the late thirties, that made 
him [Parirewa] conscious of the deeply discriminatory laws affecting his people, and 
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26 Nkomo, The Story of My Life, p.18 
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of the need to change them.'28 Joshua Nkomo similarly recalled that observing white 
native commissioners disrespectfully addressing his father provided: 'one big lesson. 
There was something upside down in my country.'29 
 The 'traditional political office holders' in African society found their 
influence diminished in the new racial hierarchy,30 and it is significant that many of 
the nationalist leaders had older family members who shared dissatisfaction with the 
situation. The political beliefs of senior figures within the family could often 
influence the child's own thinking.31 Didymus Mutasa talked of his father explaining 
to him what a 'waste of time' it was to seek redress for the humiliation black Africans 
received at the hands of the whites, particularly when 'the accused will be the judge.' 
As Mutasa recalled:  
 
You know what the judgement will be. I knew this feeling hurt my father as 
much as it hurt me. I was only eleven years old when this happened in 1946. 
Feelings affect both the young and the old.32 
 
Such interactions infantilised black Africans, argues Juliette Bridgette Milner-
Thornton, meaning 'Africans viewed themselves through the lens of their white 
colonial masters, and thus perceived their blackness as inferior to whiteness' from an 
early age.33It is this hierarchy which Frantz Fanon highlights as being the 
fundamental issue behind anti-colonial nationalism for all oppressed racial groups.34 
 The segregated Rhodesian school system reinforced the non-white children's 
understandings of the racially-discriminatory society. Underfunded and overcrowded 
African schools were visible contrasts to the well-appointed white schools. Agrippah 
Mutambara (a senior ZANLA commander during the liberation struggle) described 
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an incident as a child outside the white Bindura School: 'I began questioning myself 
as to why there should be no black children studying at this school, and no black 
teachers either.'35 As these individuals became parents themselves, they found their 
views on segregated education become of pressing importance. Referring to his 
literary representative for Rhodesia's black African population, Ndabaningi Sithole 
argued that Obed Mutezo's 'politics do not spring from the study of any textbooks. 
They spring from down-to-earth situations. [...] They spring from the shortage of 
schools for African children while European children have universal education.'36 
 For those minority groups whose place in the racialised Rhodesian society 
was already precarious, the institution of schooling further exacerbated their 
uncertain status. The coloured, Asian, and Indian communities were particularly 
susceptible given their already uneasy claims to Rhodesian citizenship and Brian 
Raftopoulos explains the role the school system had on racial formation. 
 
Originally, many coloureds lived with Africans. They lived as Africans. It was 
the deliberate policy of this government to take children of mixed race and put 
them in separate schools, even taking them out of the villages, and imposing 
this term "coloured".37 
 
The impact of this external categorisation would persist into the long-term. The 
students themselves were made acutely aware of the significance of their racial 
identity in defining their membership to the Rhodesian state, building upon the early 
childhood recognitions provided through social exposure. Fay Chung (a Chinese-
Zimbabwean teacher for ZANU during the liberation war) recalled the headmaster at 
her primary school in the 1940s '[drumming] into our heads form the earliest grades 
that since we were not whites, we would only make our way in the world through 
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education.'38 This mantra was one adopted by a number of the young black Africans 
during their primary education. 
 A vast majority of the nationalist leadership received their primary education 
in mission schools, often at the hands of moderately-liberal (and often expatriate) 
white missionaries. Of those nationalist leaders whose details are recorded by Cary 
and Mitchell, 55 of the 77 spent all or part of their education at mission schools, yet 
the range of the nationalities and denominations of these missions make it difficult to 
generalise about the specific politics imbued through such environments.39 Carol 
Summers explains in her work on African education in Southern Rhodesia that there 
was little homogeneity within the African education experience as a whole, and even 
less within the mission schools where 'multiparty competition' caused huge 
discrepancies in teaching methods and results.40 Whereas in rural areas there was 
often little choice about the schooling available (many mission schools catered to 
catchments covering hundreds of square miles), when there were options the mission 
schools were still regularly regarded as being the better education. Fay Chung 
recalled her parents' decision to remove her from a government school and send her 
to St. John's School, 'a well-known Roman Catholic school for Coloureds', on the 
basis that her 'father had great faith in the nuns, and believed they had special powers 
to improve a person's character and morality. [...] He was not very confident that a 
government school like Founders would provide the right moral background.'41 
 Although debates persist about the extent to which mission school education 
contributed to the advancement of African political aspirations,42 Fabulous Moyo has 
suggested that '[mission] education indirectly promoted, rather than hindered 
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Africans' efforts for socio-political advancement.' In particular Moyo points to the 
'other philanthropic church channels such as individual missionaries' for their role in 
educating the future nationalist leaders.43 The presence of a multi-racial teaching 
staff has been discussed by the nationalists themselves as being an important part of 
their political development, and almost every nationalist leader recounts how they 
were influenced to some extent by their mission educations. Daniel Madzimbamuto 
was a prominent nationalist in the Highfield township and credited 'his early 
grounding in politics [as coming] from a teacher at Mrewa Mission in 1947.'44 
Killion Bhebe (later the ANC's Organising Secretary for Mashonaland) pointed to 
'political discussion with several of his teachers (including two American 
missionaries, Miss Collin and Miss Walen)' at Gwelo Mission as the key factor in his 
political awakening.45 These formative experiences with white liberal missionaries 
made a lasting impression on the young black African elites.  
 As well as contributing to the development of their racial and national 
thinking, the education provided by missionaries influenced the young Africans 
understanding of their place in Rhodesian society. Referring to J.F.A. Ade Ajayi's 
work in Nigeria and Ranger's on Rhodesia, Ademola Adeleke argues that the 
influence of white missionaries on the development of an African nationalism was 
equal to the influence of African primary resistance movements. As Adeleke 
explains: 
 
The educated African was a product of [...] the social "revolution" initiated by 
the Christian missions in the nineteenth century. The missionaries introduced 
European ideas of nation-building; they also educated the Africans who 
imbibed these ideas. [...] The rise of this [elite] class of Africans is, in the 
author's view, the greatest contribution of the missions to African 
nationalism.46 
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The social connections and position of these African elites afforded by a missionary 
education were consolidated through personal relationships with white liberals. Anna 
Weinrich argues that 'the missions' contribution to African education, which results 
in personal ties of friendship between many members of the emergent African elite 
and missionaries, is a major factor contributing to the understanding between 
missionaries and Africans'.47 Apart from the ideological associations, there was often 
a personal connection that carried over the racial divisions of Rhodesian society and 
it is notable that a number of the white supporters of African nationalism in 
Zimbabwe were missionaries. When the African nationalist politician and intellectual 
Ndabaningi Sithole formed the breakaway party ZANU in 1963, he turned to his 
former mission school teacher (and ousted Rhodesian Prime Minister) Garfield Todd 
to act as an intermediary with other nationalists, principally because Sithole 
personally trusted Todd.48 
 The fundamental religious influence of mission schools was also crucial in 
shaping the national and racial thinking of black Africans. Important creeds 
contained within the Christian faith translated into community values, social beliefs, 
and political action, and challenged the dominant Rhodesian racial narratives 
presented.49 'It is virtually impossible to reconcile the Christian ideals of self-worth, 
human development, liberation, service to others, and a willingness for personal 
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sacrifice, with the injustice and exploitation which prevails in South African society,' 
explained the South African Council of Churches,50 and the same applied in 
Rhodesia. David Lan argues that black Africans in Rhodesia typically assessed social 
and political debates 'through the lens of their own worldviews',51 and Munyaradzi 
Munochiveyi suggests that this perspective consequently manifested itself through a 
Christian framework.52 The nationalist leaders were similarly affected. 'Christianity 
made an indelible imprint upon them [the nationalist leaders], and through their 
instrumentality, upon many others,' summarises Nathan Goto.53  
Assistance from the Catholic Church, and from individual mission stations 
during the liberation war, also proved to be important in the struggle against the 
white state.54 Although there was a resurgence of traditional African belief systems 
(including spirit mediums) as a response to the anti-white and pro-black identity 
nationalism of the 1970s,55 Christianity remained the spiritual lingua franca that 
united black Zimbabweans in their struggle. Furthermore, the radical progressive 
Christianity of individual missionaries facilitated an alternative dimension to the 
conceptions of the African's place in a colonial system. David Maxwell's work on 
Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe highlighted this Christian influence on African social 
organisations, as he explains in relation to the emergence of the Zimbabwe 
Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA):  
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ZAOGA’s trajectory is not easily captured by the meta-narratives of class and 
nationalism, although both of these forces shaped its development. Emerging 
from Zimbabwean townships in the 1950s and 1960s it had no formal relation 
with the nationalist movement. It followed a different path, which focused its 
adherents’ energies on transforming themselves, and their families, rather than 
the nation.56 
 
Yet this religious focus was not always positive and mission schools were often 
criticised for their educational policies. In his study of black nationalism in South 
Africa, George Frederickson notes that early African elites 'were too deeply imbued 
with the cosmopolitanism and universalism that they had learned in mission schools, 
at Fort Hare Native College, or from their association with white liberals and radicals 
to become whole-hearted and consistent Africanists.'57 The outspoken American 
missionary, Ralph Dodge, similarly argued that 'the major blind spot of the total 
missionary program in Africa may well be the failure of white leaders to foresee the 
approaching rebellion and to train nationals for administrative responsibility.'58 
Nathan Goto expands upon Dodge's cautionary warnings:  
 
The conspicuous missionary presence in the primary decision making 
processes impeded the development of top level African leadership. The 
organization pyramid created no space for capable, intelligent Africans. [...] 
Instead of teaching the African students to think independently and to develop 
fully as human beings, much of the curriculum, especially the religious 
elements, trained the African to be obedient. The African was trained to be a 
dependent person, mainly satisfied with pittance handouts. Initiative, 
resourcefulness, and self-help were discouraged.59 
 
Furthermore, the foreignness of missionaries to African society alienated them, 
despite 'often consciously identifying themselves with the African people'. As Anna 
Weinrich explains, missionaries 'do not normally meet socially with Africans who 
possess very little education and whose cultural environment is very different from 
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that of Europeans'.60 Ruramisai Charumbira summarises this alienation by 
contending that missionaries did not feel it was their 'place to challenge the colonial 
government's race-based policies and laws,'61 despite their distaste for them. Whilst 
some missionaries were actually overtly hostile to black Zimbabwean nationalist 
thinking, particularly during the earliest years,62 even moderately liberal ones found 
their own white congregations likely to criticise any 'untoward' behaviour.63 
 This division often led to fundamental disagreements between the politics of 
white missionaries and their black students. Didymus Mutasa recalled writing an 
essay as a schoolboy on 'good citizenship' in which he highlighted the racial division 
of society in Rhodesia and for which he was punished by white mission-school 
headmaster. 'Being European, the Principal could never appreciate how I, as an 
African, felt about such citizenship,' Mutasa explained.64 Such alienation would have 
a lasting legacy on the mindsets of the African nationalists and provided the 
foundation on which their expressions of political discontent could be built.  
 
ii. High School and University: Transnational Political Awakenings 
 
Access to secondary education within Southern Rhodesia was highly restrictive for 
non-white students. Only two government and one mission secondary schools for 
black Africans existed in Rhodesia in 1957.65 The Rhodesian state preferred 
channelling smart black Africans towards industrial or teacher training schools and 
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then into established labour roles such as clerks or teachers.66 There was an inherent 
contradiction in how young aspiring black Africans were treated by the white state. 
On the one hand, the paternalism of white Rhodesians recognised that a small group 
of African elites would be necessary to protect white prosperity. The author Doris 
Lessing recalled as a young girl in the 1930s hearing Godfrey Huggins (the 
Rhodesian Prime Minister) tell a meeting of farmers 'that the white people must 
create a class of privileged blacks to act as a bulwark against revolt.'67 On the other 
hand, the racialism of white settlers throughout southern Africa maintained that black 
Africans lacked the capacity to rise beyond a working class, and that to encourage 
them would threaten poor white livelihoods. 'There is no place for the Bantu in the 
European community above the level of certain forms of labour,' argued Hendrik 
Verwoerd (South Africa's Minister of Native Affairs) in 1955.68 Consequently, well-
educated black Africans remained relatively rare in colonial Zimbabwe for a long 
time with Michael West noting that as late as 1965, less than a thousand black adults 
in Rhodesia held college degrees.69 
 The restrictive nature of further education in Rhodesia meant young, aspirant 
black Africans typically had to look abroad, mainly to South Africa. Driven by their 
understanding of Rhodesia as a white-dominated nation, many of the emergent 
African elites saw education as necessary for their success in Rhodesian society. 
'Those men [the elites and intellectuals] and their education levels are important, 
because most of them later used their access to Western education to turn toward the 
African past,' summarises Ruramisai Charumbira.70 Nobody espoused the typical 
story of this transnational (and multifaceted) education more than the 'father of 
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nationalism in Zimbabwe', Joshua Nkomo.71 After a primary education in Rhodesia, 
Nkomo studied at Adams College in Durban, South Africa, one of several 
institutions for higher education in South Africa that brought together young 
Africans from across southern and central Africa in a truly transnational 
environment. Amongst its alumni, Adams College counted the Zimbabwean 
nationalists Joshua Nkomo, Enoch Dumbutshena, Matthew Wakatama, Stephen 
Parirenyatwa, Herbert Chitepo, Paul Moton Malianga, and Stanlake Samkange,72 as 
well as the South Africans Edgar Brookes, Z.K. Matthews, and Albert J. Luthuli (a 
Nobel laureate),73 and a number of others from Malawi, Zambia, and Botswana. 
Under the guidance of outspoken teachers such as George Copeland "Jack" Grant 
(the Trinidad-born British missionary and famous cricketer)74, these young Africans 
formed friendships and shared ideas that persisted well after they had moved on to 
further occupations.75 
 It was at Adams College that Nkomo found his understanding of race and 
African politics broadening. As Nkomo recalled:  
 
Since it drew students from all over central and east Africa, I got to know 
people from other countries, as well as facts about those countries. Yet I do not 
think any lesson was so important as the one Mrs. Hoskin [a white clerk at the 
school] taught me: that white people too were human beings, if you could 
somehow get through the barriers that society erected to stop us being 
friends.76 
 
When Nkomo continued his studies at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Science in 
Johannesburg, it was the same Mrs. Hoskin who paid his fees and supported him 
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through his studies.77 Having grown up regarding the racial divisions in colonial 
southern Africa as insurmountable, these compassionate actions by a member of the 
ruling racial group challenged personal beliefs. As with many other nationalist 
leaders, it was early experiences like this which proved highly influential in shaping 
the racial views they espoused in their politics.  
  Other academic institutions in South Africa also proved crucial in the 
political development of young black Africans, none more so than Fort Hare 
University College. Described as 'the Mecca of the lucky and talented black 
students', Fort Hare in the 1940s was the place where 'black students developed a 
vision of a better Africa.'78 The multinational student body facilitated the spread of a 
solidarity between all black Africans 'united by the single fact of their common 
identity as members of the dominated groups of the population'.79 Henry Chipembere 
was one of the Nyasaland nationalist leaders to attend Fort Hare. Of his time there, 
he recalled:  
 
Fort Hare remained the training ground of future leaders in South Africa. There 
was [...] enough political activity and awareness to transform each student into 
a much more radicalised and politically enlightened person by the time he 
completed his studies.80 
 
Young radical black South Africans like Robert Sobukwe publicly argued during 
protests at the university that 'education meant identification with the masses and 
service to Africa' and encouraged black Africans to use their opportunities to 
advance the struggle in their own nations.81 
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 When a branch of the South African ANC youth league was launched at the 
university in 1948, many of the Zimbabwean students were quick to join. Yet they 
were still regarded as somewhat reactionary compared to their South African 
counterparts and accused of being dominated by a multi-racial liberalism which 
encouraged the need to work within the settler states to achieve change. Critics 
pointed to their only significant protest so far being 'about the fact that senior 
teaching positions in schools would be closed to Africans.'82 In 1949, Maurice 
Nyagumbo (a Fort Hare student between 1947 and 1949 and long-time member of 
the South African Communist Party [SACP]) and his fellow Zimbabwean James 
Chikerema formed the Central African Social Club, 'the aim of which was to involve 
Rhodesian Africans in political activity.'83 The ANC youth league were quick to 
criticise the group for 'adopting the duplicitous Stalinist and Trotskyite class agenda 
in the face of the African Nationalism becoming rooted in South Africa.'84 The 
radical environment offered through the exposure to South African nationalist 
thinking apparently could not breach the underlying awareness of the racial divide 
and the purported dominance of white settlers that defined Rhodesian society. As 
Nyagumbo recalled: 'although [...] I had had some political education in South 
Africa, I still felt very shy to speak to white Rhodesians.'85 
 One consequence of this mentality was a desire amongst the young African 
elites to understand, negotiate, and present themselves within the framework of a 
white western society. Whether a deliberate undermining of the socio-cultural 
divisions in Rhodesia or not, there was an almost universal adoption of European 
fashion and language within the elites. In many ways, this adoption of European 
cultural traits was a continuation of the attitudes imbued during their mission school 
educations with white culture seen as something to aspire to. Grace Keith, the wife of 
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the only white liberal MP in the CAF Parliament, described the African elites in 
Southern Rhodesia as having 'a readiness to adopt European culture. [...] Oxford 
accents, bridal veils, Beatles and sundowner parties, but in a hundred and one other 
facets of everyday life, and those at the very top are by no means immune from the 
general trend.'86 She added:  
 
It is almost as though they have aspired to live up to their white "oppressors" 
way of life for so long that they would be lost without it, and only by adopting 
the white man's habits, fashions and standards - even his sense of humour - as 
closely as possible, can they feel secure.87 
 
Anna Weinrich notes that the 'top stratum' of the African elite (which included 
members of the African political leadership), 'distinguish themselves through a way 
of life which closely resembles that of Europeans. Most of them receive high 
salaries, and all are well educated. Many of them have visited Europe or America.'88 
The adopted cultural traits were those of the British middle- and upper-classes, as 
demonstrated by George Nyandoro's propensity towards dinner jackets.89 This 
cultural affection was both personal (as Enoch Dumbutshena explained of his close 
friend Joshua Nkomo, 'he belonged to the class of many educated Africans who, at 
that time [1950s], sought the comforts of European civilisation.'90) but also political. 
By conforming to the culture of the dominant racial group, these African elites hoped 
they could engage with sympathetic and antagonistic whites in a way that diminished 
inherently-racialist concerns. James Campbell terms this approach 'racial vindication' 
whereby black Africans sough to demonstrate their capacity 'to uphold "recognised 
standards" in their personal and collective lives' to hasten inclusion into white 
society.91 This approach met with limited success. Eugene Wason, the Scottish-born 
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white editor of the African Daily News, recalled a dinner with white friends at which 
Josiah Chinamano was in attendance. Chinamano was a nationalist leader, university 
graduate, and the headmaster of a school in the Highfield township. 'I'm ashamed to 
admit that I watched him [Chinamano] carefully at dinner and was surprised he 
seemed quite at ease and behaved exactly like a European,' Wason noted.92 Although 
Chinamano 'behaved' like a European, the adopted cultural traits were not enough to 
overcome the prejudice of skin colour. 
 
iii. Multi-racial Politics 
 
Upon their return to Rhodesia, many of the African elites began to seek the means to 
protest the inequalities they found in Rhodesian society. Yet the political 
environment of Southern Rhodesia prior to 1950 was distinctly unwelcoming to 
direct black African participation. Direct involvement with the dominant political 
parties was almost entirely impossible. Although 'the state did not legislate for 
separate racially defined institutional representation, the dynamics of the society 
ensured such an outcome through informal discriminatory practices,' explains Pierre 
Du Toit.93 The desires of the African population were regarded by white politicians 
as largely irrelevant to the administration of the state. The multi-racialist MP 
Hardwicke Holderness reflected in 1958 that Godfrey Huggins (the Rhodesian Prime 
Minister) largely considered:  
 
as far as the African population is concerned, everything in the garden will be 
lovely as long as economic development is maintained, any manifestations of 
activities hostile to the established government are dealt with "firmly" and 
European leaders remain apart and in a position of authority.94 
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Even when two African MPs were elected to the first Federal Legislative Assembly 
in 1954, they had little influence on governmental proceedings and were there solely 
on the support of the United Federal Party (UFP) and its white voters.95 The same 
racial attitude which had restricted the number of African secondary schools also 
dictated the perceived place of Africans in politics. Rhodesian society revolved 
around an 'evolutionary paradigm in which Africans figured as less "civilised", and 
in need of European custodianship' notes George Karekwaivanane.96 The result was 
that despite a growing number of young Africans seeking to make their voices heard, 
few white Rhodesian political parties were willing to risk the political fallout that 
came with non-white membership. 
 One of the few white organisations to count Africans amongst its registered 
members was the Rhodesia Labour Party (RLP) formed in 1923 and its successor the 
Southern Rhodesia Labour Party (SRLP) formed in January 1944.97 The disastrous 
experiences of this group regarding black participation emphasised the bellicose 
nature of racial discussions in Rhodesian politics prior to the 1950s. The SRLP's non-
white membership revolved around the prominent African trade unionist, Charles 
Mzingeli, who the SRLP had courted since the late 1930s.98 Despite his misgivings 
about 'Labour's traditional attitude to the black worker,'99 Mzingeli eventually joined 
the SRLP in the belief that 'the ideals of true democracy, irrespective of race and 
colour, would be a fundamental and guiding principle' of the party.100 In 1939, an 
African members branch was established under Mzingeli but the literacy requirement 
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for membership ensured that by 1944 only thirty-one African elites had joined, of 
whom just seven were voters.101 
 Despite the low number of African members in a party espousing socialist 
principles of non-racialism, the 'wider consequences of African involvement in white 
men's politics' proved to be 'the overt and immediate cause of the disintegration of 
the [SRLP] party' in less than six months.102 As the journalist, author, and SRLP 
member Doris Lessing explained: 'whenever racial questions are discussed reason 
flies out of the window, and people become unbalanced.'103 Lessing was talking 
about the party's own members but broader Rhodesian society was no more 
accommodating. As Murray Steele relates: 
 
The Liberal Party published a cartoon depicting a black "cookboy" informing 
his indignant "madam", 'Mena funa hamba lo blanch meeting ka lo Labour 
Party (I want to go to the Branch Meeting of the Labour Party)'.104 [...] At a 
Raylton public meeting, the SRLP candidate was subjected to an interrogation 
as to whether members of his party would "sit down to dinner with a native, or 
let a native marry their daughters."105 
 
Rhodesian politics proved unready for even partial multi-racialism. Despite the 
failings of the SRLP, the younger generation of politically active black Africans 
learnt from the events that transpired. A white-led political party had accepted 
Africans as members, implemented multi-racial strategies for (albeit separate) 
political and economic development, and defended the participation of black 
supporters in the face of an unwelcoming environment. Regardless of the paternalist 
motives behind the SRLP's acceptance of black members, the few years in which an 
African branch had existed proved to African elites of both the top and middle 
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stratum that they could participate in Rhodesian politics through cooperation with 
liberal or radical whites.  
 Yet the milieu would not shift enough for black participation on a substantial 
level until the early 1950s, with the emergence of explicitly multi-racial groups led 
by white liberals (a term that has itself been the subject of much debate106) and 
catering mainly to African elites. These organisations were physical manifestations 
of a multi-racial ideal that had grown from the white Christian paternalist 'civilising 
mission' of the nineteenth century.107 In distinction to the espoused 'non-racialism' of 
the later Zimbabwean nationalist parties (and the failure of other scholars to clearly 
delineate between the two108), multi-racialism or inter-racialism was a stand-alone 
and proactive political ideology that recognised racial distinctions as cultural and 
social differences but envisaged cooperation between the races as being possible and 
advantageous. In 1953, this multiracialism was one key ideal behind the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (also known as the Central African Federation [CAF]), 
the existence of which would act as a catalyst for African political development in all 
three nations.109 The moderate white liberals behind the CAF and the multi-racial 
ideology believed that the growing African political activity could be controlled and 
dictated through the inclusion of African elites in white politics. Hardwicke 
Holderness was one of the most prominent and vocal proponents and explained his 
motivations during a Parliamentary debate in 1955: 
 
[...] with the development of our country and the uprooting of the African 
people you have a whole section of people who are politically conscious, and, 
as I once said before are, for lack of a better phrase, knocking at the door of 
Western civilisation. That being the position, we must accept it, and we must 
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try to take positive measures, we must find ways and means of integrating 
these people into Western civilisation, and we must in fact find an inter-racial 
nationalism.110 
 
By “an inter-racial nationalism”, Holderness meant a hierarchical white nationalism 
in which black Africans occupied subservient positions. Thus although multi-
racialism was often framed as a way of promoting African advancement, there was 
also a clear belief in its ability to stifle African nationalism. Holderness admitted as 
much, stating that the Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia (IASR), founded 
in 1952, rejected any politics that created racial discord within Rhodesian society.111 
David Stirling, the founder of the multi-racial, transnational Capricorn Africa Society 
(CAS), described the organisation's role as preventing the emergence of an 'effective 
African nationalist movement whose purpose would be to push the European out of 
Africa.'112 Perhaps most damning was the description by the Prime Minister of the 
newly created CAF, Godfrey Huggins, of multi-racialism in the colony as being 
something akin to the partnership between a horse (the Africans) and its rider (the 
Europeans).113 
 After his first meeting with David Stirling, the newly arrived white radical114 
British lecturer John Reed bluntly explained the flaws he saw in this multi-racial 
agenda. 
 
Stirling apparently really believes he has the Africans behind him. His next 
move is to found a political party, and then put the weight of it behind 
[Garfield] Todd - what Stirling feels is the best possible thing for Rhodesia, but 
unfortunately hasn't got the confidence of the Africans. So really Capricorn is 
committed to present policies, but wants to secure the African will for these 
policies. But it is impossible to appraise whether Capricorn is therefore a good 
or a bad thing, because the whole thing is so utterly unrealistic as to be out of 
the realm of political thinking altogether. It is obvious the Africans are not 
behind Capricorn - both on the evidence, and by the natural laws of political 
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movement - Capricorn offers the Africans nothing - it merely asks them to be 
good. Why should they support it?115 
 
Other white radicals were also wary about a multi-racial approach. Guy and Molly 
Clutton-Brock were British missionaries who had arrived in Southern Rhodesia in 
1948 and established a multi-racial farm at St. Faith's Mission near Rusape. Yet they 
found themselves isolated from white society for their views and questioning the 
benefits partnership offered to black Africans. 
 
 I asked one such [sympathetic white] if he would gather leaders of the white 
opposition in Rusape to discuss our differences frankly and confidentially. 
“Good idea”, he said, “I’ll try.” After a fortnight he reported: “Sorry, they 
won’t meet you. They say when it comes to the crunch, you’ll be on the 
natives’ side.” Through all the Federal talk of “partnership”, it was ever thus. 
“It’s Them or Us; and it’s going to be Us.”116 
 
The situation was made worse by a Rhodesian state concerned by the rapidity with 
which African elites were joining these parties and increasingly critical of the more 
radical, expatriate whites who encouraged multi-racial partnership. In a speech to 
Parliament on 7 August 1957, the leader of the opposition Edward Aitken-Cade 
denounced the multi-racial organisations. 
 
It is merely a group of people from outside, from places which are not 
Rhodesia's problems, working here under special conditions, upsetting and 
corrupting the minds of the imperiously young... giving them ideas which can 
have no place in the society where they must move... these are the Fifth 
Columnists. The traitors are the Rhodesians themselves - such as the Capricorn 
Africa Society or the Interracial Association [...] and also such as with a screen 
of words try to hide the activities of the Fifth Columnists.117 
 
The most notable aspect of Aitken-Cade's denouncement was the emphasis placed on 
race. The laager mentality which would come to dominate Rhodesian politics over 
the next two decades demonised all whites who failed to toe the line of racial 
                                               
115 Reed, 'Thursday 23 May 1957', Diary, Vol.75 
116 Guy Clutton-Brock & Molly Clutton-Brock, Cold Comfort Confronted (Oxford, 1972), 
p.75 
117 'Traitors and Irresponsibility', The Rhodesia Herald (8 August 1957), p.4 
56 
 
division. As the race of the white multi-racialists was unquestionable, the focus was 
shifted to their foreignness instead and the organisations were painted as the work of 
external forces attempting to undermine the stability of Rhodesian society.118 This is 
discussed more in later chapters, but the first associations between white radicals and 
foreign influence arose with multi-racial partnership. 
 Despite multi-racialism's restrictive traits and largely apolitical stance,119 
organisations like the CAS and IASR saw the widespread participation of mission-
educated African elites and white liberals. The IASR had 120 members, of whom a 
quarter were black, including Joshua Nkomo.120 Nathan Shamuyarira (later the 
ZANU Secretary for External Affairs) also joined the IASR in 1953, and Leopold 
Takawira was a paid official of the CAS for several years.121 Many more of those 
who would later become militant nationalists were committed advocates of multi-
racialism during the 1950s, including Mike Hove, Jasper Savanhu, Stanlake 
Samkange, Lawrence Vambe, Chad Chipunza and Patrick Rubitaka.122 Enoch 
Dumbutshena was also one of this generation and noted how the desire of Africans 
for political representation overcame the conflict concerns with partnership's 
paternalistic ideals. 
 
There was a time in Zimbabwe when it was believed that partnership between 
the races would triumph. Africans were invited to European houses to 
sundowners and tea parties. Most enlightened Africans, including some of the 
present nationalist leaders, accepted multi-racialism and the methods by which 
it sought to provide a final solution to the racial problems.123 
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Multi-racialism was more than a political ideology, with white liberals encouraging 
the implementation of partnership across multiple socio-political divides. The impact 
of these experiences on the discourses of racial identities and national belonging was 
particularly profound.124 Those educated Africans who had adopted European styles 
of dress and culture found themselves welcomed with open arms. Alongside social 
gatherings such as the tea parties mentioned by Dumbutshena, the 'new liberal 
movement' (as Hardwicke Holderness termed multi-racialism) introduced 'a kind of 
self-education programme in national affairs.'125 This was the National Affairs 
Association (NAA) which organised a series of lectures by prominent white 
Rhodesians and encouraged a multi-racial approach. As with multi-racialism more 
broadly, the NAA made half-hearted efforts to attract support from other racial 
communities. Hasu Patel recalls being approached to speak at an NAA meeting on 
the relationship between the Indian community with the other Rhodesian races.126 
Yet there was little broad support for multi-racialism outside of the dominant black 
and white populations. Patel notes that the Asian Association, established in the late 
1940s and dominated by first generation immigrants, was resistant to the idea of 
fighting racial discrimination if it was not being fought in terms of special rights for 
Indians.127 James Muzondidya similarly asserts that 'only a handful of Coloureds [...] 
joined or actively participated in the political activities of multiracial organisations,' 
preferring instead to focus their activities on groups centred within their own 
established communities.128 
 Regardless, the NAA did find support amongst black Africans. Many of the 
meetings were held in the African townships and drew large crowds; one talk in 
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Harare on the pre-colonial history of Rhodesia attracted some 200 Africans, 
demonstrating again the avid interest many African elites had in their histories even 
prior to the nationalist histories of the 1960s.129 This support highlighted the 
prevailing racial sentiments of the period. Although the white Rhodesian state 
discriminated against all non-white populations, there was not yet the animosity that 
would come to dominate race relations in later years. The 1940s saw 'a time in 
liberalisation in racial attitudes, coinciding with a huge wave of immigration from 
Britain into Southern Rhodesia after the war,’ recalled Joshua Nkomo.130 The 
involvement of many educated African elites with the multi-racial partnership ideals 
would become a source of contention in the mid-1960s and the ZAPU-ZANU split, 
with many of the radical ZANU leaders denouncing ZAPU's leaders (including 
Joshua Nkomo) for being too familiar with the white population. Yet as Enoch 
Dumbutshena countered, 'it must have seemed to most of them that multi-racialism 
was a thaw in the long crusted and frozen political life in Zimbabwe.'131 
 What the multi-racial societies appeared to offer was a race conscious but 
less-discriminatory stance on politics, where Africans could speak for themselves 
alongside the whites. 'The African elite were buoyed by a naive optimism in the 
ability and willingness of the dominant white population to reform itself; they 
believed that it was a sensible for them to participate in the country’s multiracial 
liberal experiment,' explains Nathan Shamuyarira, himself a member of the IASR.132 
Enoch Dumbutshena (also an IASR member) expanded further, 'It must have seemed 
to most of the [African leaders] that multi-racialism was a thaw in the long crusted 
and frozen political life in Zimbabwe.'133These secular organisations were seen as 
credible alternatives to the protest-based racial militancy that the African political 
groups were advocating. And perhaps more importantly, the organisations focused 
their efforts on the participating African elites themselves. With a paternalistic 
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approach to universal adult suffrage ('it was the eventual goal but would not be 
rushed'134) the concept of racial partnership was deliberately designed to elevate a 
few African elites to work with the white population, and to ensure an eventual 
transition to majority rule without any negative effects on white industry or 
society.135 The IASR, for example, saw no problem with the common voters role 
'because it already exists, is simple and workable, and gives hope to Africans, and 
lessens the possibility of future racial politics.'136 
 Another social component of this elite-focused multi-racial agenda were the 
African Women's Clubs formed in the 1950s. These groups were run by white 
liberals with the intent 'to help and encourage all African women to become good 
homemakers and to work together in unity for the advancement of their people,'137 
and so they provide a counterpoint to the dominant representation of African politics 
as a male orientated space.138 Groups like the Radio Homecraft movement sought to 
educate African women on various aspects of European style domesticity, like 
cleaning, sewing, and cooking. Alongside home demonstrators like the 'Jeanes 
teachers',139 African domesticity was believed to improve both the home 
environment and African communities, whilst also increasing the acceptability of 
close habitation of Africans to white Rhodesians.140 
 However, the African Women's Clubs arose at such a time that the demanded 
subservience of blacks under white instructors had begun to lose hold, permitting 
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questions about ascribed racial roles to be asked. As Carolyn Shaw explains, it is 
justified to 'compare African women's acceptance of the tenets of the Homecraft 
syllabus to emergent middle-class men's desire to be recognised and respected over 
and above the "raw native", as "civilized men".141 Agnes Kanogoiwa was a founding 
member of the Harare Radio Homecraft Club in 1952 and during its formation had 
made acquaintance with the Governor of Rhodesia, John Noble Kennedy. Given this 
prominence, Kanogoiwa was invited to a women's forum of the Salisbury City 
Council discussing segregation where she emphasised what she saw as the benefits 
of multi-racialism. 
 
I saw so many European women. I was the only African [...] So I was called. I 
prayed. “Oh God, help me! I am the only African here. Help me to open my 
mind, help me to say what will help my people tomorrow." So they said, “We 
don’t like to mix. Africans must have their own place to rest and so on and to 
eat.” And the one who was in the Chair said, “Mrs. Kanogoiwa, have you got 
anything to say to this?” And I said, “Yes, I have.” And then I said, “We learn 
from each other. If we don’t see each other often, then how can you learn from 
me? Because you won’t see what I do. If I don’t see a European woman, how 
can I learn from her?”142 
 
The value of these kind of interactions on changing opinions was an important tenet 
of the 1950s multi-racial ideals and did much to influence African racial thinking. 
The spaces opened up by partnership were not as restrictive as the white liberals had 
desired and provided many opportunities for black African elites to exert their own 
agendas. Because of the involvement of African elites, many individuals found their 
authority within African politics growing. It was no coincidence that same names 
appear in the executives of the multi-racial organisations and the post-1957 
nationalist parties. Thus the Zimbabwean nationalist leadership's early attitudes to 
race were a reflection of these earlier political experiences, alongside the influence of 
pre-nationalist African organisations. 
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iv. The inevitability of white rule: African social, political, and professional 
associations pre-1957 
 
The counterpart to the multi-racialist groups were the local associations led by black 
Africans and promoting black African interests; social protest organisations, trade 
unions, and (from a later date) youth leagues. For many politically conscious black 
Africans in Rhodesia, these associations provided an alternate means of expression 
that ostensibly went beyond the limitations of white politics. Michael West argues 
that 'the "nationalising" of the African elite took an important turn in the mid-
1930s',143 and it was these associations which acted as contiguous cause and effect. 
Although 'people were not very active as they were only just beginning to organize 
themselves,'144 recalled Maudy Muzenda (the wife of a prominent African activist), 
these groups still acted as significant incubators for Zimbabwean nationalism. 
African elites within these organisations received a practical education in leadership, 
as well as an opportunity to develop and challenge concepts of nationalist and racial 
thinking. Despite the differences in composition and goals, these groups unilaterally 
encouraged a recognition of black solidarity in achieving social and political change, 
and called for Africans to secure their own advancement through self-improvement 
and public action. Acting as pressure groups for specific agendas, the associations 
refused to participate in formal state politics.  
 Many of these traits would be adopted by the later Zimbabwean nationalist 
movement, leading some scholars to describe these earlier groups as 'proto-
nationalist organisations',145expressing an 'inchoate black nationalism'.146 If we 
consider a nationalist ideology as being the intent of creating a nation synonymous 
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with the state, then some of these groups were indeed truly nationalist in their 
thinking. Nevertheless they remained heavily localised in regional, occupational, 
class, or ethnic terms, and retained restrictive sub-national memberships based on 
exclusionary criteria. As Michael West explains: 'even when they had the will, the 
quest for national representativity [...] eluded earlier protest groups.'147 Miles Larmer 
consequently employs the term 'African self-organisation' in the place of 'proto-
nationalist politics',148 and this description provides a much more appropriate 
framework.  
 The nationalisms being espoused at this point were as varied as the groups 
themselves. One initiative was the Ndebele Home Movement (later the Matabele 
Home Society [MHS]), who called for a 'restored kingship in a consolidated 
"national home"' (a semi-autonomous ethnically-based Ndebele nation contained 
within the Rhodesian state).149 Some imagined nations were more ethnically-defined 
than others, particularly those emerging out of Bulawayo, the historic centre of the 
Ndebele society.150 Like the MHS, the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association adopted 
a vocally anti-Shona stance and drew heavily upon the nineteenth century hostilities 
as justification for their exclusionary politics.151 Conversely, the Rhodesian Native 
Association formed by 'progressive Shona farmers' ('the tiny black petty-bourgeoisie' 
in the words of Ian Phimister152), denounced the Ndebele and called for a modestly 
incorporationist policy for Shona into the Rhodesian state.153 
 When it became apparent that ethnic-based strategies were failing to achieve 
traction, a multi-ethnic Bantu nation was proposed by the Bantu Congress of 
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Southern Rhodesia (BCSR). The BCSR was formed by Aaron Jacha and 'other 
leading black teachers, catechists and clerks from both Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland' in 1934.154 With its non-ethnic membership, the BCSR was the first 
African organisation to provide black Zimbabweans (as opposed to a sub-ethnic 
group) with a self-controlled channel to work against racially discriminatory policies. 
Although limited in its aims, Dickson Mungazi nevertheless argues that the BCSR 
'created a new level of consciousness among Africans in a way that set the stage for 
the political transformation of Zimbabwe beginning in 1957.'155 Similar claims can 
be made of two other significant African political organisations active in post-war 
Rhodesia. These were the (British) African Voice Association, established by 
Benjamin Burombo in 1947 and which played a crucial role in the organisation of the 
1948 African industrial strike with its links to the trade union movements156, and the 
original Southern Rhodesia African National Congress [(O)SRANC], under Joshua 
Nkomo, Jerry W. Vera, and Thompson Samkange. The latter was a popular 
movement in Bulawayo throughout the late 1940s but largely inactive by 1955.157 
Many of those African nationalists cut their political teeth in these early groups. 
 As products of a Rhodesian socio-economic landscape that permitted the rise 
of the elite African class, these earlier groups were inherently elite focused and their 
objectives and tactics were in many ways comparable to that of the multi-racialists. 
The BCSR counted several white missionaries within its most active encouragers,158 
and the (O)SRANC's 1936 constitution emphasised co-operation with the settler 
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Government,  going so far as to invite a Rhodesian Government official to open its 
meetings.159 As Jaap van Velsen explained in his 1964 history of Zimbabwean 
nationalism, 
 
these societies tended to be run by and appeal to the new African elite who 
were greatly concerned to gain from the whites social recognition as "advanced 
natives" in contrast to the "uneducated masses".160 
 
The well-educated elites found themselves joining older generations of African 
politicians and thus having to cooperate with the paternalistic rhetoric of the group as 
a whole.161 They focused on challenging the logic of empire including the 
'uncivilised' label attached to all black Africans, and utilised education, wealth, and 
culture to do so. The leadership's goals (including 'the relaxation of the Pass and 
Liquor laws for enfranchised African voters'162) reflected their newly-acquired elite 
status and their adoption of European culture and there were almost no calls for 
majority rule from these groups. 
  Although widely accepted during the 1930s and 1940s, the groups’ failures 
to challenge white rule led to criticisms by later nationalists. The prominent African 
journalist and nationalist Willie Musarurwa explained: 
 
these organisations accepted the white man's rule as inevitable and sought to 
improve the African social and economic position within the established social 
and political framework. The idea of seeking political power for the African 
people was completely ruled out.163 
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A similar accusation was levelled at the independent African trade unions, including 
the Independent Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Rhodesia (ICU) and 
the Reformed Industrial Commercial Union (RICU). Although scholars still disagree 
about what role organised African labour had in the emergence of a mass 
Zimbabwean nationalism in 1957, one conclusion is clear.164 As Nelson Sambureni 
summarises, 'the independent African trade unions provided a forum for the 
expression of popular discontent over economic, political and social issues' that 
rivalled, conflicted, and sometimes cooperated with the other forms of African 
representation.165 Nevertheless African trade unionism failed to achieve the mass 
support it would elsewhere with some scholars like André Astrow blaming the 
leadership for failing to effectively direct the agency of the African workers,166 
whilst others like Brian Raftopoulos highlight the lack of a properly constituted 
African working class.167 
 Raftopoulos also argues that the African trade unions in Rhodesia were 
subject to a multi-racialist ideology that was incomparable to the black consciousness 
of South African industrial workers. The very emergence of the African trade unions 
in Rhodesia had been in the context of white efforts to stifle the power of an African 
labour force. Thus in the words of the trade unionist Thompson Samkange, 'a simple 
economic issue [had] taken a racial form in Southern Rhodesia.'168 The stories of 
Charles Mzingeli and the RICU personify this argument.169 After finding 
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employment on the railways at fourteen, Mzingeli quickly found himself working 
with the South African ICU. Impressed by their successes, he adopted the same 
strategy of 'race-pride populism with an attention to local grievances' upon his return 
to Bulawayo, with the fallibility of the supposedly-superior white race a focal point 
in his actions.170 'Mzingeli was not afraid to call European officials thieves and 
would use the popular play on words that mocked the supposed authority of 
European native commissioners who expected Africans to refer to them as "chief",' 
relates Scarnecchia, and indeed Mzingeli went so far as to contrast the concept of 
race supremacy in southern Africa with Hitler's principle of Herrenvolk in 1946.171  
Yet Mzingeli's anti-white sentiments were overshadowed by his distaste for 
racial discrimination in politics. Calling segregation 'a fanatical deliberation in the 
creation of race hatred',172 Mzingeli participated in liberal multi-racialism, including 
joining the SRLP.173 Between the trade unions and African protest groups, there was 
a significant overlap between leadership and ideology. Mzingeli, Joshua Nkomo, and 
Enoch Dumbutshena were all members of the IASR and trade unions, and all 
believed that there was no conflict between representing the African working class 
through the trade unions, whilst also promoting their own interests through elitist 
multi-racial groups.174 
 However, these commitments also demonstrated the conflicts about racial 
thinking that had begun to emerge within the African leadership during this period of 
'African self-organisation'. Whilst most educated African elites maintained that 
multi-racialism was the surest way to secure change for the African population, a 
growing number were becoming disenchanted with the failures of partnership to 
produce tangible benefits. Generational differences in Karl Mannheim's sense of the 
term emerged within the African population as young radical Africans began to make 
their voices heard. Explaining that distinct generational identities arise from unique 
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'reactions to moments of social upheaval and transformation,' Mannheim argues that 
generations are 'united by a rather mysterious "intuitive understanding" of coevality 
created by individual reactions to shared events and by "collective" memories of 
those experiences.'175In this case, generations were defined by their attitudes to the 
struggle for African representation and an end to racial discrimination. 
 The radical generation included James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Edson 
Sithole, Henry Hamadziripi, Thomson Gonese, and Duduza Chisiza. These men 
would become a key stimulant behind the emergence of a mass Zimbabwean 
nationalism later in the 1950s and their ideologies were an explicit response to the 
failings of existing vehicles for African voices. Although all lacked a formal 
university education, they were recognised by contemporaries as intelligent and 
capable men.176 Chisiza was described as 'extremely intelligent and a brilliant orator', 
Nyandoro was 'admired for his skill in argument' and his efforts to 'read widely and 
in depth', and Sithole would later become only the second black man to pass the 
Rhodesian Bar.177 However, they were not so removed from the ordinary African 
population as to alienate themselves from a potentially important membership base, 
and their objectives reflected this somewhat anti-elite stance.178 As Raftopoulos 
summarises, the group sought 'to challenge [...] the dominance of an increasingly 
conservative Mzingeli [...] and the leadership of the intellectuals who were 
participating in multi-racial organisations such as the Capricorn Society and the 
Inter-Racial Society.'179 Both of these goals appealed to a number of discontented 
black Africans, frustrated by the limitations of the existing groups. 
 The product of this agitation was the formation of the City Youth League 
(CYL) in August 1955, described as 'the first of the new militant African political 
                                               
175 See Karl Mannheim, 'The Problem of Generations', in Paul Kecskemeti, ed., Essays on 
the Sociology of Knowledge (London, 1952), p.282 
176 Chikerema had twice enrolled for a BA at the University of Cape Town in 1949 and 1950 
but sat no exams.  
177 See Cary & Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders, p.69, 41, 73 
178 Scarnecchia, Urban Roots, p.301 
179 Raftopoulos, 'Nationalism and Labour', p.87 
68 
 
movements.'180 Under those same young Africans who had publicly criticised the 
multi-racial groups, the CYL sparked the beginning of what Michael West calls the 
'Nationalist Moment' of Zimbabwean history.181 The movement quickly gained 
popular support amongst young urban African workers, and 'soon eclipsed the multi-
racial politics of the elites'.182 The CYL's stringent anti-partnership stance and its 
rejection of elitist politics forced Africans to choose whether they would work with 
the white liberals or pursue national affairs through the mobilisation of African 
agency. The leaders accused those Africans who supported the concept of racial 
partnership as having been 'bought off' by a Federal government offering economic 
expansion and a relative wage increase of unskilled labour in place of genuine social 
advancement.183 
 This turn against multi-racialism was fuelled in part by the elites’ realisation 
that even their assimilation of European culture did not spare them from racial 
discrimination. 'We were half-trusted and half-respected by the African masses and 
half-feared and half-accepted by the European Society,' wrote Bernard Chidzero in 
1959.184 Black Africans 'assumed their "lack of education" was the main reason for 
exclusion as "uncivilised".'185 When this belief was proven false, the comprehension 
that race was the defining feature of social status resulted in what Jean-Paul Sartre 
called 'an anti-racist racism'. Whilst ultimately aiming for a race-less society, it was 
necessary to use 'positive discrimination' along racial lines to achieve that goal.186 
These young radical Africans 'accepted the racial identity constructed for them by 
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white oppressors and turned it against its creators by using it as a basis of solidarity 
and struggle against white domination,' explains George Frederickson.187  
Furthermore, alongside the tripartite of white liberal multi-racialism, elite-
driven African protest, and pro-African trade unionism, these young radicals were 
also influenced by the experiences of its leaders elsewhere. The transfer of ideas 
across national borders was made possible by several factors including the shared 
racial subjugation of European colonialism, education at the hands of European 
missionaries, and transnational networks created through foreign study and work. 
The politics of black South Africans were particularly influential on the young 
Zimbabweans.188 Daniel Madzimbamuto, Maurice Nyagumbo, and James Chikerema 
had all lived in South Africa, and Chikerema’s membership of the ANC Youth 
League [ANCYL] during his time as a student at Cape Town University had a 
significant impact on his own politics.189 'He [Chikerema] brought with him the 
South African Youth League constitution, which became the guideline for the Youth 
League that he helped set up in Salisbury,' argued the American activist George 
Houser, demonstrating the connection went beyond mere rhetoric.190 The racial 
policies of the CYL were unsurprisingly also heavily influenced by the ANCYL, 
although the CYL retained a less racialist agenda than their counterparts to the south. 
Driven by the 'Africanist' ideologies of Marcus Garvey and the ANCYL's Anton 
Lembede,191 the ANCYL insisted only black Africans could join the organisation.192 
They believed they would 'be wasting their time and deflecting their forces if they 
look up to Europeans either for inspiration or help in their political struggle,' explains 
                                               
187 Frederickson, Black Liberation, p.278 
188 David Birmingham & Phyllis Martin, eds., History of Central Africa: Vol.2 (London, 
1983), chapter nine 
189 Lawrence Vambe, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (London, 1976), pp.275-276 
190 George M. Houser, No One Can Stop The Rain: Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle 
(New York, 1989), p.221 
191 Frederickson, Black Liberation, p.280 
192 Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Berkeley, 
1978), p.60. 
70 
 
Thomas Karis,193 and consequently encouraged separate anti-apartheid organisations 
along racial lines.194 The belief was formed that African parties must exclude non-
black individuals in order to ensure the strength of the party remained with the 
cohesion of shared experiences.195 
 The Rhodesian CYL, however, did not exclude non-black groups from 
participation (although it did not actively seek non-black membership), with James 
Chikerema recalling that the CYL found 'limited support among coloured and Asian 
businessmen and professionals'.196 Nathan Shamuyarira similarly refers to a 
'pamphlet on self-determination obtained from the Indian diplomatic mission in 
Salisbury' as providing an inspiration to the founders of the CYL,197 and it is no 
coincidence that Dunduzu Chisiza, a founding member, worked for the Indian High 
Commission.198 Maurice Nyagumbo had further been a member of the non-racial 
SACP whilst working in Cape Town for most of the 1940s,199 and noted how his 
attendance with a fellow black Zimbabwean, Willie Mashaba, at a party organised by 
the SACP fundamentally altered his view of how races could cooperate within a 
political organisation. 
 
When we arrived at the hall, we found two European girls in the ticket-office at 
the door who greeted Willie as “comrade”. [...] As we entered the hall, Willie 
was embraced by a group of cheering European and Coloured girls and when 
we had taken our seats, Willie introduced me to them. One of them, Jean, took 
me to one corner of the hall where she started to explain the aims and the 
objects of the party. Although I did not understand a word of what she was 
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talking about, I agreed to join the party, because I was impressed by the 
behaviour of the European girls.200 
 
Interaction with radical whites in Rhodesia also proved to be an important element in 
the development of the CYL's racialist thinking. A chance encounter with Guy and 
Molly Clutton-Brock in 1955 impacted upon Nyagumbo's beliefs. 
 
They [Guy and Molly] both appeared rugged white Rhodesian fighters. The 
only difference was their conversation with us. As [Guy] talked about the 
political situation in the country where he observed that Africans did not have 
any right in their land of birth and he was wondering how that kind of situation 
as going to change in those circumstances. He shocked me by his clear thinking 
and understanding of the situation. It was at a time when the Youth League in 
Harare was inaugurated. [...] During my next visit to Harare I talked to James 
Chikerema, George Nyandoro and Paul Mushonga about this man Guy 
Clutton-Brock I had met at St Francis Mission and requested the three people 
to make a visit to see Guy Clutton-Brock. In 1956 the three men, James 
Chikerema, George Nyandoro, and Paul Mushonga, visited St Faith’s. All three 
men expressed their appreciation of Guy’s explanation of the situation which 
existed. From that time onwards Guy became identified with our struggle.201 
 
Clutton-Brock's influence on the racial thinking of these young African radicals 
would come to play an important role throughout the liberation struggle, as would his 
physical presence within the African movement. Nevertheless, despite the inclusion 
of non-black individuals within the organisation, the CYL's relative radicalism led 
many African elites to 'stand aloof’ from what they termed the ‘more crude 
manifestations of the [African] movement'.202 Those with authority in established 
groups remained hesitant to join, especially given Chikerema and Nyandoro's 
condemnation of multi-racial elitism. The CYL's members were younger, often less 
educated and frequently poorer than their counterparts in the CAS or IASR.203 As a 
result the group struggled to present itself as a respectable alternative to the multi-
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racial societies. For all of its claims to represent the black population of Rhodesia, 
the CYL also remained largely focused around Salisbury and had a predominantly 
Shona membership which even changing its name to the African National Youth 
League (ANYL) could not overcome. Consequently, Joshua Nkomo, Herbert 
Chitepo, Leopold Takawira, Michael Mawema, Ndabaningi Sithole, and a number of 
others regarded the CYL as a potentially destructive movement. Even some of the 
CYL's founders were initially reluctant to embrace a radical stance. Nyagumbo 
recalled a meeting with Chikerema in July 1955 in which the latter first raised the 
possibility of forming a Youth League: 
 
He [Chikerema] told me that the move to form this organisation was being 
backed by a large number of enthusiastic and intelligent people, and he asked 
me to attend the inaugural day. The idea of the youth league did not appear 
attractive to me. I argued that the best thing was to form a national party and 
not a youth league which I thought was bound to be run by irresponsible town 
gangsters.204 
 
These limitations of the CYL in terms of membership and ideology had to be 
overcome in order to produce a politically-usable Zimbabwean nationalism, but it 
had nevertheless provided a valuable testing ground for new ideas.205 
 
Conclusion 
 
By the summer of 1957, it was apparent that the conflict between the multi-racialists 
and the African organisations was showing no signs of resolution, despite the 
formation of the CYL.206 With the failures of the CAS and IASR to create a shared 
sense of racial cooperation, the white radical Peter Mackay argued that 1957 'was the 
time for Africans to dispose, to assert their claims to a better order in their own 
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land.'207 This sentiment had begun to gain support within politically-conscious 
Africans. On 15 June 1957, at a meeting of the IASR, the Prime Minister Garfield 
Todd spoke on the need for the continued advancement of Africans. When the 
African politician Thompson Samkange responded to Todd, John Reed recorded the 
reaction of the largely African crowd: 
 
 Samkange: "Those of us who have to sit in Parliament, and hear the debates - 
we have often thought, when we have been listening to the Prime Minister [...] 
how long can this go on? [...] The Prime Minister spoke the way he did, and 
was the only one of his Cabinet who voted the way he did, we thought what 
strange bedfellows he has with him. And if he does leave his party, and form a 
true liberal party..." 
 African Voice [from the hall]: "He can join the Congress ([O]SRANC)." 
 Samkange: "I hope whoever said the Prime Minister can join the Congress 
will remember that he can also join the Prime Minister's Party."208 
 
Whilst many of the loudest voices still called for Africans to participate in white-led 
parties, a growing vocal minority had begun to demand the opposite. Given the 
demand for a truly nationalist African organisation, the result was the coming 
together in September 1957 of the disparate elements of African politics; trade 
unionism, multi-racialism, and African associations. 
 This is the key point to be taken away from the pre-1957 period. African 
nationalism was not the only possible ideology to come to define the African 
struggle, but it was the only one which fitted the specific criteria demanded at that 
moment in time. It was the result of preconditions (childhood experiences, Western-
style educations, and a racially-exclusionary political environment) combined with a 
particular set of precipitants (the clash of multi-racialist and Africanist principles 
within the context of a growing pan-Africanism). These same conditions defined the 
racial thinking inherent in Zimbabwean nationalism. The relationships built during 
the era of liberal partnership and the experiences of working alongside whites, 
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Asians, Indians, and coloureds was a central basis on which some of the nationalist's 
leading figures would organise their policies. 
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Chapter 2 
Non-racialism versus black consciousness: the emergence of 
a Zimbabwean nationalism, 1957-1959 
 
Introduction 
 
As the previous chapter argued, it was anything but inevitable that a black nationalist 
ideology would come to dominate the Zimbabwean anti-colonial struggle. Indeed, 
the situation prior to 1957 emphasised the complexity of African politics and the 
seemingly insurmountable divisions within African society. It was thus surprising 
when an African party emerged in September 1957 that counted multi-racialists, 
youth-leaguers, and trade-unionists within its members. More remarkable was that 
this Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) embraced an African 
nationalism previously unseen in the nation. From 1957 through to independence in 
1980, African politics in the nation would be (broadly) dominated by nationalist 
parties, led by the same group of elite Africans, and espousing ideologies descended 
from the SRANC. Although these movements and the nationalist discourse 
(particularly regarding non-black positioning within the struggle and the imagined 
nation) were constantly changing, the formation of the SRANC would prove to be a 
defining moment in the history of race and Zimbabwean nationalism. 
 This second chapter thus sets out to accomplish two goals. First, to provide a 
detailed account of the role of non-black radicals within the first nationalist 
movement, including the anatomy of the non-black radical group involved and the 
means by which these individuals supported the nationalist cause. It examines how 
non-black participation shaped the racial policies of the incipient nationalist 
movement, and the reaction by the white state to such dissent. It delves into the 
motivations of these radicals to understand their decisions for supporting African 
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nationalism over liberal multi-racialism and how the transnationalism of white 
radicals informed perceptions of their usefulness to the cause. Secondly, this chapter 
also addresses the impact non-black participation had on conceptions of race for the 
imagined future Zimbabwean nation. It challenges the lazy assertions by scholars 
that 'race was not a primary concern for Nkomo and other [...] nationalists,'1 and 
argues that race was in fact a paramount feature of early nationalist discourse. 
Finally, it details how a new form of racial thinking called 'non-racialism' emerged 
and became an intrinsic part of late-1950s Zimbabwean nationalism. 
 
i. The formation of the SRANC 
 
Formed in September 1957 from a broader support base than any previous African 
political group,2 the SRANC was a party of contradiction. An amalgamation of the 
CYL under James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, and the defunct (O)SRANC 
under Joshua Nkomo, the SRANC combined the political sophistication of the older 
generation of African elites with the youth, vigour and determination of the younger 
nationalists in a deliberate effort to appeal to as many Africans as possible. The 
SRANC gained unprecedented popular support across both rural and urban African 
populations and by May 1958 had thirty-nine branches throughout the colony and a 
membership of 6,000.3 Within a year, a further 11,000 people purchased membership 
cards.4 These figures, however, do not show the full level of support, as Munyaradzi 
Munochiveyi explains: 
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An African-led party, rejecting European tutelage and voicing African 
aspirations, was at that time a novel concept for most Africans and only the 
most politically committed and bravest people joined. Others, particularly in 
the countryside, supported the SRANC silently.5 
 
Nevertheless, the diversity within the leadership and supporters complicated a group 
that required unity in order to overcome the entrenched political viewpoints of 
existing African politics. As a result of these conflicting ideologies, disagreements 
arose about how best to achieve that goal and what form this imagined future nation 
would take, and the SRANC found itself tied to two agendas struggling for position. 
 The first was a rejection of the slow crawl towards racial equality as 
encouraged by the multi-racialists (including the CAS and IASR), and to which 
many African elites remained committed.6 George Nyandoro (the SRANC’s 
Secretary General) made clear the nationalists' attitudes to multi-racialism. 'Any 
policy of striving for power through Parliament is ridiculous and [...] Africans should 
no longer look to European political parties as the latter have rejected partnership; 
instead, they should join congress.'7 The SRANC blamed the multi-racialists for the 
failure of existing political strategies. In an anonymous article published in the 
nationalist-supporting magazine Dissent produced by John Reed, Terence Ranger, 
and Reverend Whitfield Foy, the author (likely Reed) explained:  
 
There are racial blocs - and the conflict of interest between African and 
European cannot now be influenced except in very minor ways by the 
existence of our multiracial liberal bridge builders - over whose bridges no-one 
ever crossed anyway except the builders themselves.8 
 
Consequently, as a means of distinguishing themselves from the multi-racialists, the 
SRANC consolidated its racial policies into a recognition of the exceptionalism of 
black Africans and vocalised a connection between authority and indigeneity. 
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According to the Zimbabwean intellectual Ndabaningi Sithole, the SRANC argued 
'we do not want to be ruled by foreigners. We want to rule ourselves.'9 This ideology 
manifested itself in a policy of 'denunciation' and a complete rejection of the 
authority of the white state. Joshua Nkomo (the SRANC's President) recalled that 
'the ANC in that period was against everything the government did, whatever it 
was.'10 Denunciation was more successful than the 'one man, one vote' slogans of 
previous parties,11 largely because the rejection of white power appealed to all 
Africans who had experienced racial discrimination.12 The promises to not only 
target everyday discrimination, but to do so immediately rather than in some 
undetermined future as promised by multi-racialism, was a broadly popular ideology. 
In common with the concepts of African nationalism arising elsewhere on the 
continent during the same period, Zimbabwean nationalism was at its heart a 
movement against white supremacy and the tangible objectives of this struggle were 
well-received.  
 This is where the second agenda of the SRANC came in to play. Whilst also a 
rejection of white multi-racialism, the party was fundamentally a proponent of black 
African nationalism. As its founding statement declared, 'all inhabitants of the 
country in true partnership regardless of race, colour and creed,' and its conceptions 
of power in the future nation reflected this.13 The party rejected a few African elites 
participating in a system dominated by the white minority and foresaw a system 
where state power reflected the numerical superiority of the black population. In 
September 1957 the SRANC released a press statement which argued that the party 
would champion for 'the interests and aspirations of both the educated and 
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uneducated Africans, a movement of the under-privileged and un-enfranchised.'14 
Steve Biko, the pioneer behind the black consciousness movement in South Africa, 
highlighted why this shift was both a rejection of white liberalism and an 
opportunity. 
 
The role of the white liberal in the black man’s history in South Africa is a 
curious one. Very few black organisations were not under white direction. True 
to their image, the white liberals always knew what was good for the blacks 
and told them so. The wonder of it all is that the black people have believed in 
them for so long. It was only at the end of the 50s that the blacks started 
demanding to be their own guardians.15 
 
Accused of making disparaging remarks about the Minister of Native Affairs, the 
trial of Chikerema in June 1958 reaffirmed the uneasy accommodation of a non-
racial ideology alongside the rejection of multi-racialism. Several white SRANC 
supporters were subpoenaed to appear in court and their names printed in the 
Rhodesia Herald, including the UCRN lecturers John Reed and Terence Ranger 
(alongside his wife Shelagh), the journalist Eileen Haddon, and a doctoral candidate 
named Eleanor Glynn-Jones.16 The Rhodesian government's intent behind this public 
act was apparent. As Reed noted in his diary, 'the Government has handled this case 
so as to bring odium, both from the European and African population on those white 
people who have been willing to take an interest in Congress.'17 As in South Africa,18 
this strategy worked and the presence of white SRANC members testifying against 
one of the black leadership reportedly exacerbated tensions: 'these Europeans, look at 
them, they come to meetings and pretend to be on our side - and then they turn and 
give evidence against us', ranted one SRANC member outside the courtroom.19 
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Considering that the white radicals had been forced to appear in court (and gave little 
useful testimony in any case), such accusations were baseless. Nevertheless the 
incident had a significant impact during an important moment in the early history of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. The trials of nationalists like Chikerema's were significant 
events in swaying African public opinion to the side of the nationalist cause, and 
there was an interest in using the attention to highlight the independence of the 
African leaders.20 Whether or not the leaders truly believed the racial rhetoric is 
something discussed later in this thesis, but a recognition of the important interplay 
between public and private discourse is crucial to situating the statements in their 
proper context. 
 What these early incidents demonstrated was an incipient belief amongst 
some nationalists that the non-black supporters were less committed to African 
politics than their black counterparts. Returning to the concepts of 'insiders' and 
'outsiders', white radicals were regarded as being unable to fully comprehend the 
realities of a struggle against oppression because they had not suffered due to their 
race under the settler state. In 1959, John Reed noted in his diary that: 
 
Whatever you do, and whatever theories about race you may hold, a white 
liberal can never become an African. Even the missionaries who believe in the 
economic witness and live like the Africans obviously are never going to be 
accepted by Africans as Africans and they know this.21 
 
Peter Mackay, the Scottish-born radical and former soldier, similarly recalled: 
 
I was not part, I knew, of the wrongs being done [by the white state], for I was 
beyond the laager’s pale. But I remained, I knew, outside the Africans’ gate 
[...] But if I could not stand aside as an angry witness I remained conscious of 
the limitations on a non-African involvement in what was essentially an 
African cause. Certainly it was not a time for Greenmantles. Yet, if one could 
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serve what one believed to be justice perhaps one could also serve one’s 
friends in their cause.22 
 
Many amongst the nationalist leadership's more radical elements also argued that 
whites, Asians, Indians and coloureds could not share the same intense sense of 
injustice as black Africans. In a vocal attack on those who had supported multi-
racialism, Edson Sithole (a founding member of the CYL) criticised the failure of 
'even the most liberal whites [...] to understand the deeply ingrained resentment that 
fuels the African's actions, the resentment of all Europeans for what their race has 
done to ours since conquering our country sixty years ago.'23 Sithole's views on non-
black participation led him to form the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP), an anti-
white party discussed more in later chapters,24 but one immediate consequence was 
that those non-black individuals wishing to support the African cause were forced to 
justify their support through an alternative discourse. The immovable foundation of 
racial experiences meant that since they could not be considered black Africans on 
the basis of their political beliefs, most remained firmly entrenched in their specific 
racial identities. The necessity of broaching these identities was highlighted by Guy 
Clutton-Brock. 
 
When the Congress was formed, Molly and I had to decide whether to join and 
formally identify ourselves with the African movement, which was both 
political and social. We knew what it would mean to many of our fellow 
whites; we would be confirmed as one of “them”, hence traitors to our kith and 
kin. We had come to live in Africa, however, so to us no other course seemed 
open than to identify with Africa. We paid our dues and took out membership 
cards.25 
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Clutton-Brock's understanding was that although an individual remained defined by 
their racial identity, they could nevertheless 'empathise' with the African cause. The 
white radicals therefore drew upon their marginalities from society due to other 
factors including gender, sexuality, race (including Jewishness), radical Christianity, 
and left-wing politics. Peter Fry (a young British doctoral candidate researching in 
rural Rhodesia during the early 1960s) explicitly highlighted his sexuality as 
influencing his attitudes to the nationalists. 
 
Because of the fact that one was ipso facto criminal just for existing, this 
involved a considerable amount of terror and care. I've often thought about this 
and I thought about this at the time, why my attitude to black nationalism was 
not that of an abstract political scientist, it wasn't a question of principle, it was 
an emotional relationship that I had. I identified very strongly with [the African 
nationalists], especially when people were threatened with silence and 
banishment, which was exactly what happened to the nationalists in Rhodesia. 
So it was a very personal feeling which I can talk to you about. [...] I was 
actually more afraid of being picked up for being gay than for being 
sympathetic to the nationalist cause. Because they were related in a funny kind 
of way in my own mind, and I felt strangely related, and one could accuse one 
of being a sort-of unrepentant romantic I suppose.26 
 
Alongside Fry's individual motivations, there were other broader commonalities 
within the white radicals which explained their involvement. Education and early-life 
experiences appear to have strongly shaped the views adopted in adulthood. Many 
white radicals were highly educated. Eileen Haddon had attended medical school at 
the University of the Witwatersrand,27 and the Methodist minister Whitfield Foy had 
studied at the Wesleyan college at Headingly.28 Peter Mackay had been head boy at 
Stowe public school and an instructor in what is now the Defence Academy of the 
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United Kingdom.29 Garfield Todd, John Reed, Michael Faber, and Terence Ranger 
all attended Oxford University, whilst Guy Clutton-Brock and Peter Fry were 
Cambridge graduates. In his memoirs, Clutton-Brock emphasised the importance this 
environment had on his politics.  
 
I spent most of my time at Cambridge with friends who felt strongly about the 
social situation in the 1920s [...] We gathered in his room, endlessly talking 
religion and politics, socialism and social work. We attended meetings of 
diverse groups, clubs and churches - Conservative, Communist, Liberal, 
Labour, Atheist, Anglo-Catholic, Roman Catholic, and 'Come and Be Saved in 
the Vestry' Evangelicals.30 
 
This intellectual openness was reflected in the fact that the decision to join the 
nationalists was not as clear a break with the multi-racial ideals as some scholars 
have sought to portray.31 Indeed, the SRANC simply appeared to be the most likely 
route at that moment to secure an end to racial discrimination and political 
representation for the black population. Many radicals and African elites retained 
their memberships in other groups including the CAS, IASR, African trade unions, 
and liberal white Rhodesian political parties like the Central Africa Party (CAP). The 
result is that even some of the most committed radicals in later years describe their 
membership of the SRANC without reference to nation building efforts. Peter 
Mackay, for instance, explained his initial participation with the SRANC as a 
'stumble across the colour bar',32 and in 1958, John Reed highlighted his involvement 
with the SRANC as a cautionary attitude to black nationalism. 
 
I will believe this - that every African meeting I go to, is something against the 
development of the Mau Mau situation, the absolute separation of black and 
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white, by the apartheid, from both sides of violence, suppressing upon the 
apartheid from one side, of convention and oppression.33 
 
The Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya had highlighted what Giovanni Arrighi and John 
Saul called the 'living tradition [...] of peasant violence to redress socio-economic 
grievances'34 and many non-black radicals were worried by the violence of events in 
another white settler state. Of further concern was the conflict in Algeria which had 
been steadily escalating since 1954, the Ifni War in Spanish West Africa which had 
seen Moroccan soldiers attack the Spanish-held city of Sidi Ifni in an act of national 
liberation, and the numerous strikes, boycotts, and protests across South Africa.35 
 As with anti-colonial movements elsewhere on the continent, the SRANC 
could have adopted a strict black African membership policy and forced non-black 
activists to form their own groups. Black African nationalism was after all a 
concerted effort to withdraw black participation from integrated organisations. If the 
party's anti-partnership stance was interpreted in the way that historians like John 
David Leaver have attempted to do (as a rejection of any concept of racial 
cooperation), non-black membership of the SRANC would appear entirely 
antithetical.36 Yet Terence Ranger has emphasised that the SRANC 'by comparison 
with other African movements elsewhere, [remained] a moderate and painstakingly 
non-racial organisation.'37 Despite the vocal opposition of some, many African elites 
asserted that their fight was against white domination, not the whites themselves, and 
anybody who supported majority rule and was willing to work under African 
leadership was welcome to join. Willie Musarurwa (an SRANC founding member 
and one of the most prominent black journalists in Rhodesia) was an eternal optimist 
regarding racial co-operation. 
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African nationalism, as the leaders have often stated, does not exclude whites, 
many of whom are natives of the country and who were born and bred here, 
having no other home but Rhodesia. It accepts the whites as part and parcel of 
a non-racial nation in which the skin colour of a person has no more 
significance than the accident it is.38 
 
Nevertheless, even during the earliest days of the SRANC, there were visible 
demonstrations of the heterogeneity in Zimbabwean nationalist thinking. The CYL 
leaders James Chikerema and George Nyandoro had both taken up seats within the 
SRANC's executive but found themselves outnumbered by former (O)SRANC multi-
racialists like Jason Moyo, Francis Nehwati, and Joshua Nkomo. Thus whilst multi-
racialism was lambasted for not permitting black Africans to think and act for 
themselves, non-blacks were still welcomed into the party. Noel St. Quintin (the 
Mayor of Salisbury in the 1940s and a well-informed political commentator and 
historian of Rhodesia) asserts that there were about fifteen white members of the 
SRANC by 1958.39 
 Support for non-black participation was also conditional. Reed recounts a 
conversation with Joshua Nkomo in March 1958 in which the SRANC President 
lamented that 'at the moment there were only three Europeans in the Congress' and 
insisted 'that Congress does want Europeans - that they can be useful.'40 This utility 
was demonstrated most visibly by the Clutton-Brocks, the British missionaries and 
non-racialists who had proved influential on the CYL leaders' political development 
in 1955 and who, as Stephen Matewa described in a letter in 1980, had 'known we 
were oppressed before we realised it ourselves'.41 Despite a difference in skin colour, 
the Clutton-Brocks' non-racial work at St. Faith's Mission in Rusape endeared them 
to the Africans in the area. 'Both seemed full of love for people. Race and colour just 
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didn't enter their minds at all,' described their close friend Patricia Chater.42 John 
Mutasa was another who worked with them. 
 
Guy did a lot for us at St Faith’s, more than anyone. He educated us politically. 
I remember him having a meeting at St Faith’s with Herbert Chitepo and 
talking half the night. He spent much time with the nationalists. He was a man 
who had no class or colour bar in any form.43 
 
Given the Clutton-Brocks' reputations and support for the African cause, it was 
unsurprising they were quick to join the SRANC. Maurice Nyagumbo (Secretary of 
the Rusape branch of the SRANC and former member of the CYL) recalled Clutton-
Brock's crucial role during the multiple assemblies in September 1957 from which 
the SRANC would be born. Clutton-Brock was asked at the last minute to fill in for 
Herbert Chitepo in chairing a meeting that included the CYL leaders James 
Chikerema and Paul Mushonga, as well as members of the (O)SRANC. Nyagumbo 
states that Clutton-Brock refused, answering bluntly that 'I am no different from Sir 
Patrick Fletcher [the Minister for Native Affairs]', and emphasising that he was a 
white man first and foremost and it would therefore be a mistake to include him in 
such a prominent way in what should be a black African affair.44 However, at the 
same inaugural meeting, Clutton-Brock was the only non-black individual to speak 
and such acceptance did not go unnoticed as Eileen Haddon recorded. 
 
Those attending the ANC meeting were almost all black, the few whites 
present being treated with great courtesy and given seats on the platform 
despite the fact that there were far too many people present for the seating 
available. The emphasis here was on non-racialism and genuine “partnership” 
and Guy’s speech, given in English and translated into Shona by George 
Nyandoro, underlined the Christian message of love and equality of mankind.45 
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Word spread quickly about Clutton-Brock's involvement. In his diary entry for 15 
September 1957, Reed recorded: 
 
Whilst I have been away Terry [Ranger] has been meeting African leaders, and 
has attended the Inaugural meeting of the newly re-founded Southern Rhodesia 
African National Congress. [Guy] Clutton-Brock, who seems in an indefinite 
but real way somewhere behind the Congress, has suggested Terry should do 
work for it, without necessarily joining it - pointing out that they need a good 
propaganda which will have to be taken seriously by Europeans. But there is 
also the possibility that they have merely been persuaded by Clutton-Brock to 
have Europeans in, and in fact are not anxious.46 
 
Joshua Nkomo similarly highlighted Clutton-Brock's not-insignificant role in the 
context of the SRANC Executive's stated policy of non-racialism. 'There was – I 
must emphasise this – absolutely no intention to exclude white people as such from a 
full share in the national life. Guy Clutton-Brock in particular gave us significant 
help with drafting the new constitution.’47 In later years the validity of this statement 
would be repeatedly challenged, but initially it appeared that despite the reservations 
some African leaders held, those non-black individuals who demonstrated a genuine 
support for the African cause were to be welcomed.  
 
ii. Non-black participation 
 
The history of white dissent in Rhodesia is a complicated one. Academics have had a 
tendency to divide individuals involved into three clearly defined groups: moderates, 
liberals, and radicals.48 Yet these definitions were fluid, with individuals retaining 
multiple memberships simultaneously or transitioning from one group to another. 
Although such terms remain useful in broadly identifying an individual's position on 
the spectrum of white activism, it is important to recognise the fluidity and the role 
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self-ascribed identities played in defining one's position. Ian Hancock summarises 
the radicals as: 
 
the handful of missionaries, farmers, professional people and housewives who 
offered more than mere sympathy for African aspirations and positively 
supported majority rule from the late 1950s [and] accepted a subordinate status 
within black-led politics.49 
 
The important distinction between a radical and liberal agenda was the belief in 
African nationalism. Like some of the African leaders, many white liberals 
abandoned their multi-racialism in favour of African-led politics. Peter Mackay was 
one example. As a result of his favourable impressions and relationships generated 
with African nationalists through shared experiences within the CAS, 'Peter made the 
same journey from "partnership" to nationalism as Leopold [Takawira],' explains 
Terence Ranger50 and as the divisions between liberals and radicals widened, those 
who saw themselves as the latter began to voice their distaste for those who failed to 
follow. Writing in Dissent in 1959, John Reed (one of the first generation of radicals) 
laid bare this disdain. 
 
Very few liberals really think being a liberal involves any sort of identification 
with African aspirations. They think of themselves as manipulating (so far they 
have done this very ineptly) an already existent political system in a direction 
which they believe will bring about a less racially divided country. The liberal 
adopts an inviting stance and waits for the African to run to join him. He 
doesn't join the African [...] They are striving to reform that they may 
preserve.51 
 
This differences between liberal and radical activities were less clear. Both the 
welfare organisations seeking to support the families of detained African nationalists 
and the protest groups against the legal racial discrimination in Rhodesia were 
predominantly liberal groups in their goals and actions, yet were often led by 
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radicals.52 Thus where the radicals are seen to stand apart was in their visions for the 
future. The radicals believed in a black African state; the liberals in a white state 
where black Africans played a significant but still subservient role to the white 
minority. 'A truly multiracial society, like a truly classless society, isn't just the old 
familiar society minus a few prejudices, with well-dressed Africans sitting in the 
restaurants,' explained Reed wryly.53 
 The result of this relative extremism was that only a few whites were willing 
to openly support the SRANC, a pattern that also repeated within the coloured 
community.54 In an interview from January 2000, James Chikerema claimed that 'in 
the two major towns of Salisbury and Bulawayo, [the SRANC] managed to find 
limited support among Coloured and Asian businessmen and professionals’55 and 
Noel St. Quintin similarly notes in his unpublished manuscript on the SRANC that 
there were 'some coloured and Indian members,' but puts the figure at less than 
fifteen.56 This small number was a reflection of how black African nationalism was 
regarded by those communities for whom it appeared to offer no obvious benefits 
over their existing policy of self-contained community-based activism. For the 
coloured population in particular, African nationalism remained a distant second as a 
means of securing change. Already marginalised by Rhodesian society for being 
outside of the easy taxonomy of geography ('European', 'African') or skin colour 
('white', 'black'), the coloured community's rights to citizenship in Rhodesia were 
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perpetually uncertain despite over 90 per cent being born within the nation.57 Thus a 
black nationalist ideology seemed to ignore them just as much as the white 
Rhodesian politics did, whilst an independent coloured movement offered them a 
political identity and voice which recognised their unique position in society. As 
James Muzondidya asserts: 
 
the majority of coloured activists in the RTL [Rhodesia's Teachers League] and 
other coloured communal organisations continued to pursue their political 
objectives through the politics of co-operation [with] those white liberals who 
displayed signs of commitment to the gradual equalization of opportunities for 
advancement.58 
 
Organisations like the Coloured Community Service League and the Euro-African 
Patriotic Society (the latter founded by the prominent coloured Rhodesian hotelier 
Ronald Snapper) 'stepped up their mobilisation' and 'tried to improve their 
effectiveness by mobilising Coloureds [...] to defend and promote their social and 
economic interests as a group.'59 The fear was that black African nationalism would 
absorb their distinct demands under a nationalist effort.  
 Although the coloured community as a whole was generally wealthier and 
more educated than their black counterparts, it was still only an elite sub-section who 
actively involved themselves in politics. Businessmen like Ronald Snapper, 
Christopher Raftopoulos, and Jack Jones were at the forefront. Coloured teachers 
were also particularly vocal critics of racial discrimination and a number were 
willing to 'pursue other strategies meant to yield positive results for their 
communities'.60 Those coloured individuals who did join the nationalist movement in 
1957 were predominantly the same generation of radical activists who had suggested 
closer political cooperation between coloureds and other oppressed groups in 
Rhodesia in the 1940s and thus had some experience of inter-racial political 
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collaboration.61 This small group had first advocated for coloured involvement with 
the SRLP, then the African trade unions, and finally the multi-racial organisations 
like the IASR and CAS. It was thus unsurprising that they embraced African 
nationalism when it arose.  
 The Indian community faced similar challenges in mobilising elements to 
support the Zimbabwean nationalist cause. In the 1950s a number of Indian groups 
were established, partly to demand rights and representation, but also according to 
Hasu Patel to 'search for what is the identity of the Indian community here, based on 
the fact that it is a migrant community'.62 In 1954 the radical Lotus Group was 
established in Bulawayo to encourage discussion around a monthly magazine. At the 
same time a political group (the Bulawayo Asian Civil Rights League) demonstrated 
the growing discontent with multi-racialism beyond the radicalism of black African 
elites.63 Floyd and Lillian Dotson explain that the older Indian generation feared that 
there would be a 'moral contamination' through close cooperation with the African 
nationalists given the 'lower standing' of black Africans in Rhodesian society.64 Yet 
although unwilling to follow the younger radicals on their progression from Indian-
based protest groups to the emergent SRANC, a number of the older Indians 
recognised the benefit of a political cooperation based solely on the Indian 
community's 'non-white' classification. As was noted in a 1957 article in the Bantu 
Mirror, the older generation of leaders began referring to a partnership between all 
'dark skinned people in the Federation' as something worth pursuing.65 
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 The SRANC's leadership also recognised the benefits of a membership 
containing representatives of all the Rhodesian racial groups, especially the 
possibility of a multi-racial support base. A non-racial membership would visibly 
demonstrate to the white liberals with voices in Rhodesian politics as well as the 
ordinary rural and urban black Africans that Zimbabwean nationalism could function 
without the racial conflict that some of the more extremist SRANC leaders were 
agitating for. Such a claim was desirable from the perspective of the African party, if 
not imperative, at that delicate moment in time. When engaging the white state and 
white public, non-racialism within the African parties presented an interesting 
challenge to the perceptions of the African movement. 'A European party that admits 
Africans is multiracial: an African party that admits Europeans is still racialist,' 
explained an article in Dissent in 1959.66 This was to prove a key theme of changes 
in the perception of non-racialism within the nationalist movement over the next few 
years. 
 Relationships were beginning to form between many of the nationalists and 
the non-black supporters which added a personal dimension to the situation. As Peter 
Mackay explains,  
 
I had come to know many of those who were active, or who in time would 
become active, in the African national movement, ordinary members of the 
Congress with high feelings and others who had emerged into positions of 
leadership.67 
 
These connections afforded an opportunity to force discussions. In 1957, Terence 
Ranger raised the question of non-black citizenship with the SRANC leaders. 'We 
ranged over nationalism and democracy. I tried to persuade them that they must do 
some serious thinking about minority safeguards and that democracy is about the 
rights of minorities,’ he wrote.68 John Reed's diaries similarly include a number of 
dinners with black and white friends including nationalist leaders, trade unionists, 
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and academics. On the 29 March 1958, Reed recorded that 'Nyandoro, Chikerema, 
[Moses] Ayema and [Paul] Mushona are Terry's guests to dinner,'69 and on 30 May, 
Reed dined with Enoch Dumbetshena (one of the most prominent nationalists of the 
pre-CYL era). Afterwards both went for tea with Nathan Shamuyarira and the racial 
composition of the dining party was notable enough for Reed to emphasise the 
significance. 'Thus we sit together, European and Africans, in a house in Harare, 
eating and drinking and discussing.'70 For the white Rhodesian state, this cross-racial 
socialising represented exactly the breakdown of established social segregation 
which it was desperately trying to prevent with the existing Colour Bar.  
 
iii. Racial divisions: white Rhodesia's response to the SRANC 
 
The reaction of the Rhodesian government to the formation of the nationalists' non-
racial ideology revealed the underlying instability of Rhodesian society. The reliance 
on European domination of the political scene meant the existence of a popular 
African-led party indicated to the Rhodesian population as a whole that the 
government's policy of gradual advancement had failed. Compared to subsequent 
black nationalist parties, the SRANC's manifesto was not particularly radical. Aside 
from the calls for a complete revocation of the Land Apportionment Act,71 it was the 
fundamental incompatibility between guaranteeing a white voice in government and 
the SRANC's demands for majority rule which were viewed as anathema to the 
security of white Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the simple existence of the youth leaguers 
in an organisation alongside former multi-racialists was worrying for the white 
population. The activities of African political groups in both Nyasaland and Northern 
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Rhodesia further ensured that the SRANC was regarded as being explicitly anti-
white.72 
 The result was that whilst the dominant political paradigm in Rhodesia 
remained focused on multi-racial partnership, the fear of African nationalism spurred 
elements of the population to embrace increasingly racialist politics. Stephen Hintz 
explains that ‘the majority of white Rhodesians always possessed conservative racial 
attitudes, but a large percentage of this majority identified with the racially moderate 
party for non-racial reasons. These traditional ties were irreparably broken by the 
increasing prominence of racial issues.’73 In an effort to stifle African nationalism, 
new white-led parties were formed that appealed for black and white supporters. 
Hercules Robinson, the leader of the Dominion Party (which would later become the 
RF), announced:  
 
We must have Europeans and Africans in large numbers in all the main 
political parties. [...] The last thing we want to see in this country is all the 
Africans in one party and all the Europeans in another. If we are to do away 
with racial politics, it will only be done if the division in the country is political 
and not racial.74 
 
 Even those white politicians who vocally supported African advancement found 
themselves struggling to reconcile the SRANC with their own political strategies. At 
the time of the SRANC's rapid early growth, the New Zealand-born farmer and 
missionary Garfield Todd was the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister.75 A liberal by 
Rhodesian standards, Todd was nevertheless quick to attack the SRANC in 
December 1957 for having 'been captured [...] by those two extremists Nyandoro and 
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Clutton-Brock!'76 The involvement of both in the formation of the CYL in 1955 was 
public knowledge and earned them the epithet of extremist. 
 Todd would later become an ardent supporter of the nationalist movement, 
but in the late-1950s with the possibility of a multi-racial solution still on the table, 
he denounced racialised nationalism (of any sort) as a threat to stability in central 
Africa and set about attempting to secure change in his own way. The modest 
reforms Todd proposed would eventually see him ousted by his own cabinet, 
unhappy at the extent of the changes.77 Denounced as an 'ultra-liberal',78 Todd was 
accused in February 1958 of paying secret visits to Joshua Nkomo, desiring to 
destroy the authority of the Native Affairs Department, and prioritising the IASR 
over the Federation. Many scholars including John David Leaver and Dickson 
Mungazi see Todd's denouncement as marking 'the start of racial polarization' in the 
nation,79 and emphasising to Africans that they 'could no longer place their trust and 
confidence in the so-called liberal whites.'80 Even commentators at the time reiterated 
the significance of the event in shaping the racial nature of African politics, with 
Knight T.T. Maripe (Nkomo's successor in the SRTUC) declaring it 'a severe blow to 
the African community.'81 The multi-racialist Nathan Shamuyarira was a UFP 
delegate present when Todd was voted out and would later argue that with Todd's 
removal, the efforts 'for peaceful cooperation and swift progression toward racial 
equality - or better, a non-racial state -were over.'82 Although the government of 
Todd's successor Edgar Whitehead did not abandon multi-racialism completely (in 
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March 1958, the UFP's new branch at Bulawayo West was launched with an Indian 
chairman and secretary-treasurer83), the new government rejected the extent and 
speed with which Todd had proposed changes. This stance dismayed many of the 
remaining African multi-racialists. Although a few would persist with partnership 
including Herbert Chitepo (Rhodesia's first black lawyer), Enoch Dumbutshena, and 
Reuben Jamela (the trade union leader), a large number shifted their support to the 
SRANC. 
 Several of these elites were motivated by personal grievances they believed 
could not be resolved under the Whitehead government. One was Bernard Chidzero, 
an academic offered a teaching position at the UCRN in 1959. Chidzero's marriage to 
a white French-Canadian woman meant he found himself unable to take up the place 
as there was nowhere for his family to reside near the university.84 Realising any 
significant changes in these laws were unlikely given Todd's dismissal, Chidzero 
joined the SRANC in 1959 and marked his arrival with a public lecture on the topic 
'Partnership in Practice', in which he criticised the differences between the actual and 
potential meanings of racial partnership.85 A number of white liberals also joined the 
SRANC, with white membership jumping from less than twenty in December 1957 
to around fifty by the autumn of 1958, according to one of the Rhodesian police 
tasked with observing the organisation.86 Accompanying this surge of supporters, 
there appeared to be the possibility of cooperation between the largely antagonistic 
trade unions, nationalists, and multi-racialists. At a meeting in April 1958 organised 
by the Commercial and General Workers Union, the SRANC, Trade Unions 
Congress (TUC), Christian Action Group, and IASR were all represented, and 
attendees included Hardwicke Holderness, George Nyandoro, James Chikerema, 
Paul Mashona, John Reed, Terence Ranger, and Guy Clutton-Brock.87 
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 Unfortunately, the public knowledge that whites were involved with the 
nationalist leadership enabled the Rhodesian government to propagate rumours of the 
'educated African who poses as a leader of the people, but in whose background 
there is a white man who tells him what to do.'88 On the 28 May 1958, Reed recorded 
'there is some [...] nonsense about a story that there are six Europeans, who control 
Congress and they are all in the URP, and the URP is merely a facade for the ANC 
(or the other way round).'89 Such attacks were indicative of a deeply rooted fear held 
by the white state; the mobilisation of the African population by a foreign power.  
As would become familiar rhetoric in future years, the white Rhodesian state 
was quick to paint the nationalist movement as one influenced by outside forces, 
particularly Communist ones. In his New Year's message, Sir Roy Welenksy (the 
CAF's Prime Minister) explicitly condemned the dangers of a 'communist influence 
through the medium of African nationalism.'90 In the global context of the Cold War 
and with the presence of Soviet or Chinese weapons and instructors elsewhere on the 
continent (especially in Algeria and Egypt), attempts were made to highlight the 
foreignness of the white radicals from the white Rhodesian nation and thus discredit 
their connection to the African struggle. The white settlers ardently believed 'the 
"natives" could not have done it alone; there must have been a white hand behind it 
and that meant a red hand,' explained Clutton-Brock.91 In January 1958, Eric Louw 
(the South African Minister of External Affairs) stated that Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia were being: 
 
led up the garden path by India and other Eastern countries who are looking 
only after their own interests and who will not hesitate to use and exploit the 
black peoples of Africa for the furtherance of such interests.92 
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The labelling of all white radicals as communists, regardless of their politics, 
afforded the Rhodesian government with justification to keep them under 
observation. On 19 March 1958, Garfield Todd reported to Terence Ranger that he 
had seen both Ranger and Reed's names on a list of white SRANC members,93 and 
Reed's ongoing engagement with the African trade unions had also been noted by the 
intelligence services.94 The distrust of any dissenting elements of the white 
Rhodesian state would grow until all institutions potentially harbouring liberals or 
radicals were viewed with suspicion. These included the Cold Comfort Farm of the 
Clutton-Brocks, Ranche House College established and run by Ken and Lillian 
Mew,95 and even the UCRN. 
 
 
iv. 1959 State of Emergency 
 
 
The description of Zimbabwean nationalism as being part of an international 
movement was also a response to the pan-Africanism surrounding the independence 
of Ghana in 1958. As Zoë Groves has shown, the events that transpired in 1958 and 
1959 regarding the SRANC cannot be understood without considering the 
transnational collaboration of the African nationalist movements within the CAF and 
beyond.96 The nationalist movements in all three federal territories shared a number 
of aims and objectives, and the pan-African sentiments that had emerged provided a 
framework on which the peoples of the CAF had sought to work together. As 
evidenced in the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra in December 1958 'such 
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contacts with older nationalist movements were important in that they helped to 
internationalise what later became known as the Rhodesian problem.'97 
 Whilst protests in Southern Rhodesia remained relatively peaceful, worries 
were growing regarding the escalating violence in Nyasaland.98 On 26 February 1959 
a State of Emergency was declared across the CAF. Under the pretence of growing 
African violence in the region, 495 people were detained for their association with 
the ANC parties of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.99 Of those 
detained, 492 were black men, two were black women, and one (Guy Clutton-Brock) 
was the sole white detainee.100 As a sign of the distrust white Rhodesians had for 
Clutton-Brock, Edward Aitken-Cade (leader of the opposition) 'appealed to the 
Government that the [Emergency] regulations should be implemented without 
discrimination', adding 'there are Europeans in these organisations for whom he 
hoped there would be room in the Federation's prisons.'101 Clutton-Brock held the 
honour of being 'the first European to be arrested under emergency regulations,'102 
and the Clutton-Brocks' daughter Sally vividly recalled her realisation that the family 
were no longer regarded as nuisance liberals. 
 
The crunch came in 1959. Five hundred Africans and Dad were arrested. I’d 
overheard girls at school saying “Kill all those terrorists” and there it was on 
the front page of the paper – my Dad was one of them and white into the 
bargain. There was silence when I walked into the locker room.103 
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Clutton-Brock's arrest was also recognised by the black nationalists as noteworthy. 
As Terence Ranger wrote: 
 
I remember arrested and detained members of Congress writing to me in 1959 
to say that they were astonished that Guy had been arrested: that it was only 
Guy and a few other people who reminded Africans that the struggle was not a 
racial one, but a struggle for justice.104 
 
The attention given to Clutton-Brock's detention demonstrates how prominent the 
presence of non-Africans within the nationalist movement was and how discouraging 
the rise of this non-racial nationalist movement was for the white state. Edgar 
Whitehead was particularly reluctant to let the black nationalism replace white-led 
multi-racialism. On 26 February 1959, Whitehead warned that 'unless multi-
racialism worked [...] there could be nothing but misery ahead for the country.' 
During the same press conference, Whitehead was asked what had been the biggest 
motivation for him proclaiming an emergency. He replied: 'I feared the Congress 
pressure on Africans who believed in multi-racial development was getting worse 
and worse.’105 In Parliament the following month, Edwin Aitkin-Cade pressed the 
Minister of Justice to both reveal the names of any whites who were members of the 
SRANC and to state the extent to which the party had been externally financed. 
When the Minister refused the former on the basis of public interest and the latter on 
a lack of concrete information, Aitkin-Cade insisted that since the name of Clutton-
Brock had been publicly disclosed, the names of the other members should be 
also.106 
 Although fifty African detainees were freed shortly after, Clutton-Brock was 
the first to be released in a move which brought international focus to the nationalist 
struggle.107 An article in Time Magazine on 4 June 1959 entitled 'Religion: The 
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Practical Christian', portrayed Clutton-Brock as an integral part of the African 
nationalist struggle. Although a distinctly American racialised rhetoric crept into the 
article (especially the use of the term 'Negroes'), it nevertheless emphasised Clutton-
Brock's commitment to the cause and highlighted both his month in prison and his 
camaraderie with the African nationalists. 'When Congress organizers were branded 
"agitators", he [Clutton-Brock] said: "It is the duty of every citizen and Christian to 
be an agitator for justice, righteousness and truth"', the article reported.108 
 As the article demonstrated, little is said of Clutton-Brock which does not 
take into account his religious and socio-political beliefs, often deliberately 
misconstrued by his critics as communist in their basis. A more accurate assessment 
is that Clutton-Brock was able to 'reconcile Christianity with Marxism',109 resulting 
in what Donald S. Moore describes as a 'Christian humanism dedicated to racial 
equality.' Because of this belief system 'Clutton-Brock embodied access to capital, 
knowledge, and support that spanned countries and continents'.110 Along with those 
Africans who had been educated through the mission school system, Clutton-Brock 
believed that there was no place for racial discrimination in a Christian society. As he 
himself explained, 'living close to African life, we inevitably identified ourselves 
with the problems of those among whom we lived.’111 Christianity provided him with 
a greater understanding of these issues than a purely economic or political 
foundation. Furthermore, Clutton-Brock's religious faith earned him support from 
other radical elements of the Christian community. After his arrest, Cecil Alderson 
(Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland) stated that 'Clutton-Brock has taken the only 
course open to an honourable man to take.'112 Others took his actions as indicative of 
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the strength of spirit a strong conviction in a socialist agenda afforded, including the 
British Labour Party.113 
  Nevertheless, as J.R.T. Wood notes, 'Clutton-Brock, of course, was far more 
involved in the activities of the SRANC than the protestors would concede,'114 and 
many white Rhodesians did not view the single white arrest as going far enough. 
Motions were put forward in the Rhodesian Parliament for the ANC parties 
throughout the CAF to be banned permanently due to the undue influence of whites 
within the groups, as one MP explained. 
 
I am satisfied that certain persons have set out wrongly to inflame the 
legitimate grievances of Africans in Southern Rhodesia [...] These persons 
have endeavoured to instil in the minds of Africans a contempt for properly 
constituted authority [...] They have brought terror by threat and 
intimidation.115 
 
Into this environment was brought the Unlawful Organisations Bill which legally 
banned the ANC in all three Federal territories and made membership of any 
proscribed organisation punishable by up to five years in prison.116 As an attempt to 
suppress the rise of the SRANC, the widespread repression was successful - albeit 
temporarily - and the arrests of many of the leading nationalist stalwarts ensured a 
disruption in the daily running of the nationalist parties.117 Yet the Rhodesian state's 
actions also served to exacerbate racial tensions, particularly between the nationalist 
leaders and the white Rhodesian government. In the aftermath, attitudes to the settler 
governments throughout the CAF became increasingly hostile. As Dissent reported 
on Nyasaland, 'the events of the emergency have made their hatred of Federation 
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almost obsessive. This hatred and the suspicion of all Europeans which it engenders 
is damaging both to the present and the future prosperity of Nyasaland.'118 
 Similar attitudes had arisen in Southern Rhodesia. Despite the SRANC's 
relative moderation,119 the firm actions of the Rhodesian state ensured that African 
nationalism began to swing more broadly towards majority rule and anti-white 
sentiments. The infamous Law and Order (Maintenance) Act [LOMA] introduced in 
December 1960 was a particularly clear sign of the deliberately racialised repressive 
stance of the white state.120 Writing in 1960, Richard Gray described the polarisation 
of the races as a result of the emergency measures,121 and in casual conversations 
amongst members of the SRANC, the growing rancour against all whites in Rhodesia 
was noted as having taken on an unprecedented antagonism. 'I cannot help but sense 
an inevitable misunderstanding and mistrust between the African and even the 
European who wants there to be understanding and trust,' Reed had noted on 15 
September 1959.122 
 Despite the surge in anti-white sentiments, by 1959 there remained a few 
moderate African elites who remained committed to multi-racialism including Mike 
Hove, Patrick Rubatika, Stanlake Samkange, Jasper Savanhu and Lawrence 
Vambe.123 Their reasoning was explained in Dissent.  
 
Some 'moderates' feel that a withdrawal of this kind [from multi-racial 
activities] would betray the liberal Europeans and not hurt others. [...] Others 
are still suspicious that the mass African political movements will drift into 
methods which they condemn as much as ever.124 
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These tensions were a mere indicator of the internal struggles that would dominate 
the nationalist movement, and in which the role of non-blacks would come to be 
increasingly scrutinised. Even at this stage, there was no certainty as to which route 
would be likely to succeed in securing majority rule, and many Africans were willing 
to try to keep open as many options as possible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the SRANC was ultimately banned, it made substantial advances in 
defining Zimbabwean nationalist ideology and what citizenship of the future 
imagined nation would entail. It began to establish the role non-black individuals 
could play in the African cause and what positions they would occupy after 
independence. More broadly it affected relatively significant changes within 
Southern Rhodesian society and politics. As Ngwabi Bhebe explains: 
 
The SRANC was successful in that it brought about the genesis of mass 
nationalism in Southern Rhodesia; in that its methods were effective enough to 
frighten the whites into banning it as well as into embarking upon reforming 
their colonial system, even though the reforms were far below what the 
Africans wanted. Moreover, the founders of the new SRANC succeeded in one 
of their ambitions in that they established “a national organisation” which 
spoke with authority and backing on all matters affecting (African) interests.125 
 
In an article in Dissent published in October 1959, the inherent challenges Whitehead 
faced in preventing a resurgence of the SRANC were laid bare. 
 
The Government must know - [...] after the information gathered during the 
Emergency - how difficult this task [of removing African grievances] is going 
to be. They must now realise that Congress had widespread support and the 
grievances which ensured it that support were not "pin-pricks" but sprang from 
the fundamental legislation of the country. For Congress was not merely the 
instrument of the half-educated city slicker - if it had been it would not have 
presented the degree of danger that it did to the Government. Congress was 
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remarkable because it brought together for the first time two potentially 
dynamic African political forces - the force of the peasantry and the force of 
the urban worker - a traditionally potent revolutionary combination. Congress 
had the sympathy of the educated, "emergent" African and it was led by the 
frustrated half-educated. But its impetus was given by the peasants and the 
workers.126 
 
 After the emergency, the Rhodesian government made clear its belief that African 
nationalism had been silenced and that the way forward would now be through the 
policies of gradual advancement offered by Whitehead's government.  
 Yet there were three factors that undermined such claims. First, the Devlin 
Commission's report published in July 1959 highlighted the mass support that the 
SRANC had held, including from non-black sections of the Federation's 
population.127 Secondly, the release within a month of a large proportion of those 
detained during the Emergency ensured that the nationalist movement retained some 
impetus. Imbued now with their experiences in detention to add to their complaints 
against the government, the nationalist leaders gained a legitimacy with being 
arrested. In the interim, the removal of certain leaders had permitted 'stand-in players 
to come on stage [...] Michael Mawema, Leopold Takawira, Sketchley Samkange, 
Moton Malianga, George Silundika, Enos Nkala in the colony and Robert Mugabe 
abroad.'128 Many of this new generation would be important in defining the racialism 
of Zimbabwean nationalist ideology. Their sudden prominence marked a crucial 
opportunity to attain personal power, but also to bring to the fore their own beliefs 
for the struggle, and with the continued detention of the older nationalist leaders, this 
shift within the movement would become notable in the following years. 
 Thirdly, and most importantly, the Emergency of 1959 provided an 
opportunity for non-blacks to once again demonstrate their commitment to the 
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African cause in the face of anti-white antagonism. As Guy Clutton-Brock would 
reflect, 'the racial emergency produced a new outburst of non-racial activity.'129 A 
core-group of radicals including John Reed, Peter Mackay, and Shelagh Ranger 
made repeat visits to the Khami and Selukwe prisons in order to assist the families of 
detainees in seeing their imprisoned fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons.130 The 
Rangers, Clutton-Brocks, and Haddons further worked with Stanlake Samkange, 
Nathan Shamuyarira and Herbert Chitepo to establish the Southern Rhodesian 
(Detainees) Legal Aid and Welfare Fund (SRLAWF), an organisation whose primary 
goal was to raise funds in order to provide legal defence for arrested African 
nationalists.131 With international support from religious and secular organisations, 
the SRLAWF won admiration from the detainees and their families and from the 
African public more broadly, and would persist well into the 1960s.132 With help 
from the Christian Action Group (another multi-racial non-political organisation 
active in Southern Rhodesia133), the SRLAWF ensured that 'every detainee has 
received assistance to put in his answer to the Government's charges, [...] the longest 
and most complicated cases have been defended and [...] the general case for 
Congress has been stated.'134 As George Karekwaivanane has shown, the legal and 
racial aspects of such cases also highlighted the racial divisions within the trust of the 
law and those who practised it. Herbert Chitepo, the first African lawyer in Southern 
Rhodesia, played a significant role in defending the nationalist detainees largely with 
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funding from the SRLAWF,135 and did so alongside white lawyers such as Edwin 
Lichtenstein, Bryan Elliot, Antony Eastwood, Ken Reagan, and Leo Baron. Many of 
these strongly objected to the 'actions of the Rhodesian authorities and fought 
tirelessly on behalf of their clients,' regardless of their own stance on Zimbabwean 
nationalism.136 
 Such actions demonstrated the breadth of ways in which the white radicals 
sought to demonstrate their utility to the African cause, and to justify their inclusion 
in a Zimbabwean nationalist ideology. Membership of the SRANC had demonstrated 
a willingness to participate in African politics, and the arrest of Clutton-Brock had 
emphasised their readiness to suffer in the name of the cause. Although their role 
remained uncertain, their continuing presence ensured that they could not be ignored. 
Race had to be discussed and debated, and a new form of racial politics created to 
replace multi-racial partnership. Given the strength of these convictions it was 
unsurprising that the issue of race was raised as soon as mention of a replacement 
nationalist party was made. With the National Democratic Party's (NDP) formation, 
the non-black radicals found themselves not only tolerated but valued because of 
their racial identities. If the SRANC had set the stage for non-racial nationalism, it 
was the NDP which cemented the place of non-blacks in the Zimbabwean nationalist 
struggle. Yet this acceptance was hard fought and had to be maintained in the face of 
new challenges, as the next chapter shows. 
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Chapter 3 
Open Nationalism and Internal Disagreements: The NDP 
and ZAPU, 1959-1962 
 
Introduction 
 
On 1 January 1960, the NDP was launched in the African township of Highfield near 
Salisbury. For what was designed to be a successor to the banned SRANC, the NDP 
did not appear to be anything of the sort. Despite the presence of several stalwarts of 
African nationalism, the NDP's executive was dominated by new adherents to the 
nationalist cause. These comprised a younger generation of well-educated, 
internationally-minded radicals alongside several older multi-racialist elites and 
intellectuals who saw the banning of the SRANC as an opportunity to impose their 
own agendas onto a malleable political context. Consequently, the NDP quickly 
established itself as being far more radical than its predecessor, and explicitly called 
for majority rule and a universal franchise. Rather than simply envisioning a 
wholesale take-over of the Rhodesian state, the NDP also began to discuss the details 
involved in constructing a Zimbabwean nation, including the creation of a national 
consciousness that embraced their identities as black Africans. 
 The resulting movement became a 'milestone in the resurgence of African 
politics'.1 The NDP and its successor the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) 
provided the most successful definitions of Zimbabwean nationalism during the 
period of 'open nationalism'. But this consolidation also led to the first large-scale 
internal disagreements, including the formation of radical splinter groups espousing a 
competing (and often antithetical) nationalist agenda. As both a continuation of the 
objectives of the SRANC and a more focused liberation ideology, this chapter argues 
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that the NDP and ZAPU nevertheless retained many of the problems which had 
historically plagued African politics in Zimbabwe. These included an elite focus, a 
failure to transfer non-racial ideals from the leadership to the ordinary African 
supporters, and a lack of cohesion around race and citizenship in the imagined 
Zimbabwean nation. As with the SRANC, uncertainty about the chosen direction for 
the anti-colonial struggle was complicated by the existence of non-nationalist 
movements including the African trade unions and multi-racial white-led political 
parties.  
 The first two sections of this chapter focus on the debates about race which 
accompanied the emergence of the NDP. The argument is put forward that distrust 
with multi-racial politics and the impact the white state's repression did much to 
shape racial thinking within the NDP. The leadership were forced to more clearly 
define the positioning of non-black supporters within the movement and in the future 
Zimbabwean nation than within the SRANC. Furthermore, debates about the place of 
those individuals who were neither black nor white (particularly involving the 
coloured community) also gained importance. The third section tackles the short-
lived tolerance of ZAPU and the spaces created for discussion and change after the 
NDP's banning. The perennial confusion that dominated the leadership of the 
nationalist movement also became apparent during this period, and the interactions 
between non-black radicals, the nationalist leadership, and ordinary African 
nationalists, are all explored. Finally, the growing risks to non-black radicals for their 
support of the African cause and the internal conflicts surrounding an increasingly 
racialist and violent movement are assessed, with the banning of ZAPU in September 
1962 bringing the chapter to a close. 
 
i. Race and Citizenship in the NDP's formation, January 1960 - June 1960 
 
The NDP made clear from the outset that it was not going to shy away from the 
controversial issues of race and citizenship. Partly this was a reflection of the 
SRANC's own troubled efforts to distinguish itself from multi-racial organisations, 
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whilst simultaneously accommodating former multi-racialists. Because the SRANC 
had failed to clearly define its own position regarding non-black individuals within 
the struggle, it had permitted contradictory viewpoints to arise, much to the 
confusion of those non-blacks looking to provide assistance. Indeed, as the previous 
chapter demonstrated, it was only the personal relationships between prominent 
white radicals like Guy Clutton-Brock and the former CYL leaders which had 
permitted a non-racial policy based on utility to emerge in the first place. 
 However, the NDP's deliberate focus on non-black supporters was also a 
reflection of the shift at the highest ranks. Maurice Nyagumbo (who remained in 
detention at Selukwe) described the NDP 'as much or more the creation of a new 
generation of political activists many of whom [...] had remained relatively aloof in 
the Congress period'.2 At an inaugural meeting attended by some 900 people, an 
interim executive council was elected including the seasoned African politician 
Michael Mawema as interim president,  Moton Malianga, Stanlake Samkange, 
Nazaris Marondera, Enos Nkala and Joshua Nkomo (from abroad).3 This 
combination of younger radicals like Malianga with older African politicians like 
Mawema and Samkange guaranteed conflict within the leadership over fundamental 
policies, but this first NDP meeting also demonstrated several other important 
changes involving the nationalist movement and the Rhodesian political landscape. 
Several prominent multi-racialists participated in the discussions, including Leopold 
Takawira (the former organising secretary of the CAS and a member of the white-led 
multi-racial CAP) who remained convinced that a multi-racial solution was still 
needed. As Michael West explains, Takawira's speech to the meeting was 'pure 
partnership' and focused on a moderate solution to Rhodesia's problems, to the extent 
that the NDP leaders 'found it prudent to disassociate themselves from his 
comments.'4 Terence Ranger further reported that a group of the African middle class 
                                               
2 Nyagumbo, With the People, p.128 
3 See Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.71 
4 West, African Middle Class, p.221 
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(colloquially called the 'Beatrice Cottage group'5) also attended the first meeting.6 
Such support was not entirely surprising. Many of the African elites and aspirant 
middle-classes had been hostile to African nationalism because of the challenge it 
posed to their own social status. Yet by the time of the NDP's formation, it was 
apparent that there had been a steady disintegration of multi-racial partnership ideals 
whilst African nationalism was in a period of sustained growth. Individuals like 
Takawira therefore believed their best chance of persisting with a multi-racialist 
agenda was to play a role in defining African nationalism from an early stage. 
Although not well received, Takawira's attendance at the NDP meeting was a means 
of testing how responsive the movement was to non-racial ideologies. 
 The NDP's maiden meeting further provided an opportunity for the non-black 
radicals to ascertain their ascribed roles within the new party. As with the SRANC, 
assurances about the NDP's non-racial stance were quickly forthcoming. 'Europeans, 
it was made clear, were welcome - if they were prepared to accept African leadership 
- but the time had come when only Africans could help Africans,' recalled one 
attendee.7 This was a more clearly worded condition for participation than the 
SRANC had ever made, but it was also a tentative acknowledgement that it was 
unwise to completely exclude non-black supporters. Issues of race within the 
nationalist ideology were further clarified by the NDP's publicity secretary Nazaris 
Marondera the following month. In a letter published in Dissent, Marondera laid out 
the NDP's criteria for non-black citizenship in the future Zimbabwean nation.  
 
The party has defined that any immigrant who has decided to make Africa his 
home and subscribes to the belief that all men are born free and equal shall be 
called an African. The party sees no sense in anybody calling himself a 
European when he has decided to make Africa his home. The party has 
                                               
5 They were named for their residence in the 74 cottages let to middle-class black Africans 
just outside the Harare township. See Kudakwashe Manganga, 'A historical study of 
industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe and its contemporary transitions: The case of 
African Harare, c.1890-1980', Ph.D., Stellenbosch University, 2013, pp.120-121 
6 'Terence Ranger to John Reed, 6 January 1960', Terence Ranger Papers, Bodleian Library 
of Commonwealth and African Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 
7 'African Year in Southern Rhodesia', Dissent, No.15 (14 January 1960), p.15 
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therefore committed itself to a non-racial policy. For its membership, it 
depends on popular support freely given on the full appreciation of its policies 
and principles [...] If any racial group decides as a racial group to exclude itself 
from the National Democratic Party, it does not then follow that the party is a 
racialist organisation.8 
 
Rarely had an African politician spoken so candidly about race and the nationalist 
struggle. Marondera's letter was the first time that a senior member in the 
Zimbabwean nationalist movement clarified the fluidity of the term 'African' and the 
associated rights to participation in the nation building efforts that came with the 
label. As well as a clear rejection of the Rhodesian state's use of biological race, 
Marondera's statement was a dismissal of racial terms based on skin colour. It 
indicated that the Zimbabwean nationalist ideology espoused by the NDP did not 
associate 'Africanness' with 'blackness', as it would in later years. Rather it was 
possible for anyone to claim the right to participate in an African nation regardless of 
their skin colour. The reasoning behind this explicit stance lies with Raymond 
Suttner's theory that the advancement of a non-racial stance involved considering not 
only the ideological, but also the practical realities of organising a political activity.9 
The NDP had come into being at the very moment in Rhodesian history where multi-
racialism still held sway whilst African nationalism was not yet viewed as a militant 
movement. Consequently, its racial stance reflected this context, including 
considering non-black individuals as intrinsic to the struggle. 
 Another reason for the NDP's non-racialism was the influence of two 
brothers: Sketchley and Stanlake Samkange. The sons of the African minister and 
politician Thompson Samkange, the Samkange brothers represented the dichotomy 
in Zimbabwean nationalism. Stanlake was a product of mission primary schools and 
South African higher education (including Adams College and Fort Hare), who 
turned his attention first to politics and then to journalism, before continuing his 
                                               
8 N.K. Marondera, 'Letter to the Editor', Dissent, No.16 (16 February 1960), p.14 
9 Raymond Suttner, 'Understanding Non-racialism as an Emancipatory Concept in South 
Africa', Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, Vol.59, No.130 (2012), pp.22-41, 
p.28 
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studies in the USA. Whilst abroad from 1957 to 1959, Stanlake formed close 
friendships with a number of American civil rights activists and became a firm 
supporter of Garfield Todd's multi-racialism upon his return (he was elected the 
junior Deputy President of the CAP, as well as the chairman of the Christian Action 
Group).10 Many of the non-black radicals spoke of Stanlake in glowing terms. 
Terence Ranger was a particularly close friend, describing him as a man 'without a 
trace of racial feeling,'11 and John Reed was similarly effusive: 
 
[Stanlake] looks forward not to a time when the Africans have won, but to a 
time when there will be no bitterness or difficulties between Africans and 
Europeans. [He] would like to see 2000 Europeans in the NDP - this would be 
a kind of guarantee of good will between the races.12 
 
Sketchley Samkange's early life and career could not have contrasted more to that of 
his older brother, yet he too retained a strong belief in non-racialism. After struggling 
in school, Sketchley had briefly run a farm before finding himself more and more 
involved in African politics. He was a founding member of the NDP, and became a 
close friend of Ranger, Mackay, and Reed, and all three were present when 
Sketchley tragically drowned in a Malawian swimming pool in May 1961, aged only 
25.13 An indication of Sketchley's non-racial influence came at his funeral, which 
saw prominent African politicians like Michael Mawema and Leopold Takawira 
mourn alongside the Clutton-Brocks, the Rangers, Mackay, and Reed. As Reed 
recorded, 
 
Michael Mawema talks about their work together, when they formed the NDP. 
And how they were arrested together last year and shared the same cell. 
Sketchley had sung all through the night and in the morning had said that if he 
died before freedom came, he knew there would come others after him. He 
could make friends with people of all races and so we see the white people who 
                                               
10 Cary & Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders, pp.33-34 
11 Ranger, Writing Revolt, p.61 
12 Reed, '8 August 1960', Diary, Vol.89 
13 See Ranger, Writing Revolt, pp.89-90 
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are here today at his funeral - and yet he had no hatred in his heart for those 
who were opposed to him.14 
 
The Samkange brothers' firm belief in a non-racial approach to African liberation 
was more in keeping with the ideology of non-black radicals like Reed than many 
nationalist leaders. Whilst Reed explained in April 1958 that interactions between the 
radicals and nationalists were important if 'the absolute separation of black and white' 
was to be avoided,15 Sketchley similarly insisted that it would be a mistake for the 
NDP to isolate itself from potential supporters on the grounds of race. Tasked with 
attending NDP meetings and noting the non-black attendees,16 a Rhodesian police 
officer named Steven McCarthy recalled one local branch meeting at which 
Sketchley Samkange made an impassioned speech. 
 
One point that they all made [...] was the need for more Europeans in their new 
organisation than in their last [...] One of the blacks spoke, he was a known 
troublemaker, from one of the known radical families; this boy spoke for a 
while [...] and he said that they could not afford to lose the help of willing 
volunteers because of the colour of their skin.17 
 
However, whilst the positioning of whites was receiving attention within the NDP, 
the same could not be said of other non-black groups, particularly the coloured 
community. No other racial group in Rhodesia was as neglected in political discourse 
as the coloured population. Only a few days after the NDP's launch, the Rhodesia 
National Association (RNA) which represented the coloured and other mixed race 
elements, formally complained about a speech given by the British Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan in mid-January 1960. In a telegram sent to Macmillan, the RNA 
wrote: 
 
We beg leave to draw your attention to the existence of over 20,000 Eurafrican 
or Coloured people in the Federation, exclusive of Africans, Europeans, and 
                                               
14 Reed, '23 May 1961', Diary, Vol.93 
15 Reed, 'Sunday 13 April 1958', Diary, Vol.76(2) 
16 As the NDP was a registered political party, it was illegal to bar police from observing 
their meetings. 
17 Steven McCarthy, interviewed by author (15 January 2015) 
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Asians. Regret and disappointed that you did not mention this racial group in 
your speech today after mentioning the other three. May we know the reason 
please.18 
 
Macmillan's failure to include the coloured community in his speech was indicative 
of a broader trend that saw it as easier to dismiss the coloured population than it was 
to clarify their position in Rhodesian society. As Mohammed Adhikari explains, 
many coloureds saw themselves as white through a result of skin colour and 
ancestry,19 particularly because identifying as white provided them far more benefits 
in Rhodesian society.20 This conflict over classification led both black Africans and 
white settlers to oppose the concept of a distinct coloured identity,21 and 'the Asians 
and coloureds were so few that we were unable or unwilling to form our own racial 
clique,' recalled Fay Chung (a Chinese-Zimbabwean UCRN student).22 Himself a 
coloured Zimbabwean, Brian Raftopoulos explained that 'the term "coloured" is in 
fact a very artificial one, imposed here by the colonial government. [...] Originally, 
many coloureds lived with Africans. They lived as Africans.'23 By the time of the 
NDP's emergence in 1960, there was a growing resentment amongst the coloured 
minority of their status as 'second class citizens' which could have encouraged their 
participation with African nationalism.24 
 Yet these shared grievances proved not to be enough to overcome three 
factors identified by James Muzondidya as preventing a widespread coloured support 
of African nationalist politics.25 The first of these was the marginality of coloureds 
within the social, political, and economic systems of Southern Rhodesia, tied to the 
                                               
18 'Coloureds Protest to Macmillan', The Rhodesia Herald (20 January 1960), p.1.  
19 See Adhikari, 'From Narratives of Miscegnation', p.171 
20 See Milner-Thornton, '"Rider of Two Horses" 
21 B.J. Mnyanda quoted in James Muzondidya, 'Race, ethnicity and the politics of 
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23 Quoted in Frederikse, None but Ourselves, p.238 
24 Mandaza, Race, Colour, and Class, pp.809-814 
25 See Muzondidya, Walking a Tightrope, pp.170-174 
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isolationist development along racial lines. Coloureds attended their own schools and 
generally lived in separate suburbs, due in part to the segregationist laws of the 
time.26 Their economic marginality was demonstrated not only through their reduced 
earnings, but their predominant employment in a few specific professions (including 
shop owners, laundry, tailoring, or hospitality).27 Small urban areas like Rotten Row 
in Salisbury became known for the number of coloured businesses.28 The result was 
that this marginality 'constrained the mobilisation of coloureds into radical nationalist 
politics'.29 
 Secondly, this marginality also created what Muzondidya describes as 
structural impediments to coloured engagement in nationalist politics. Between 1950 
and 1960, six pieces of legislation had been introduced 'to come to terms with the 
rise of nationalism', including the LOMA.30 Given their already precarious position 
in society, many coloured radicals found the threat of imprisonment or 
unemployment too large to justify political activities. John Reed, Terence Ranger, 
and several other white radicals employed at the UCRN also raised concerns yet as 
white members of Rhodesian society they had a labour mobility that many of the 
coloured working class lacked.31 Attending nationalist meetings or marches in 
African townships presented other issues, such as navigating the various segregated 
urban laws. Migrant coloured workers were particularly at risk since the conditions 
of their immigration restricted political activity on threat of deportation.32 
 Finally, this marginality from society also affected the way the Zimbabwean 
nationalists viewed coloured participation. As Muzondidya contends: 
 
                                               
26 Juliette Bridgette Milner-Thornton, The Long Shadow of the British Empire: The Ongoing 
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The position of coloureds or the place of coloured identity in a resurgent 
African nationalism was [...] never fully defined. In the prevailing African 
nationalist movement, coloureds, like other non-black groups, and the issue of 
coloured identity were treated as an adjunct of African nationalism rather than 
as an integral part of the whole political movement.33 
 
The stated intent of the NDP was to see majority rule in the nation and it was first 
and foremost a movement which revolved around the liberation of black Africans. 
Given their socio-economic dominance, whites were temporarily considered a 
necessary component of Zimbabwean nationalism. Joshua Mpofu was an NDP 
branch leader who argued that the party's demand for universal adult suffrage was 
'the only way to achieve self-government and democracy that would meet the 
legitimate aspirations of the majority of the citizenry without undermining the rights 
of white people.'34 The other minority racial groups meant they were not afforded the 
same attention. No efforts were made to clearly define where the coloured population 
fit into Zimbabwean nationalism beyond the NDP's broad non-racialism, although 
several coloured individuals would actively participate in the NDP at branch level. 
The focus was on African solidarity and the strength of a black African movement. 
Non-black members thus remained a secondary concern during the first months of 
1960.  
 The NDP quickly attracted white members including Guy Clutton-Brock, 
Peter Mackay, Whitfield Foy, and Shelagh Ranger (her husband joined two months 
later). Yet the most significant membership came with a mass migration of African 
elites from Garfield Todd's CAP. A flawed organisation since its formation, the CAP 
had attempted to appeal to African supporters of partnership without 'giving way to 
African extremist demands and without diminishing the material benefits which 
Europeans enjoy in the Federation.'35 In the face of the NDP's non-racialism, the 
gradual advancement of the CAP lost its allure for black and non-black supporters 
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alike.36 As Terence Ranger (a CAP executive member) reported in March 1960, the 
position had given him 'power at last but in a rapidly sinking ship.'37 At a territorial 
congress of the CAP that same month, a proposal to see an African majority 
franchise saw the abandonment of the party by the majority of its supporters. For 
many this was the end of their support for multi-racial partnership.38 Between June 
and September 1960, Ndabaningi Sithole, Terence Ranger, Eileen Haddon, and 
Herbert Chitepo all resigned from the CAP and joined the NDP.39 Leopold Takawira 
had already resigned in late January 1960 and released a detailed statement 
explaining his decision. 
 
I am fully committed and dedicated to non-racialism in this country [...] My 
latest discovery, however, is that unless we Africans organise ourselves 
completely and unite ourselves solidly, Europeans will not enter into a real 
partnership with us. Multi-racial organisations alone will not be able to bring 
this so much needed change and harmony about [...] The Central Africa Party 
caters for the voters and as such cannot speak for the blacks with that natural 
and native emotion which can only be arrived at from personal physical 
sufferings and humiliations which Africans encounter day in and day out. In 
these struggles our sincere European friends shall always remain sympathisers 
but never physical co-sufferers. I therefore firmly feel and believe that an 
African run party like the NDP on strict principles of self-discipline, non-
violence and non-intimidation and open to all races will hasten the day of 
peace and common patriotism in this country.40 
 
Takawira's statement was a clear example of the shift that had occurred regarding 
race in African political discourse. In an interview, Brian Raftopoulos explained that: 
 
I think multi-racialism was very much a liberal discourse and seen as such, for 
all the ambiguities that went with it. When it moved into nationalism, it was 
more about non-racialism but never clearly defined because they didn't see it as 
a priority. Once the nationalist discourse emerged, it was because of a loss of 
faith in the liberal rhetoric, including multi-racialism. The liberals promised 
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them things they couldn't deliver. And in the end they got angry with that, they 
got despondent with it, and they said to hell with it. We will set up our own 
discourse.41 
 
For those non-black individuals who did join the NDP, they had to accept a new, 
subservient position within the movement. The young Bulawayo-based lawyer 
Edwin Lichtenstein joined the NDP in 1961, frustrated with the CAP's failure to 
demand universal adult suffrage which he saw as a necessary policy that was both 
'realistic and practical'.42 Recalling his motivations in a 1983 interview, Lichtenstein 
stated: 'I did it for the view that one's task as a white man was not to remain within a 
white dominated liberal party, but - if one wanted universal suffrage - that one had to 
join a black political movement and accept black leadership.'43 John Reed, who had 
been in England for the first part of the year and thus a distant observer, also joined 
the NDP in July 1960 after some deliberation.44 In a lengthy article published in 
Dissent,45 Reed argued that although membership of the NDP was no different than 
membership of any other political party, joining as a white man required accepting 
'that the underlying political and economic struggles in Southern Rhodesia are 
manifesting themselves and will manifest themselves in what is, generally speaking, 
a struggle between the races. It means thinking that the relation between the races for 
the time being is one of conflict.'46 This conflict was explained as being the result of 
fundamental racial difference: 
 
The European is not a very useful member to have. He lives far away from the 
great majority of the members; and is not easily in touch with them. It is often 
difficult for him to come to meetings in the townships, or even to get word that 
meetings are to be held. At the meetings he is often a kind of awkward 
exception.47 
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The presence of non-blacks in a black African movement was therefore largely based 
on personal connections. 'The NDP, although it accepts and on a personal level 
welcomes Europeans, does not need them,' argued Reed,48 and yet these personal 
attitudes sometimes carried over into political discourse. As Michael Mawema 
proclaimed, 'Southern Rhodesia is part of Africa and that it will have an African 
future. But for Europeans who can bear to live in an African Southern Rhodesia the 
NDP has so far offered nothing but welcome - and a promise of safeguarded 
individual rights.'49 Despite being geographically removed from the white radicals 
based in Salisbury, Lichtenstein consequently recalled 'I don't think there was active 
recruitment [of whites] but there was obviously a welcome extended and they [the 
nationalists] were always prepared to speak at white gatherings and things like 
Rhodesian National Affairs.'50 
 This conflicted attitude to white participation was stimulated by a growing 
consensus within African politicians was that whilst whites could sympathise with 
African suffering, they could never truly understand it. Returning to Rogers 
Brubaker's concept of 'insider-outsider' citizenship, the NDP had begun building a 
national identity around race insofar as it referred to the specific experiences attached 
to these racial identities. Although it is the discrimination suffered that renders the 
individual as part of the group, it is the racial identity that stimulated that 
discrimination. Whites 'shall always remain sympathisers but never physical co-
sufferers,' explained Leopold Takawira,51 and Reed expanded upon this argument: 
 
The NDP is not anti-European in a racialist way: its solidarity is based not, as 
far as I can see, on a common consciousness of race but on the common 
experience of all Africans living in Southern Rhodesia - and into this 
experience the European cannot enter. At one meeting of the NDP I remember 
a speaker began "All of us in this hall have suffered"; and then, remembering 
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there were a few Europeans at the back, added "Except the Europeans who are 
here."52 
 
If the common consciousness of Zimbabwean nationalism was not based on race but 
on shared experiences of discrimination, a problem is presented by the specific 
identities of those non-blacks who joined the NDP. Most were themselves on the 
margins of white society for their sexuality, religion, or political beliefs (explored in 
the next chapter). Consequently, because the NDP saw experiences of racial 
discrimination as the defining right for participation in Zimbabwean nationalism, 
race was the ultimate factor in ascribing the 'inside-outside' dynamic. This racial 
focus is further explained by what Brian Raftopoulos calls the 'ambiguity of non-
racialism'. 
 
There has always been a problem with the concept of non-racialism in southern 
Africa [...]. Often it has meant that whites become part of a movement and 
assume they can dominate it, they can assume a certain superiority in the 
movement under the guise of non-racialism. And the black nationalists have 
been very sensitive about that. So it has sometimes been abused as a way of 
perpetuating certain white dominance.53 
  
The lingering spectre of multi-racial partnership helped shaped racial thinking and 
both black nationalists and white radicals were conscious of how white participation 
could be problematic. Two letters in the African Daily News explained the African 
concerns. 'The trouble with admitting Europeans in African parties is that they like to 
come as advisors and when their advice is not accepted, they begin to despise those 
African leaders who disagree with them,' stated one.54 A second echoed this 
sentiment more explicitly: 
 
I personally think that Europeans in African parties are dangerous because they 
could act as "moderate advisors" to our leaders and spoil our plans. For 
instance when certain Europeans joined the [...] National Democratic Party 
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some of the things went wrong which to my opinion, would have done well if 
handled by Africans alone.55 
 
This issue of non-black participation was so divisive that in June 1961, the 
Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) was formed by Thompson Gonese, Patrick 
Matimba, Edson Sithole, Nathan Shamuyarira, Paul Mushonga, and Michael 
Mawema.56 Disenchanted with Nkomo's toleration of non-black members, the ZNP 
took a firm anti-white stance but never gained popular support.57 As one tongue-in-
cheek article explained, 'Europeans, Asians and any other people who choose to live 
and work with Africans in this country as equals should not be made uneasy by the 
remarks of Mr. Gonese - they do not represent the views of Africans - not even the 
six in his meeting.'58 Nevertheless the racialist rhetoric of the ZNP and elements of 
the NDP made white Rhodesians uneasy and those white radicals involved with any 
African political groups found themselves ostracised from white Rhodesian society.. 
As Reed noted, 
 
Europeans in the NDP cannot even serve as a link between the party and the 
white population. Indeed by joining the NDP a European completely loses any 
chance he may have had to influence the minds and attitudes of the Europeans 
he lives among.59 
 
Suggestions were therefore made that it would be more useful for whites to remain 
outside of African politics and use their positions within white society to cajole other 
whites in the nation. 'Some thoughtful African members of the NDP seem to think 
that sympathetic Europeans would do better to maintain some sort of reputation, even 
if a doubtful one, in their own community and use it to work what changes they 
could in the outlook of their acquaintances,' recorded Reed.60 In light of the many 
problems that arose from the involvement of a non-black with the nationalist cause, 
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Reed concluded by asking 'is it worth any European joining the NDP?' He 
maintained that it was. 'The struggle has become virtually a struggle between 
Africans and Europeans, and nothing now can radically alter that struggle. But at 
least it need not be mindlessly racialistic.'.61 
 
ii. Unrest and violence: acting in opposition, July 1960 - December 1961 
 
With the shift in discourse surrounding the NDP between January and July 1960, the 
Rhodesian state grew increasingly concerned with the surge of black nationalism. In 
a speech in July, the Edgar Whitehead ranted that 'the arguments advanced at [the 
NDP's] political meetings are becoming more and more blatantly militant and anti-
European. The theme is that Africa is only for Africans, that Europe is for the 
Europeans, and that all Europeans should go back to Europe.'62 Consequently, the 
Rhodesian state launched a crackdown, arresting and charging three NDP leaders.63 
Terence Ranger (whose own home was searched) was particularly upset about the 
arrests of Sketchley Samkange and Michael Mawema. 'In the leadership of the NDP 
Sketchley and Mawema are the two men who stand for moderation; they are the two 
who have European friends and who have from inside the NDP been integral for 
this,' he informed Reed.64 The day after the arrests, 7,000 NDP marchers were met 
with police tear gas, amongst them Peter Mackay, and such actions came to define 
Mackay's views of his participation in African nationalism.  
 
I believe the march of the 7,000 had made my commitment irrevocable, for to 
march is not to stumble [across the colour bar], and I knew as we sat under the 
lights with the police cordon ahead that I was declaring alliance with those 
around me. [...] I was proud to be thus accepted. 
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Mackay's involvement in the march further highlighted the underlying divisions 
within the white radicals. A former British Army officer, Mackay had initially been a 
member of the CAS but simultaneously a critic of Godfrey Huggins' conservative 
multi-racialism. He became one of the Zimbabwean and Malawian independence 
struggle's most prominent advocates, yet maintained a strong allegiance to the British 
government (when the British MP John Stonehouse visited Rhodesia in February 
1959to ascertain the state of African grievances in the colony, one of the white 
radicals he spoke to was Mackay).65 Mackay's politics reflected these contradictions. 
He regarded white Rhodesians not only as British citizens, but as citizens of an 
African nation waiting to be. When the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
gave his 'Wind of Change' speech to the South African Parliament in February 1960, 
Mackay celebrated the apparent strategy for British withdrawal from the continent 
that opened up spaces for African political activities.66 
 Many radicals admired Mackay's attitude and activities, with Guy Clutton-
Brock describing Mackay as a 'golden individual [who] marched lost in the African 
crowd and found himself more than ever fulfilled as an individual.'67 According to 
Reed, it was Mackay's actions which set the example for the rest of them.  
 
You have to consider carefully not out of a concern of personal safety, but out 
of a concern about the economy of one's usefulness to the cause. I hardly feel 
this, though I can see that it is time. It is a conflict between symbolic and 
practical action: I myself am fascinated by the act; Peter devoted to activity, the 
life of usefulness and devoted friendship he lives [...] and against this my own 
attitude seems tawdry and theatrical.68 
 
Reed's phrase 'the economy of one's usefulness to the cause' was another recognition 
that participation within the nationalist movement was not confined to a single role. 
Whilst Mackay was a visible actor in physical acts of protest, other radicals 
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contributed in different ways. In July 1960, protests in Bulawayo escalated into 
urban unrest, leading to the deaths of three Africans.69 In response a small non-racial 
group of NDP members including Mackay, Reed, Shelagh Ranger, Herbert Chitepo, 
and Edward Pswarayi released a statement on behalf of the party explicitly attacking 
the government.70Able to draw upon a transnationalism which many of the African 
elites lacked (despite their international education and adoption of western culture), 
the public actions of the white radicals were important in helping shape the NDP's 
non-racial image. At a Clutton-Brocks' party in August 1960, both Sarah 
Chavunduka (the first black female student at the UCRN) and Michael Mawema 
insisted that there was no reason 'why Europeans cannot take part in the 
reconstruction' of Rhodesia, although no concrete policies were laid down.71  
 The NDP's focus during the second half of 1960 remained on the civil unrest 
throughout the country. Any violence by the African population was condemned by 
the NDP, and just as quickly categorised by Whitehead as an indication that the party 
could not control its members.72 A secret memo produced by the Rhodesian 
intelligence services argued that the NDP was utilising African grievances 'in order 
to turn the country into violent turbulence,'73 and some of the threats were reported as 
specifically targeting white policeman.74 The anti-white racialism amongst the 
ordinary members concerned the NDP's executive, none more so than the newly-
elected NDP President, Joshua Nkomo. Having returned to Rhodesia to a rapturous 
welcome, Nkomo now used his popularity and the NDP's first anniversary to 
reaffirm that the African cause was a non-racial one.75 As Reed recorded, Nkomo 
spoke 'carefully, stressing democracy, inviting  Asian and Coloured and Europeans 
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to join in building a country of free and equal men.'76 Yet the constructive non-racial 
rhetoric failed to translate into the actions of ordinary NDP members. One 
explanation is the difference risks faced by the two groups. Whilst the leaders were 
being restricted or detained, 505 Africans had been arrested and twelve shot dead by 
the police over the course of three months in 1960.77 On a single day in October 
1960, seven Africans were killed during rioting in the Harare township,78 and these 
deaths elicited a surge of anti-white sentiments completely at contrast to the NDP's 
official stance. A first-hand black African account from the Harare riots on 8 October 
1960 reported on the extent of this racism. 
 
As I was coming to the river I saw five boys armed with empty quart beer 
bottles, sticks and iron bars. It was getting dark and they could not see well. 
They called out to ask me if I was African or European. They told me they 
would have killed me if I were European.79 
 
This was not an isolated incident. Mackay's experiences in the 'March of 7,000' saw 
him note 'tempers seem to be rising and the people growing more hostile to 
Europeans.'80 Indeed, if George Silundika (the NDP's secretary general) had not 
stepped alongside Mackay in solidarity, there was a very real risk the situation could 
have escalated further.81 Similarly at an NDP rally in Harare in January 1961 
attended by some 30,000 people, the supposedly well-known John Reed and Terence 
Ranger found themselves met with hostility.82 
 
Terry and I walk forward among these people who are pleased enough to have 
an opportunity to be rude to Europeans and shout to us to sit down [...] As we 
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pass through the crowd we attract attention. "You must join the Party", some 
call out. We tell them we are already members, and this seems a joke to them.83 
 
This division between leaders and ordinary members was exacerbated by 
circumstances within the top of the NDP, particularly the issue of a new Rhodesian 
constitution.84 Some of the NDP's leaders regarded the new constitution as a chance 
to ensure change and end the urban violence between Africans and the police. Others 
denounced the constitution as a selling-out of the NDP's demand for majority rule.85 
The white radicals found themselves unsure of what to do, as Reed recorded in 
March 1961. 
 
For us I think there is nothing to do. To side with the acceptance of the 
proposals would enable those objecting to say that you might expect Europeans 
to favour proposals so disastrous to the African cause. To side with the 
objectors would but bring the accusation that the Europeans are working for the 
dissolution and overthrow of the party. Silence therefore.86 
  
The situation highlighted the divisions within the white radicals and Mackay, 
Ranger, Reed, and the newly-arrived Dutch lecturer Jaap van Velsen discussed 
amongst themselves the question of white allegiance if the split became unavoidable. 
Mackay stated he would follow whichever group emerged that demanded majority 
rule, whilst Ranger contended he would likely side with the more moderate figures of 
Nkomo or Sithole.87 Reed described the differences in opinion as fundamentally a 
difference in ideology. 'The people who have got stuck, today's reactionaries who 
were in the 1940s considered white radicals; and the people who have come unstuck, 
yesterday's moderates and precisions are today's wild men - Peter Mackay the most 
notable of these.'88 These divisions was relatively minor and remained largely genial 
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for the time being, but reflected a fundamental difference in opinion as to how 
involved non-blacks could be.  
 Nothing exemplified the differences in opinion more than the Citizens 
Against the Colour Bar Association (CACBA), launched in May 1961 by Terence 
Ranger and Reverend Whitfield Foy. A multi-racial organisation designed to protest 
the racially discriminatory policies of the colony, the group used similar methods to 
the American civil rights movements.89 Hasu Patel (a young Indian radical in 
Salisbury) played a prominent role, including publishing a four page pamphlet 
stating the CACBA's aims, policies and non-racial stance.90 Despite receiving 
prominent coverage in Rhodesia (including being described in Parliament as a matter 
of 'some national concern'91), the CACBA was nevertheless often mistaken for the 
NDP's 'Salisbury Sit-In Campaign', given the similar tactics.92 As one of the 
founding members, Ranger inevitably depicts the CACBA as a crucial part of the 
Zimbabwean nationalist struggle and there is no doubting that they did succeed in 
challenging some of Rhodesia's segregationist laws, as well as increasing the salience 
of non-black radicals in the nation.93 However, the effect of the movement on the 
African nationalists was largely negative. Efforts to undermine the colour bar were 
regarded as ineffectual and even damaging to the image of the white supporters of 
the nationalist struggle.94 Incidents such as Ranger being pushed into a swimming 
pool by an angry white Rhodesian served only to associate the radicals with the 
liberals of the CAS and IASR with their focus on minor social reform. Given the 
distrust for multi-racialism, this connection tarnished the reputations of those 
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involved and by 1964 the damage done would become a serious point of contention 
for the white radicals still in Rhodesia.95 
 The publicity garnered by the CACBA did, however, have a positive 
consequence. In an attempt to reframe the non-black radicals' role, the suggestion 
was made that a Salisbury North City Branch of the NDP be established. Ndabaningi 
Sithole was anxious that it was the non-black members who launched the group, and 
invited all present NDP members in Salisbury to attend and elect a multi-racial 
committee. To this end, Sithole instructed Robert Mugabe (press secretary for the 
NDP) to provide John Reed with a list of all white NDP members.96 As Reed 
recorded, Herbert Chitepo also 'seem[ed] very anxious to attract or to keep 
Europeans. Herbert says he feels the NDP has neglected its European members and 
in future will be calling on them more often for ideas.'97 
Despite the introduction in late July of a ban on any public meetings, the 
NDP Salisbury Branch was formally launched on 9 August 1961.98 Only six non-
black men and women out of an audience of fifty were present for the inaugural 
meeting; a grim reflection of the current urban unrest surrounding the party.99 John 
Reed was elected chairman, but described his own mixed emotions at his new 
position.  
 
I am very pleased, and rather frightened, wondering whether I will find the 
energy, and the abiding interest to do this well. But glad that now at least I am 
really committed. I am afraid of being committed as well - what happens if the 
NDP suddenly gets involved in terrorism?100 
 
Reed's election to office garnered significant attention, with the three major 
Rhodesian newspapers all carrying stories about the first white man to become 
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chairman of an NDP branch.101 Interestingly, none mentioned the racial composition 
of the rest of the branch's executive despite the election alongside Reed of three other 
whites (Margaret Moore, and Shelagh and Terence Ranger). Whilst the prominent 
positions of white women in a movement dominated by black men was an important 
challenge to the perceptions of racialism,102 the committee also contained two 
coloured men (Ronald Snapper, and George Copeland 'Jack' Grant103), two Indians 
(N.R. Lalloo and Suman Mehta), and three Africans (Lovemore Chimonyo, Teresa 
Chirunga, and E.P. Mashaire), whose participation represented a significant 
challenge to existing conceptions of African nationalism in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, 
although the racial composition of the group was somewhat radical, all involved 
remained elites in their communities. Snapper was the first coloured hotelier in 
Rhodesia and the secretary of the Inter-territorial Organisation for Eurafrican 
Organisations in Rhodesia.104 Mehta was the secretary of the Salisbury Asian 
Association since 1946 and one of the most active Asian members of the nationalist 
movement, alongside Hasu Patel and R.K. Naik.105 Margaret Moore (and her 
husband Stanley) were American Quakers who joined the SRLAWF early in its 
formation and became personal friends with Sally and Robert Mugabe during the 
1960s.106 
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 The failure of contemporary press and scholarship to cover this diversity is a 
reflection of the nationalist struggle's typical reduction to a black-white racial binary, 
as well as the low numbers surrounding Asian, Indian, and coloured involvement. 
According to Clare Palley, only thirteen coloureds and nine Asians were prosecuted 
under the LOMA between 1960 and May 1965, compared to 58 whites and 6,301 
Africans.107 In an article in Dissent entitled 'The Indian Dilemma', Hasu Patel 
admitted that 'there has been a singular lack of indulgence in political activity by 
Indians in this country', and explained that the Indian had become a 'middleman', 
accepted by neither of the racial blocs. 
 
It is for this reason that I feel that Partnership has failed, and failed miserably, 
and that Indians should pay a greater regard to the philosophy of multi-
racialism (which is also the philosophy of the Nationalists) or non-racialism, 
whichever of the terms one uses - both, to my mind, mean the same thing [...] 
All the "oppressed" and its sympathisers should and must come together to 
work for the elimination of a common evil.108 
 
Patel's emphasis that members of the nationalist struggle were united by their status 
as 'oppressed' and his inclusion of those he termed 'sympathisers' is important as the 
implication is that those who have not been oppressed (namely white radicals) can 
still be a part of the struggle despite their externality. This was a challenge to the 
dominant assertions of the African nationalists that suffering was necessary for 
participation. In Patel's view, the common goal should overcome the concerns that 
persisted about racial cooperation. 
 Patel also pointed to the Lotus group as indicative that the contribution of an 
individual to the nationalist struggle was important, regardless of their community as 
a whole. The Lotus group had already made its presence felt in Indian affairs and 
was beginning to sway the political attitudes of the older generations of Indians.109 In 
1961, Don. K. Naik (an editor of Lotus magazine) was elected financial secretary of 
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the Bulawayo branch of the NDP and immediately began warning Indians that they 
'could not be excused if they did not align themselves' with the wind of change 
blowing across Africa.110 Indian financial support proved vital to the African cause 
and it seems that Naik's inclusion was a response to practical rather than ideological 
considerations. As Michael West explains, it was 'an unprecedented move, and one 
no doubt made with an eye toward the party’s bottom line.'111 Usefulness to the 
nationalist cause was again important in justifying non-black participation. 
 Although more whites participated in the NDP than Indians, Asians, or 
coloureds, white radicals remained a tiny fraction of the total membership. Yet the 
white radicals were afforded a disproportionate level of attention, particularly since 
there were no non-black individuals on the national executive of the NDP and only a 
handful in local branch positions. Given its multi-racial status and the prominence of 
white radicals within the students and faculty, the UCRN inevitably became the 
centre for this attention during 1961. Whilst the FISB had prevented at least eight 
academics from taking up positions at the UCRN between 1956 and 1960 due to 
'claims that they were either communists or strongly sympathetic to communists and 
African nationalists', there were still concerns about those already on campus.112 
Several prominent white radicals were or had been lecturers (including Reed, 
Ranger, Faber, and van Velsen) and the UCRN council came under pressure by the 
white state to rein in these more radical elements. In September 1961, Principal 
Walter Adams issued a warning letter to the academic staff.  
 
The College Council is worried by the effect on the College of the publicity 
aroused by the political activities of some members of the staff [...] The 
problem is whether and how far a member of the academic staff, in his 
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personal capacity as a citizen, should feel himself free to engage in public 
political activity.113 
 
The following day, the African Daily News editor Eugene Wason wrote in an 
editorial: 
 
As far as Africans are concerned there has been no anger or loss of confidence 
in the University at all as a result of the political activities already referred to: 
if anything, the reverse has been the case. We have not received a single 
complaint from our many African readers about the political activities of 
lecturers.114 
 
Although unclear exactly how truthful this rebuttal was, other Africans were publicly 
supportive of the lecturers.115 Ndabaningi Sithole declared it the job of intellectuals 
to challenge the systems of government in a nation in a speech in the Harare 
township,116 and buttressed by these voices, the lecturers refused to tone down their 
stance or involvement. Even a renewed crackdown which saw 1,697 black Africans 
arrested in seven weeks from October 1961117 and the presence of armed police at 
NDP meetings and in African townships, failed to frighten the NDP's supporters.118 
On 3 December, 10,000 people gathered in Highfield for the area's largest ever NDP 
meeting, leading the Herald to state disbelievingly that even the 'beerhalls and 
sportsfields were deserted throughout the township.'119 Terence Ranger was one of 
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the many speakers and his oration was 'greeted enthusiastically'.120 First, he called on 
the crowd to reject any attempts by Whitehead's UFP to divide them on the basis of 
tribe, race, or class, declaring 'we must live as a nation while the UFP were talking 
about building one'.121 Secondly, he argued non-racial unity was needed for the 
future of the Zimbabwean nation. As Ranger recalled: 
 
I went on to say that democratic unity, in which we could think and discuss and 
differ together, was needed especially to frame the shape of the new society we 
wanted: that we should begin to think about that new society.122 
 
This deliberate focus on framing a new society forced the issue of non-black 
participation into all levels of Zimbabwean nationalist discourse, and brought an 
emphasise to construction rather than destruction. The implementation of majority 
rule would not amount to anything if there were no guarantees of security for those 
not a part of the majority; a belief that was already shown to be a motivation for 
many non-black radicals. 
 However, the content of the speech went largely unnoticed by the white 
Rhodesians who were more enraged by Ranger's removal of his shoes in solidarity 
with the African speakers and crowd. The condemnation printed in the Herald over 
the following week included accusations of a 'Communist tactic' and a 'brain-
washing campaign'. Under the pseudonym 'Stubbed-Toe', one letter mocked: 'I would 
be interested if Dr. Ranger could tell me in what way shoes are a symbol of 
oppression?'123 As with the CACBA, the response to Ranger's barefoot appearance 
indicated that challenges to cultural racial divisions were more troublesome to 
Rhodesian sensibilities than any suggestions of a non-racial nationalism. Seeing a 
white man undermine the supposed superiority of western European culture 
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threatened the belief that black Africans should aspire to emulate Europeans, and not 
vice-versa.  
 Some within the Zimbabwean nationalists had already recognised the 
potential of such strategies. Earlier in 1961, Robert Mugabe had spearheaded a 
cultural revival programme which saw ordinary members of the NDP asked to reject 
European culture in favour of traditional African practices. This was an attempt to 
reclaim black African identity, and included speaking chiShona or SiNdebele, 
drinking water in traditional gourds rather than cups,124 and dispensing with 'shoes, 
socks, watches, hats and jackets' at NDP meetings.125 The NDP leaders denounced 
the missionary educations discussed in chapter one as installing the belief of African 
culture being 'backward' and 'primitive', and instead encouraged people to 'use 
traditional musical instruments such as drums, wear cultural costumes, and pray to 
ancestral spirits for political delivery from colonialism.'126 As Ngwabi Bhebe argues, 
such strategies were significant and 'the NDP can be credited with having started to 
build a liberation culture and language.'127 
 Although this ideology could easily have excluded non-black NDP members, 
Ranger and Reed's visible inclusion indicated that there was little intention to do so. 
The NDP instead emphasised that as African elites had adopted western culture, so 
too could whites adopt African culture. Interestingly, only a few did. A notable 
exception were Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock, as a report by the district Native 
Commissioner noted: 'Clutton-Brock and his wife and associates, male and female, 
mix freely with the Natives. Natives, e.g. the Mission’s lorry driver, eat in Clutton-
Brock’s house at table with him, they even sleep in his house.'128 The Clutton-Brocks 
resided in a 'little round house' of traditional African style, ate traditional African 
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foods such as sadza (ground maize meal), and worked the land alongside black 
Africans with no regard for the Rhodesian policies of segregation.129 As Stephen 
Matewa (a black Zimbabwean minister and teacher) wrote to Guy after the liberation 
war, 'I have never told you before that you are "blacker" than some of us. You 
worked harder than anybody in our struggle.'130 
 Yet despite this integration into African society, even the Clutton-Brocks 
retained some European traits. Their daughter Sally was sent to an all-white girls 
boarding school,131 and they were insistent on providing afternoon tea or 
'sundowners' to their guests.132 In this they were not alone. As Ian Hancock explains, 
many of the non-black radicals 'remained socially detached inside white society 
where they enjoyed the indignities heaped upon them by the new order.'133 Most 
white radicals resided in white suburban areas, socialised predominantly with other 
whites in Rhodesia, dined and drank in white restaurants, and interacted mostly with 
westernised African elites. These same elites were similarly reluctant to completely 
reject western culture, retaining their London-tailored suits and shoes, and speaking 
English in public and private. The photograph of Terence Ranger's deportation in 
1963 is often heralded for the lion skin hat on Ranger's head. Yet little is said of the 
nationalist leaders depicted (including Nkomo and Mugabe) dressed in suits and 
ties.134 As Enocent Msindo summarised, the NDP's 'anti-Western culture was at bets 
[sp.] superficial', and although the African cultural initiative would gain support 
during the liberation war, it would never completely Africanise the nationalist 
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ideology.135 The nationalist leaders were too embedded within an elitist westernised 
African culture to reject it completely.  
 However, such cultural issues would have to be addressed by future 
nationalist groups. By the time of Ranger's barefoot address, the NDP's time was 
already drawing to a close. A series of protests at the start of December saw 500 
African women arrested including Sally Mugabe, and subsequent riots resulted in the 
death of one African, with 25 injured and another 85 detained.136 On 8 December 
1961, the NDP was officially banned and troops called up in preparation to deal with 
rioters within the NDP's 87,000 registered members.137 A lengthy statement by Edgar 
Whitehead revealed the reasoning: 'the [NDP's] history has been one of brutality and 
violence against anyone who disagrees with it. Their aim is one party state.'138 A 
Herald editorial agreed, arguing that 'neither the NDP leaders nor their European 
apologists should now be surprised that the Government is not prepared to sit back 
and watch their attempts to overthrow the State by unconstitutional means.'139 The 
acknowledgement of the NDP's non-black members was reinforced by targeted 
police actions against the group. Terence Ranger was soon restricted alongside 
several nationalist leaders and his home raided yet again,140 and this pressure led 
John Reed (at the time in west Africa) to ask friends to hide his diaries for fear of 
discovery.141 Ironically, it appeared that the state's efforts to combat non-racial 
nationalism in fact achieved the opposite. Finding themselves office holders in a 
banned organisation, the non-black radicals shared the oppression of their black 
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colleagues during this period. The NDP would ultimately prove to be the pinnacle of 
this non-racial nationalism, but the lessons learnt and relationships formed would 
prove to be crucial in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement during the coming 
years. 
 
iii. The Zimbabwe African People's Union 
 
On 17 December 1961, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was formed 
as a continuation of the NDP and contained several NDP leaders in the new 
executive committee.142 Yet despite this continuity, there was no specific mention of 
non-racialism in the party's policies.143 On 2 February 1962, John Reed recalled 
being asked by a potential academic at the UCRN 'whether there would be any part 
to play in politics - is ZAPU accepting European members?' Reed responded: 'I say 
that as far as I know, it is.'144 The very next day Reed received a letter from Terence 
Ranger, debating whether a Salisbury City branch of ZAPU should be started. To his 
reluctance, the general demand was that Reed should once again be chairman. 'I feel 
trapped again. I can't pull out now. On the other hand, I can hardly face going back to 
it all again - the meetings, the telephoning, and the waiting.'145 For the non-black 
radicals, their isolation from the grievances of black Africans still provided them 
with the opportunity for detachment that Africans inside the party did not have. Yet 
Peter Mackay strongly condemned those who failed to fully commit to the African 
cause. 
 
The instruction I was receiving had led me to believe that standing for African 
aspirations, even as a supernumerary – perhaps especially as a supernumerary – 
was not a pastime to be toyed with, to be taken up or discarded at whim, but a 
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commitment to be respected. It was easy for non-blacks who espoused the 
African nationalist cause – and there were some – to dabble as I had done, and 
it was understandable that personal interests should prevent them from going 
further than dabbling.146 
 
Reed also questioned his commitment. 'Before I went away [Terence] was saying 
that for himself he wanted to avoid being deeply involved in the NDP [...] He might 
have taken the opportunity, provided by Sir Edgar banning the NDP, to keep clear 
altogether. And so might I.'147 Yet neither Ranger nor Reed took a step back. As long 
as ZAPU was willing to accept white members, the radicals were willing to 
participate and in the months after ZAPU's formation, it seemed that the radicals 
were going to be provided with more opportunities.  
 At a meeting in Chaminuka Square on 18 April 1962, a crowd of over 25,000 
people heard Reed announce ZAPU's 'Equality Campaign.' Reed informed the 
audience that many whites were 'leaving the country in fear of an eventual take over' 
and that 'a great deal depended on how ZAPU followers are going to conduct 
themselves to the Europeans remaining here.'148 Much like Ranger's barefoot speech, 
Reed was cheered off the stage. Yet there were some within the nationalist leadership 
who remained unsure about this vocal white participation, as Reed recalled. 
 
[Edwin Lichtenstein] has had a long talk with [Agrippa] Mukahlera about the 
future of Europeans in the party, in the country [...] Edwin said well, if Terry 
Ranger were black where would he be in the party. Mukahlera said the time 
was not ripe yet for Europeans in the Executive. Later on it might be. On the 
other hand, some people had wanted when ZAPU started that Europeans 
should be allowed to become associate members. This had been rejected at the 
time. But it might be necessary to go back to the idea later.149 
 
Lichtenstein's depressed account left Reed questioning ZAPU's policies. 
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There goes on being a point to working in ZAPU, indeed, all this is really 
nothing new to me. I would agree it is a bad time to have Europeans in the 
Executive. But what happens when the change does come. Do all the 
Europeans leave, and then the country falls to pieces - or are Europeans given 
some kind of security - so a few do stay on?150 
 
The white radicals were increasingly concerned about the lack of clarity surrounding 
the post-colonial political community in Zimbabwe, including a desire for clearly 
specified citizenship requirements and a recognition of the need to address what 
Emma Hunter terms the conflict between subject and citizen.151 Many held specific 
concerns that instead of the individual ascription of rights, notions of Zimbabwean 
citizenship would revolve around racial groups as they did in Rhodesia. Yet this urge 
to direct nationalist policies were tempered by the need to follow African leadership. 
In May 1962, in the midst of these debates, Peter Mackay ranted to several white 
radicals that 'it is blasphemy [...] if you are not committed, absolutely, to the country 
[...] to interfere in its practices.'152 
 Luckily for Mackay, the fluid nature of political authority and reactionary 
racialist nationalism negated the role the radicals could have in the debates. 
Triggered by the slow trickle of support the ZNP were gaining through their anti-
white racialist rhetoric, May and June 1962 saw indications that the ZAPU leadership 
remained uncertain regarding white members. ZAPU and Nkomo's non-racialism 
became the weapon of choice for the ZNP, with one member writing to the ADN 
that: 
 
The ZNP is fighting a battle in which our guns are directed at the white man. 
Our guns will soon be fired. We do not expect men like Dr. Ranger to turn 
round his gun and direct it to his fellow white man or to his cousin, just 
because he wants to maintain the rightful status of the African in his 
fatherland.153 
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In the face of this racial rhetoric, even Nkomo was alleged to have stated that 'there is 
no future for Europeans here. [...] Europeans like [the radicals] will especially not be 
wanted, prattling as [they] do about the liberty of the subject and the need for more 
than one political party.'154 Although van Velsen, Mackay, and Reed dismissed these 
reports by the British journalist Andrew Wilson as nothing more than creating a story 
out of gossip, the threat of exclusion was worrying.155 
 It took several statements from nationalist leaders to begin to alleviate these 
concerns. Jason Z. Moyo (ZAPU's treasurer) declared at a meeting in Mtoko that 
'ZAPU is not against Europeans but against '"evil" [...] We have Europeans 
contributing at all levels of the cause.'156 Dr. Samuel Parirenyatwa (ZAPU's Vice 
President) similarly informed the potential committee of the as-yet-unconfirmed 
Salisbury City Branch that ZAPU's leaders 'have been too preoccupied with African 
membership, we should worry about Europeans. The party needs them.'157 But as 
Reed adroitly observed, 'there is no common mind in the party leadership - one can 
learn from talking to this man what he thinks - but not what the Executive thinks. 
Certainly not what the party is likely to do.'158 This lack of cohesion meant 
discussions about citizenship were largely abstract and little practical policies 
emerged from them. Regardless, on 15 June 1962 a permanent district committee for 
ZAPU in Salisbury North was elected with Reed as chairman, Terence Ranger vice-
chairman, and Edwin Lichtenstein treasurer. Reed was somewhat surprised. 'So 
Europeans begin to move up the party. In the context, it is astonishing how there is 
no prejudice against the Europeans.'159 
 The ZAPU Salisbury branch was launched at a peak of anti-nationalist 
sentiments as the increasingly racialist white Rhodesian population expressed their 
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discontent at Whitehead's 'pandering' to a 'few African dissidents.'160 Between 
January and August 1962, over 2,500 Africans had been charged under various laws 
(more than in the entirety of 1961) and the non-black radicals were not exempt.161 In 
June 1962, two white members of the ZAPU Youth League at the UCRN had their 
rooms ransacked by police.162 Shortly afterwards Edwin Lichtenstein reported 
ZAPU's executive were planning something for which 'they are expecting to be jailed 
and for the party to be banned.' Yet as Reed observed in his diary: 
 
Edwin also seems to think it is quite possible we [the Europeans] may be 
arrested ourselves, "just to show there is no racialism, you know." But this I do 
not think. The last detainees are trouble enough, but Guy Clutton-Brock was 
surely more trouble than the rest. Unfortunately, the one sure way to attract 
large attention is to arrest Europeans.163 
 
Again, the utility of non-black radicals lay with the publicity their actions garnered, 
particularly when such actions forced a response by the Rhodesian state, as Mackay 
noted. 
 
If the laws were asinine I was prepared, as before, to work outside them and 
perhaps in the process help to display them as asinine. There did not seem to be 
virtue in provoking the laws for the sake of it, but neither was there merit in 
allowing them to get in the way of doing what should be done.164 
 
Imprisonment was also seen as a sign of commitment to the nationalist cause. 
Describing his arrest in 1959, Guy Clutton-Brock emphasised that he had been aware 
of police surveillance for months prior and the concern the Rhodesian state held 
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about his radicalism.165 Those who remained in detention from 1959 (such as James 
Chikerema and George Nyandoro) had earned admiration from ordinary Africans, in 
sharp contrast to the growing distrust for Nkomo's long period spent abroad.166 As 
one anonymous African wrote to the ADN, 'detention is not only inevitable, but a 
badge of honour to be worn with pride and those who run from it, shame 
themselves.'167 Thus when Nkomo returned to the country at the end of June 1962, he 
proclaimed that both he and all nationalists should be willing to face arrest.168 
 By August 1962, it appeared that conflict along racial lines in Rhodesia was 
unavoidable. On 3 August, amendments to two Acts increased the ease with which 
police could arrest and charge individuals associated with the nationalist cause,169 
and on 14 August, ZAPU's vice-president Stephen Parirenyatwa was killed in a car 
crash alleged to have involved white soldiers.170 With the restrictions and violence 
against African politics, there emerged a growing demand for violent struggle.171 
Any groups still associated with the Rhodesian government were deemed enemies of 
African nationalism, especially the trade unions. As Scarnecchia relates, 
Parirenyatwa's funeral heralded attacks against Reuben Jamela (a TUC leader and 
close friend of Parirenyatwa).172 Accused of having been 'used by Whitehead's 
government to cause a split in the trade union movement,' Jamela was assaulted by 
ZAPU members.173 Even the suggestion of a multi-racial inclination was seen as 
justification, as Lawrence Vambe explains. 
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That was the end of Jamela’s leadership – he was definitely the trade union 
leader of the day at that time. [...] He was a very strong person, and so the 
white people planned to use him, but I do not think that he wanted to be used. 
The way they offered him certain favours and the way they spoke of him, made 
people think he was being used. The government authorities would say, for 
instance: “if all leaders were like Jamela...”. Unfortunately that made people 
think he was a sell-out.174 
 
Even traditionally non-violent nationalist leaders like Nkomo saw Parirenyatwa's 
death and the anger directed at Jamela as indications that the African political milieu 
had fundamentally changed. 'Nkomo, who made the funeral oration, was deeply 
angry and could scarcely contain his emotion. As we eventually dispersed, some of 
us had the premonition, I know, that our immediate future was to be even darker than 
the present,' recalled Vambe.175 Within weeks, ZAPU's executive agreed to procure 
weapons in Cairo for the struggle.176 The non-black radicals were also aware of the 
violent sentiments, as Reed noted on 24 August. 
 
I can no longer believe that there is a chance of a settlement through which the 
transfer of power can take place. Even if Whitehead and even if ZAPU agreed - 
the change over from minority to majority rule will be catastrophic because 
there is no more possibility of a multiracial party. The country faces rebellion 
and economic collapse. Repression and long economic decline. Is there 
anything to do? Even the old project of keeping open the friendship between 
the races, preventing it from becoming merely a racial business - in God's 
name why? Since the situation will kill stone dead what has with such patience 
and care been kept alive, in the very first moment it would really be of use.177 
 
Surprisingly this violent hostility to the white state was not echoed in attitudes to the 
white radicals, likely due to the disjointed nature of ZAPU's leadership. Although 
anti-white leaders sought to make their voices heard, they remained tempered by the 
committed non-racialists within the ranks. In early September 1962, the Salisbury 
district committee made plans for a series of house meetings 'to which will be invited 
Asian, Coloureds and Europeans who are thought likely to join ZAPU, and at which 
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we will have Nkomo and other leaders to talk to them.'178 Yet the confusion within 
the nationalists meant even this somewhat innocuous idea was subject to debate, as 
Reed noted. 
 
It is possible that it might become a political liability. The ZNP although 
insignificant at the moment, still strives for racial purity - Edison Sithole has 
recently said he hates European members in a pure Nationalist organisation. 
There are rumours, vague enough, that at the Congress in October there will be 
a resolution against non-black membership.179 
 
The ZNP had temporarily returned to the spotlight in early September when four 
members of the executive attempted to oust Patrick Matimba (the party President) 
because of his white wife.180 These actions by prominent black Africans led Suman 
Mehta to report the non-blacks he approached on behalf of the Salisbury committee 
were reluctant to join ZAPU.181 Even Reed lamented that 'it strikes me with very 
great force that if the party is banned then the struggle is irretrievably committed to 
violence and desperate bitterness.'182 
 The premonitions of the doubters were correct. On 20 September 1962, 
Whitehead banned ZAPU and both Ranger and Reed, as well as Stephen Lombard (a 
young white UCRN student), were issued restriction orders.183 Ranger stated that he 
intended to appeal as 'ZAPU had not been endangering the public peace', and both he 
and Reed would not renounce their support for the African nationalist movement.184 
However, the Rhodesian state was equally belligerent, describing the banned party as 
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'neo-Communist and pan-Africanist in character' and accusing ZAPU of fostering 
'extreme racialism' within the nation.185 It appeared now that the struggle was about 
to enter a new phase, and the question of non-black participation required re-
contextualising. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the last two chapters have shown, there are inherent difficulties in classifying the 
nationalist parties between 1957 and 1962 as being genuinely non-racial. Alongside 
differing perspectives between ordinary members and the leadership, internal conflict 
within the executive also made a comprehensive racial policy difficult to maintain. 
Contrasting stances on the necessity of race in the nationalist movement and the 
imagined future nation, and the difference between the public and private discourse 
of the nationalist leaders, all emphasised how fluid racial thinking was and how 
contested was a non-racial nationalism.  
 Nevertheless, the period surrounding the SRANC, NDP, and ZAPU also saw 
the truly non-racial microcosms of Zimbabwean nationalism. The number of non-
black radicals involved as both party members and personal friends of the nationalist 
leaders reached its peak with the NDP, whilst ZAPU would prove to the last time 
whites would hold elected office in any Zimbabwean nationalist party for almost 
twenty years. The Clutton-Brocks, the Haddons, the Rangers, John Reed, Peter 
Mackay, Margaret Moore, Hasu Patel, Suman Mehta, Edwin Lichtenstein, and 
numerous others were actively engaged in the nationalist movement. The financial 
and logistical support they offered and the close friendships they maintained with 
nationalist leaders had largely endeared the non-black supporters to the African 
leadership. But it was the establishment of an NDP (and subsequently ZAPU) branch 
with a non-racial committee that indicated the adherence by some nationalist leaders 
to a non-racial ideology. For the SRANC, NDP, and ZAPU, it was the presence of 
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non-black radicals requesting inclusion which challenged racial thinking, more so 
than the legacy of multi-racialism or the existence of a white settler population. 
 With the banning of ZAPU, the period of open nationalism had drawn to a 
close and specific amendments were introduced to prevent any new African 
nationalist party from emerging from ZAPU's structures. As Peter Mackay wrote, 
'whereas ZAPU had been in all but name the direct successor of the National 
Democratic Party – which in its turn had succeeded the African National Congress – 
now the nationalist movement was denied any formal identity.'186 The nationalists 
were forced underground, and non-black radicals were required to do so the same. 
Forced face-to-face with the realities of what an oppressed people's struggle against 
an entrenched state entailed, questions of commitment once again rose to the fore, 
especially when that state was willing to use violence to hold onto its position of 
power. 
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Chapter 4 
Racial Identities in the underground Zimbabwean 
nationalist movement, 1962-1963 
 
Introduction 
 
A month after the banning of ZAPU, Edgar Whitehead remained unequivocal in his 
condemnation of the proscribed party. 
 
ZAPU was not banned because of its political opinions. It was banned because 
its members adopted terrorism as a weapon to force people to support its cause. 
[...] What I will not tolerate is a Party which [...] communicates with foreign 
powers with a view to overthrowing the legitimate government of the country; 
stirs up racial feelings and encourages hostility between the races.1 
 
The intention behind these pronouncements was clear. The nationalist leaders were 
no longer to be treated as genuine politicians or permitted to spread their views on 
race and the African struggle through legitimate means. Previous parties had been 
able to organise branch meetings, draw huge crowds in the African townships, and 
have a voice in important political decisions like the constitutional talks. However, 
Whitehead's decision to attack Zimbabwean nationalism rather than a single 
nationalist party forced African nationalism to become an underground organisation.  
 This chapter therefore focuses on four main themes and specifically on the 
period between ZAPU's banning in September 1962 and the murder of Petrus 
Oberholzer in July 1964 (the first white civilian death in the struggle). The opening 
theme is the escalation of anti-white rhetoric within the nationalist movement and its 
leaders. Although some elements had always held strong racialist views, the absolute 
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repression of the nationalist cause by the white state saw support for these viewpoints 
intensify, with clearly defined concepts of race becoming more popular than in 
previous parties. This led to the second theme of this chapter: disagreements within 
the African nationalist leadership and the non-black radicals. Conflicts worsened 
over the direction of Zimbabwean nationalism, and the irreversible split between 
Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo in the summer of 1963 led the Zimbabwean 
nationalist movement to fracture for good. Encouraged by the space opened by the 
ZAPU-ZANU split, black identity politics began to make the position of non-black 
supporters even more precarious. 
 The utility of non-black radicals within the nationalist struggle is the third 
theme explored. Given the growing adherence to a nationalist ideology associated 
with 'blackness', and the underground nature of the African cause, non-black 
supporters were forced to again justify their positions within the movement. The 
restrictions, detentions, and exiles of African leaders further broke established 
relationships between non-black radicals and senior nationalists, and the arrival of 
new non-black radicals meant new social dynamics came to direct interactions 
between the radicals and their African counterparts. Some of these younger radicals 
brought with them a white African perspective; many others drew upon European 
experiences and identities, further complicating the anatomy of non-black radicals in 
Rhodesia. This transnationalism is the final theme explored, with particular focus 
given to its role in defining the mentality of non-black radicals, but also in 
facilitating their actions. Comparisons are made with the restrictions placed on black 
African mobility and feed in to the debates around the utility of non-black radicals. 
The transferral of ideas throughout Africa are also highlighted for their impact on the 
shape of Zimbabwean nationalist thinking.  
 
i. ZAPU Underground: Non-black radicals  
 
The inevitability of ZAPU's proscription had been anticipated from as early as July 
1962 when the ZAPU executive had made the decision not to form a new successor 
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party.2 Yet this preparation did not lessen the impact, particularly given the 
restrictions of Ranger, Reed, and Lombard and the effect on the white radical 
community was severe. Several days after ZAPU were banned, the legal scholar 
Clare Palley and her liberal MP husband Ahrn hosted a dinner party at which the 
mood was largely despondent with Leone Lichtenstein (Edwin's wife) particularly 
'full of the pointlessness of Europeans getting involved in African Nationalism,' 
reported Reed.3 A sense of frustration was building and being white and a member of 
an African nationalist party now seemed to be irreconcilable. When Peter Mackay's 
home and offices were searched by the police that same week, the relative liberty that 
white nationalists had enjoyed until that point appeared to be quickly disappearing, 
and Reed was quick to again hide his own ZAPU documents for fear of discovery.4 
 In light of the state persecution, each individual who supported the nationalist 
movement could either commit further to the cause and risk imprisonment or 
restriction, or renounce their allegiance to ZAPU and attempt to extricate themselves. 
The white radicals retained a level of mobility and financial security that enabled 
them to leave the country at relatively short notice and apart from the three 
restrictees, ZAPU's white supporters were able to travel freely within and outside of 
Southern Rhodesia. Previously this mobility had been used to support the 
nationalists, but now it became a means of escape and the Lichtensteins were 
amongst the first to emigrate from Rhodesia in the early 1960s. A South African 
lawyer, Edwin had begun practicing in Bulawayo in 1957 just as the African 
nationalist movement was emerging. Although he did not join the SRANC and was 
initially a supporter of Garfield Todd, he did have contact with Nkomo, Joseph 
Msika, and Clutton-Brock, and with the failure of multi-racialism, was the first white 
to join the Bulawayo NDP.5 
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 Like many white radicals, Lichtenstein's motivations to support the African 
nationalists came from his own marginality from white society. In this case, it was 
his Jewish heritage which had given him an experience of discrimination based on an 
unalterable element of his identity. Comprising no more than 2.5 per cent of the 
white Rhodesian population,6 Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock argue that Rhodesian 
Jews 'felt isolated and uncomfortable within the Anglo-Celt hegemony' of white 
Rhodesian society and consequently garnered a liberal reputation.7 Counting several 
multi-racialists within their ranks including Ahrn Palley (a liberal MP), Leo Baron 
(Nkomo's lawyer), and Roy Welensky (the Federal Prime Minister),8 as multi-
racialism fell from favour, 'the Jewish community which had been in the forefront of 
the “liberal” multiracial camp felt very vulnerable in this heightened political 
atmosphere'.9 Lichtenstein was one of those targeted. 
 
When I was elected treasurer of the Bulawayo branch of the NDP, this was 
widely publicised and it did arouse a very hostile reaction from most of the 
white community. I [...] received a number of threatening phone calls and 
letters and this continued for some weeks actually, culminating in an assault on 
me in my office and eventually in the loss of my job in Bulawayo.10 
  
This treatment was an unprecedented indicator of the potentially violent response of 
white Rhodesians to dissent in their community, and the alienation facing white 
radicals. Ostracised by the white Bulawayo population, Lichtenstein was also asked 
by his law firm to resign because of his politics. In 1961, the Lichtensteins moved to 
Salisbury where Edwin established his own practice catering almost exclusively to 
Africans charged with political crimes. It lasted less than a year.  
 
It was becoming impossible for me to earn a living in Rhodesia at that time. I 
received an almost total boycott by the white community professionally. I had 
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to rely on African political cases for which, very often, I didn’t get paid and I 
would actually have to finance them for counsel’s fees myself and it just 
became impossible.11 
 
In late 1962, Leone's teachership at the Teachers' Training College was also 
questioned in the Rhodesian Parliament because of her politics. Presented with the 
stark choice of renouncing their support for ZAPU or leaving Rhodesia, they chose 
the latter and emigrated to London only a few weeks after ZAPU were banned.12 
 The Lichtensteins were not alone in having to balance their political views 
with an ability to earn a living in Rhodesia as David Caute's account of Rhodesian 
society demonstrates.13 However, one notable exception was the UCRN which 
appeared to offer security for students and staff alike including Judith Todd (Garfield 
Todd's daughter and economics student). A ZAPU membership card in Todd's name, 
signed by Stephen Lombard as the ZAPU representative, was found in Lombard's 
room during a search by police.14 Todd brazenly responded by telling the Bulawayo 
Chronicle that she had joined ZAPU and would remain a member despite its ban.15 
Along with the restrictions of Ranger, Reed, and Lombard, such incidents 
consolidated the image of the UCRN as a hotspot for non-black radicalism.16 
 Meanwhile a series of events towards the end of 1962 cast aspersions on the 
acceptance of non-blacks in an African nationalist movement. In September, leaflets 
were distributed in African townships calling for 'the killing of all whites'.17 Whether 
they were produced by the ZNP, Rhodesian Special Branch, or ZAPU is uncertain, 
but leaflets bearing ZAPU's name and containing open racism was a cause of 
concern.18 In a letter to Shelagh Ranger, Maurice Nyagumbo wrote 'what worries me 
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is how to protect these settlers when we take over. Although most of our people do 
not believe in killing, [...] there seem to be a big number who may want to retaliate. I 
am finding it hard to avoid this situation,'19 and even the most senior nationalist 
leaders found themselves involved. In October 1962, Rhodesian newspapers 
published a statement from Nkomo which saw him completely withdraw his support 
for white radicals.  
 
Because of the stand of the majority of Europeans in the country and the form 
of our struggle that is going on now, one feels embarrassed to have Europeans 
working with one. They have no place in the struggle of African nationalists in 
this country now.20 
 
Questions were immediately raised about the veracity of the statement, particularly 
in light of the campaign for white members that had been planned just prior to 
ZAPU's banning. As Reed noted in his diary: 'everything in the paper is a lie, 
however plausible it looks. And even if Nkomo did say it, what status it has, God 
knows. Does the party now get directives through Nkomo's public press 
statements?'21 Well-versed in the perennial uncertainty surrounding the nationalist 
elite's policy-making process, Reed's confusion with Nkomo's statement 
demonstrated how those outside of the executive were often none the wiser as to 
what was the party's stance as a whole.  
 In an effort to clarify the situation, Terence Ranger wrote to the detained 
Nyagumbo questioning the future of the nationalist movement. 
 
I do not know whether it will be possible for me to [join a ZAPU replacement 
party]. It seems quite likely that any new party will now take an exclusively 
African line and no longer find it possible to have European members. Indeed, 
the Herald phoned me up yesterday to report that Joshua [Nkomo] is supposed 
to have said just that in an interview from restriction - that the time had come 
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when it was impossible and embarrassing to have whites as members of the 
nationalist movement.22 
 
Nyagumbo was quick to attempt to set Ranger's mind at ease:  
 
In the last five years Joshua [Nkomo] has experienced the terrible hardships 
which you people have undergone after having joined the nationalist 
organisation. [...] Joshua was not happy with these waves of threats after 
threats of deportation orders against you. He realizes how much it will damage 
our cause if you were to be deported. Thus Joshua decided to make that 
statement in order to disarm our enemies. [...] I don't want to tell you how 
much we value your ability in the struggle. But I want to tell you this secret. 
The first Nkomo parliament will not do without the following people - Guy 
Clutton-Brock, the already deported Faber, T. Ranger, John Reed and Mackay. 
I know that you may not believe me but this is the fact.23 
   
Painting Nkomo's public rhetoric as security for the white radicals provides an 
insight into the deeply politicised place of race in Zimbabwean nationalism by late 
1962. The nationalist executive had realised that with the popular anti-white hostility, 
any vocal support for non-racialism (particularly by the former multi-racialist 
Nkomo) weakened their credentials to lead the African struggle. Thus attempts were 
made to preserve the support of non-black radicals through less-public methods and 
those whites who knew Nkomo reported that there had been no change in his positive 
attitude to non-racialism.24 Seeing his anti-white statement as an attempt to detract 
attention from the radicals explains the dramatic divergence from his previous public 
rhetoric. 
 Nyagumbo's letter to Ranger was important for a second reason, namely the 
five men identified as being intrinsic to the future of a post-colonial Zimbabwe: Guy 
Clutton-Brock, Michael Faber, Terence Ranger, John Reed, and Peter Mackay. 
Although a small list, the recognition of five specific non-black radicals 
demonstrates what Zimbabwean nationalist leaders in 1962 regarded as desirable 
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criteria for non-black radicals and it is necessary to highlight some common elements 
of their identities. 
 
ii. Women and the Nationalist Movement 
 
All five radicals made significant contributions to the African nationalist cause, 
predominantly in Rhodesia but also throughout central Africa. Clutton-Brock, 
Ranger, Reed, and Mackay are already familiar from this thesis, but Faber was an 
equally important supporter of African nationalism. A British economist, journalist, 
Eton and Oxford graduate, Faber had settled in Northern Rhodesia in 1956 where he 
was involved with the University College of Northern Rhodesia's Department of 
Economics and participated in the Northern Rhodesian ANC, forming close 
attachments to many of the CAF nationalists in the process.25  
 Within the broader heterogeneous group of white radicals, the 'impeccably 
orthodox [...] credentials' of the five men were striking.26 All were born into middle-
class British families; all went to private schools (Clutton-Brock to Rugby, Ranger to 
Highgate, Reed to Bancroft's, Mackay to Stowe, and Faber to Eton); and four went to 
Oxford or Cambridge, whilst the fifth (Mackay) had a distinguished career in the 
British Army. Writing in Ranger's obituary, John McCracken noted 'there is a certain 
irony in the fact that a man perceived in the early 1960s by white Rhodesians as the 
very epitome of left-wing radicalism should have had an entirely conventional 
English middle-class upbringing.'27 All five men retained a strong connection to 
Britain in both their politics and culture, and both Mackay and Faber were reported 
to have worked with British intelligence services.28 Furthermore, apart from Clutton-
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Brock, the other four were around the same age as the nationalist leaders, having 
been born between 1926 and 1931. As Trevor Grundy explains, these were the 
'upper-class, well-connected Britons who appeared as devils incarnate in the eyes of 
most indigenous Europeans'.29 For the African elites who sought to emulate upper-
class British culture, these five men were afforded recognition precisely because of 
their identities. In the imagined post-independence Zimbabwe, it stood to reason that 
if the Zimbabwean leaders were to be well-educated elites, their white counterparts 
would be similar. Citizenship was to be created around the nationalist leaders' 
personal identities and because it was black African elite men leading the debates, it 
was white elite men who were afforded the greatest accommodation.  
 This further explains the male focus of these discussions and of this thesis 
despite the number of radical white women involved with Zimbabwean nationalism. 
The most notable were Shelagh Ranger, Eileen Haddon, Molly Clutton-Brock, Judith 
Todd, and Margaret Moore, but there were several others who played less prominent 
roles including Mary Benson, Patricia Chater, Sylvia Roberts, and Sheila Graham. 
All were no less persistent in their activities than their male counterparts yet their 
names are conspicuously absent in the Nyagumbo letter and most primary accounts 
of events during the period. Both Eleanor O'Gorman and Susan Geiger have explored 
the subsuming of women under the umbrella of African nationalism, with O'Gorman 
concluding that women (like the non-black radicals) were viewed as 'a political 
constituency to be mobilised for support in the way of other sub-national groups'.30 
Like the non-black radicals, the role of women within the nationalist movement was 
affected by the male elites who shaped policy. Their voices tended to be hidden 
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within the traditional sources, and only alternative approaches to the history of 
Zimbabwean nationalism have managed to reconstruct their contributions.31 
 These problems are further complicated when the focus of the research is a 
minority group within a minority group, as with the non-black radical women. Kate 
Law's work on white women in colonial Zimbabwe dedicates an entire chapter to 
Eileen Haddon solely because Haddon left behind a loud voice in existing sources. 
Tracing Haddon's progression from multi-racial liberalism to nationalist radicalism, 
Law demonstrates how respected Haddon was by the nationalist leaders despite her 
gender.32 Yet Law's chapter leaves the reader with the impression that Haddon was 
working in complete isolation and makes no mention of other white female radicals. 
This invisibility of the others is disappointing given the valuable contributions they 
made to Zimbabwean nationalism. Although her husband took most of the headlines, 
Molly Clutton-Brock was just as involved in the formation and administration of the 
SRANC and its successors,33 and regularly organised informal gatherings of radicals 
and nationalists at the Clutton-Brocks' farm which facilitated the discussions that 
shaped racial thinking within the nationalist leadership.34 Furthermore, Molly's 
letters to various radicals helped overcome the fractured existence of white radicals 
in Rhodesia.35 
 Shelagh Ranger was another of the most prominent white supporters of the 
African cause whose husband garnered the most attention. All those who knew 
Shelagh emphasised that she had her own motivations that went far beyond simply 
following her husband (as was sometimes portrayed in contemporary reports).36 
Indeed, Shelagh was regularly a driving force behind other's actions, as Reed noted 
in May 1958. 'Terry reminds her [Shelagh] that she has spent the last year goading 
                                               
31 See for example Barnes & Win, To Live a Better Life 
32 Law, Gendering the Settler State, ch.3 
33 Reed, 'Saturday 17 September 1957', Diary, Vol.72 
34 Patricia Chater, '"By their fruits ye shall know them"', in Haddon, Guy and Molly Clutton-
Brock, p.102 
35 See Reed, 'Tuesday 19 July 1960', Diary, Vol.88 
36 See 'Ranger issued deportation order', Natal Mercury (21 March 1963) 
158 
 
me and himself into action - "Why don't you do something instead of sitting here and 
talking?"37 As indicated by her threat to take 'an obscurantist policy of bovine 
imbecility' when subpoenaed for James Chikerema's trial (a threat that made both her 
husband and friends 'annoyed and alarmed' at the likelihood of repercussions by the 
white state), Shelagh was frequently willing to go further in her actions than many of 
the radical white men.38 By the time of the 1959 emergency, Shelagh's reputation had 
grown to such an extent that her husband wrote: 'I am widely known among Africans 
as Mr Shelagh Ranger'.39 After a contentious vote in September 1961,40 Shelagh was 
elected chairwoman of the NDP Salisbury City branch's Council of Women, with 
Teresa Chirunga and Margaret Moore as Secretary and Treasurer respectively.41 
Despite at least a dozen women of all races present ('Shelagh, Eunice Herbst, another 
European women, Evelyn, the Rangers' maid, Teresa...'42), Reed noted that Shelagh 
continued to call for more action. 
 
Shelagh is [...] unimpressed by the mere driving for more members and more 
subscriptions. "A man doesn't become committed to a cause because he has 
paid a shilling. Organisation is not just getting members but doing something 
with the members you have got."43 
 
Due to this persistence, Margaret Moore (the American Quaker) persuaded her close 
friend Sally Mugabe to come to the branch's women's meeting the following week 
and speak on 'Ghana and national dress'.44 This proactive attitude meant Shelagh was 
held in such high esteem by the nationalists that by the time the Rangers were 
deported from Rhodesia in February 1963, the ZAPU Women's League sang 'Nkomo 
                                               
37 Reed, 'Saturday 17 May 1958', Diary, Vol.78 
38 Reed, 'Friday 16 May 1958', Diary, Vol.77 
39 Ranger, Writing Revolt, p.43 
40 According to Reed, the idea of only the NDP Salisbury branch's women voting for the 
women's council was contested by some of the African men present, including Lovemore 
Chimonyo. 
41 Reed, 'Thursday 7 September 1961', Diary, Vol.92 
42 Reed, 'Thursday 7 September 1961', Diary, Vol.92 
43 Reed, 'Monday 14 August 1961', Diary, Vol.92 
44 Ranger, Writing Revolt, p.101 
159 
 
is a bull, Ranger is a bull, Shelagh is a militant woman.'45 Yet such statements 
demonstrated the limited recognition afforded to the few white radical women, and 
the keen distinctions with their male counterparts. 
 
iii. The Rhodesian Front and ZAPU underground 
 
When the SRANC and NDP were banned, it took only a matter of weeks for official 
successors to emerge. However, during the nine months in which ZAPU was allowed 
to operate relatively freely, amendments were made to the several laws to prevent the 
same process from recurring. Thus when ZAPU was banned, no office holders were 
permitted to join a new party, all meetings involving ZAPU members were banned, 
membership became punishable by lengthy prison sentences, and even possession of 
ZAPU literature became a crime.  
 Unsurprisingly, it was the nationalist leaders who were most severely affected 
by the restrictions. According to Timothy Scarnecchia, it is possible this was Edgar 
Whitehead's intention from the outset. In order to keep ZAPU's more moderate and 
less overtly anti-white elements as possible partners in future government, it was 
seen as necessary to 'separate Nkomo from Robert Mugabe and the ZAPU left'.46 The 
majority of ordinary supporters thus continued with only minimal disruption, as 
Terence Ranger explains: 'The parties may have been banned; many local leaders 
may have been detained and restricted; but in a very real sense nationalism continued 
to function at the local level.'47 
 The local ZAPU branches were efficient in their administration in both 
townships and rural areas because they had remained largely independent of the 
national executive. However, this disjointed structure also had unwanted 
consequences. As Scarnecchia's research has shown, the inability of the ZAPU 
leadership to control the violence of their supporters was partly a result of the 
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relative autonomy that local branches and members had.48 Moreover, as with the 
ANC in South Africa and the township violence of the 1980s, socio-political 
violence has a dynamic of its own that the nationalist movement was not always able 
to control from a centralised perspective.49 Social unrest created spaces not only for 
discussion and debate, but for disorder, as Michael MacDonald explains. 'The ANC 
did call for the townships to become ungovernable and the townships were 
ungovernable, but they were ungovernable before and for reasons independent of the 
ANCs calls.'50  
The same is true for early 1960s ZAPU and violence proved to be an 
increasingly important theme in Rhodesia's socio-political environment by late 1962, 
both urban and international. The Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960 and the 
memories of the Mau Mau in Kenya had planted a belief in 'the violence of 
unchecked-Africans' in the minds of many white Rhodesians.51 This was reinforced 
by the arrival of hundreds of whites fleeing turmoil in the Congo and accounts of 
violence they had suffered.52 Sue van Reineen (a broadcast supervisor at Rhodesian 
Television) recalls the contents of one programme.  
 
There was video footage from Katanga of black soldiers dragging whites from 
their homes and making them kiss their boots. We thought this could happen 
here if we let the blacks take power. [...] We wanted to be cautious because we 
had nowhere to go if things went wrong.53 
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Combined with the emergence of FRELIMO in Mozambique, white Rhodesians felt 
increasingly isolated on the continent they called their home.54 The result, as J.R.T. 
Wood has noted, was that 'many voters forsook Whitehead and the UFP to halt the 
slide to African majority rule and all it seemed to portend,'55 and in the December 
1962 election the white settler nationalist party, the Rhodesian Front (RF) under 
Winston Field, saw a surge of support. Brian Raftopoulos points to the success of the 
RF as an indication of how race was becoming a 'central modality through which 
people lived and experienced their lives'56 and many of the non-black radicals were 
well aware of the precedent set by the RF's rise to power.  
Worryingly, the RF specifically targeted non-black radicals during their 
election campaign, labelling them 'fellow travellers who were misleading the 
Africans in the country'.57 For some white radicals, the election marked the complete 
end of multi-racial liberalism, for good or bad, and Ranger recalled the reaction of 
Jenny Frost, a white radical seller of prohibited books. '[Frost] came in and perched 
on my bed, greeting the election result with enthusiasm. The feeble liberals had been 
swept away. “Now we know where we are!”', she said.58 Others were more 
despondent, including the typically cautious Reed. 
 
The threat was that the society that the Europeans have built up - the kind of 
country, the kind of society could be made somehow viable for the future by a 
kind of multiracialism by buying up enough Africans, they could perpetuate the 
values of the white ruling autocracy, even though it had stopped being white. 
This is no longer on the cards [...]. Terry expects an onslaught against the white 
liberals. It is so easy and will be so satisfying. He is now wondering should he 
after all apply for the job in Dar es Salaam?59 
 
As soon as their restriction orders came to an end in January 1963, Terence Ranger 
was declared a prohibited immigrant. Although Shelagh was not similarly deported, 
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Ranger stated to the press that the RF 'said if she did not leave the country within the 
prescribed time' she would also be expelled.60 The publicity garnered by Ranger's 
CACBA activities was obviously of greater concern to the RF than Shelagh's more 
radical inclinations. 
 Although Ranger embellished the African reaction to his deportation,61 there 
was admittedly some resistance amongst the white population about the precedent set 
by deporting a white man without trial. Once again, it was the ability of white 
radicals to attract attention to the nationalist cause which justified their participation 
with the nationalists. As Mackay begrudgingly admitted, some good came out of the 
deportation; 'it has brought out such African sympathy and support [for the white 
radicals] as could hardly have been expected at this time.'62 Ranger's deportation 
remained in the public eye for a matter of weeks, beginning with an editorial in the 
Rhodesia Herald. 'We stress, as we have done consistently in the past, that if a 
person is objectionable in any particular country, it would be better were he brought 
before the Courts [...] to stand trial,' wrote the editor.63 Both the Association of 
University Teachers and the UCRN Principal Walter Adams similarly condemned 
the order:  
 
No reasons for this drastic action have been given either to Dr. Ranger or to the 
college authorities. No charge has been brought against him that can be tested 
in the courts or by any independent tribunal. I presume therefore that Dr. 
Ranger has not broken the law but is being condemned for his political 
opinions and activities.64 
 
This concern about freedom of speech was repeated by both public figures and 
ordinary Rhodesians. The Bishop of Mashonaland, Rev. Cecil W. Alderson, attacked 
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the ability of the Rhodesian state to declare somebody a prohibited immigrant 
'without accusation, trial or cause given.' After drawing comparisons with Guy 
Clutton-Brock's experiences, Alderson argued 'whether you like Dr. Ranger and his 
activities is, I believe, an irrelevant question in a society which claims to be governed 
by the principles of justice and fair play.'65 
 In the days that followed, the letter pages of the Rhodesia Herald and the 
African Daily News demonstrated the broader debate. Some letter writers raised the 
issues of free expression. 
 
Voltaire said: “I do not agree with one word you say, but I will die for your 
right to say it.” I do not agree with all that Dr. Ranger has said and done, but I 
appeal to the Government, in the spirit of that quotation, not to send him out of 
the country simply because we do not agree with him. He is a brilliant lecturer 
and his going will be a loss to the country, if only for the stimulus he gives to 
our thinking, and that not simply in matters political.66 
 
Another Rhodesian wrote: 
 
Dr. Ranger’s name has become a pass-word among the African people. Surely 
no Government can wish to widen the chasm that now exists between the 
races? What is the Government afraid of – any voice of opposition, any mind 
of superior intellect, any man of courage? Is this to be the future policy of our 
“new” Southern Rhodesian Government?67 
 
Sharing the same outrage was an African woman in the ADN: 
 
Dr. Ranger and Sheila [sp.] have done more for the people of Zimbabwe than 
fifty years of white rule. That they are being evicted because of their desire to 
help people of all colours shows the desire of the Mr. Field [the Rhodesian 
Prime Minister] to prevent even a gradual transition to fair African 
representation.68 
 
However, others had no sympathy for the Rangers. 
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It is thanks to Dr. Terence Ranger and his handful of multiracial fanatics that 
we have forced integration in our swimming baths today, and it is due to them 
that large numbers of our European children cannot enjoy the swimming 
facilities which we, their parents, pay for. The sooner the people responsible 
for this situation are deported or made to pay for what they have done to the 
unfortunate victims of their multi-racial rose-coloured dreams the better.69 
 
The desegregation of public baths was unlikely to cause the whole of white 
Rhodesian society to crumble but nevertheless, as a second anonymous letter stated: 
'to many of us solid Rhodesians [... Ranger] has been a nuisance, an upstart, and an 
unwanted expatriate.'70 
 Reactions within the white radicals and the African nationalists were 
similarly diverse. At one end of the spectrum, Mackay was vocal in his disdain for 
the commotion. Although buoyed by Hastings Banda's appointment as the first Prime 
Minister of Nyasaland on 1 February 1963, Mackay failed to see why Ranger was 
being celebrated. As Reed noted, 'Peter objects to the fuss being made over a 
European who won't suffer in being deported and thinks that dissenting persons 
would have avoided being deported and attracting so much attention.'71 A week later, 
Mackay was even more adamant in his criticism of Ranger. 'Peter says how 
remarkable it is that with all Terry's enemies no one has come forward to say that all 
this fuss about his being deported is unreal, because he was intending to leave the 
country anyway.'72 (Ranger had recently applied for a Chair at the University of Dar 
es Salaam.) 
 Apart from Ranger's deportation, the first few months of 1963 proved to be 
incredibly significant for the Zimbabwean nationalists and for the non-black radicals. 
The imminent granting of independence to two of the three countries in the CAF 
gave the RF a number of concerns about the future of race relations in the region, 
including the possible 'significant movement of Asiatics to Southern Rhodesia' as a 
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result of the Federal collapse.73 In an effort to build a workable relationship with the 
new African leaders to the north, Winston Field released over 125 prominent 
nationalists, including some senior ZAPU detainees like James Chikerema who had 
been in detention since 1959.74On 24 February, a farewell party at the Rangers' house 
provided an opportunity for the recently released to reacquaint themselves with the 
white radicals. In attendance were Margaret and Stanley Moore, Joshua Nkomo in an 
'immense fur hat', several students from the UCRN, and, 'Maurice Nyagumbo [...], 
George Nyandoro, [James] Chikerema, Robert Mugabe, the Haddons, Herbert 
[Chitepo]. Even Peter is at the party sulking through the kitchen,' described Reed. 
The composition of the gathering gave Reed hope for the future. 'Such an occasion is 
one of the things that make the misery of the Southern Rhodesian situation tolerable. 
In spite of everything, this can happen.'75 A few days later, in a well-attended 
departure from Salisbury airport, Ranger was bid farewell by a gathering of ZAPU 
leaders including Nyagumbo, Nkomo, Chikerema, and Mugabe.  
 Mackay, however, remained typically critical, arguing to Reed that 'it is going 
to be difficult for [Ranger] to contribute to the cause from the university in Dar [es 
Salaam]. It would be better to remain here, in prison, where he can at least be a 
symbol for cause.'76 Mackay's differences with Ranger highlighted how close to the 
surface tensions were, particularly with the external pressures upon the white 
radicals. Whilst Ranger's contributions revolved around 'principled protest against 
racial discrimination',77 Mackay was a more extreme radical, which even Ranger 
later recognised. 
 
Peter put the rest of us to shame by being so useful to the nationalist 
movements, not merely rhetorically but practically [...]. My speeches were 
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reported in the Rhodesian newspapers and made me notorious among the 
whites; Peter’s unselfishly practical activities evaded public attention.78 
 
Mackay's activities ranged from providing support for families of the detainees, to 
publishing two pro-nationalist journals (Tsopano and Chapapu) as well as the 
Malawi News (the mouthpiece of the Hasting Banda's Malawi Congress Party). 
Starting in the early 1960s, Mackay also began transporting nationalists to safety in 
Northern Rhodesia (like NDP founder George Silundika), and running Land Rovers 
provided by Kwame Nkrumah into Malawi.79 Although the majority of these 
contributions went unnoticed by the general public, the Rhodesian intelligence 
services were not so disinterested. It 'is believed that [Mackay] is also working with 
other extreme organisations within the Federation that seek to overthrow the 
government of these countries by unconstitutional means', noted a report in August 
1962.80 
 As with Ranger's deportation, Mackay's fervent belief in full commitment to 
African nationalism ensured he frequently came into conflict with fellow radicals, 
particularly because of his vocal dislike for white settlers in Rhodesia. In November 
1962, Reed noted his thoughts following a lengthy conversation with Mackay: 
 
Talking with Peter does not always do me good. [...] There is a kind of 
extremism in all he says and he seems to embrace a ruthless cynicism and a 
warm hearted belief in the people that is often nearly embarrassing. Sometimes 
this is no more illogical than a belief and trust in Africans and a hatred of the 
Europeans here, but Peter does not check this with facts or with a guilty feeling 
that it could perhaps be a racial way of thinking, [...] he refuses to be abashed 
by it.81 
 
In another conversation between Reed and Mackay, the latter clearly laid out his 
personal ideology regarding non-black participation in the nationalist struggle: 
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Peter's view is that the European must accept everything - he must substitute 
for the sins of the whites - embrace the racialism of African nationalism. I say 
that in joining a political party, one should expect to be treated to a member of 
the party. "How can you be treated as just another member of the party, a white 
man in a African Nationalist party?" says Peter. And this is true enough.82 
 
Reed noted that Mackay's long history as a champion for African advancement in 
Central Africa undoubtedly played some part in his staunch ideals. 
 
Peter's ordinary multiracialism is much nearer the surface I think than mine - 
he has, much more than I have, a multiracial past - Capricorn and so on. [As 
Mackay repeatedly stated] "afterwards at least it cannot be said that it was a 
purely racial struggle." I feel this too. But for Peter, this is almost just a matter 
of honour.83 
 
Mackay and Ranger were on good terms in later years but the tension that existed 
around this issue of imprisonment was as much a result of their individual character 
as it was their actions. Single men like Mackay, Reed, or John Conradie were at 
greater liberty to take risks than those with families.84 Moreover, proving oneself 
under trying circumstances was a common theme in Mackay's life story, particularly 
after 1948 and his departure from the British army. Thrust back into the civilian 
world, Mackay's firm disdain for publicity was a self-imposed reaction to his own 
heroic self-image and a justification for resigning his army commission. His 
commitment to the African cause was primarily driven by his desire for equality and 
justice, and yet the liberation struggle's depiction as a 'heroic enterprise for which 
brave and idealistic men were prepared to suffer and die' flattered Mackay's self-
image.85 Moreover, the sacrifice of imprisonment was a means of overcoming his 
externality and foreignness from the African cause, ostensibly granting him the 
legitimacy denied by his skin colour. As with other white radicals, Mackay also saw 
Zimbabwean nationalism as a means of securing a non-racial post-colonial nation 
                                               
82 Reed, 'Tuesday 4 June 1963', Diary, Vol.99 
83 Ibid., 
84 For more on Conradie, see chapter six 
85 Terence Ranger, 'Introduction', in Mackay, We Have Tomorrow, p.xii 
168 
 
and the election of the RF provided fresh impetus to his actions. Indeed, Mackay 
would go on to have the most impact between 1963 and 1966 when the stance of the 
nationalists shifted from peaceful protest to violent underground opposition. 
 Race relations in the country and the position of the non-black radicals 
become even more complicated in March 1963. It appeared that different elements of 
the nationalist movement were still following different racial policies, and public 
statements on the topic very much depended upon the audience for such speeches. In 
early March 1963, Nkomo reportedly stated that 'the white man should be made to 
leave this country because he was the cause of destitution.'86 Yet, only a few days 
later, Reed and Mackay were welcomed to a United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) meeting in Highfield at which Mugabe and Nyandoro spoke.87 They 
encountered no hostility at the small gathering despite a 'forceful' speech by Mugabe, 
dressed in a 'Ghana toga and a skin hat, against the Federation and minority rule.'88 
This anti-Federation stance had become a prominent topic once again with Rab 
Butler's (British First Secretary of State) announcement that same month that any of 
the territories of the CAF had the right to secede in principal.89 Butler's rejection of 
Rhodesian independence due to its white government rankled the Rhodesian 
population and led to a resurgent attack on African nationalism. This repression, 
combined with the apparent stagnation of the struggle in Rhodesia, undermined what 
should otherwise have been a celebratory moment for the Zimbabwean nationalists. 
As Reed explained in an eloquent diary entry: 
 
It is easy to feel a breeze as of the end of an era. Yet suddenly all the attention, 
the long waiting that has been directed towards this is released - and there is a 
moment like the moment as you step out through the door of a noisy crowded 
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room to the coldness and starlit dark of the night. Exhilarant but only for a 
moment. And the night is colder than at first it seemed and much darker.90 
 
In a May 1963 circular written by the white liberal Patricia Chater for supporters of 
the inter-racial Chikore Mission school, strikingly similar rhetoric was employed. 
'Here in Southern Rhodesia the future looks dark: the races have pulled so far apart 
in the last six years that one cannot see any sort of compromise having any chance of 
success,' she grimly observed.91 
 Given the racial tensions, it was entirely unsurprising that the RF returned to 
the idea of publicly prosecuting the white radicals. On 1 May, Mackay was arrested 
for declaring that he would not take up his mandatory service in the Rhodesian 
military. The arrest, occurring so shortly after Ranger's deportation, led Reed to once 
again question his own commitment: ''Terry, Peter, then who? If Peter does go to 
prison [...] will I be going on my long leave after all? But if it is to be between 
serving the cause in jail and actively outside over the next year or so, perhaps it 
would be best in jail.'92 The question was rendered irrelevant as Mackay was quickly 
handed a fine and a suspended sentence, and ordered to register again. Disappointed 
by the light sentence and seeking martyrdom for the African cause, Mackay 
confirmed to Reed and the Clutton-Brocks that he would refuse to register regardless 
of the consequences. He also expressed reluctance to move to Nyasaland, even 
though his relocation could help establish a ZAPU base there, and couldn't resist 
having one last jab at Ranger. '"One just feels," [Mackay] says, "that enough people 
have run away lately from prison sentences." [...] It is a matter of personal pride - a 
determination to test oneself, to persuade oneself one is not a coward, is able to stand 
prison.'93  
 Jaap van Velsen (an outspoken UCRN lecturer with a history in the Dutch 
resistance movement during the Second World War) was less than impressed with 
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Mackay's desire to go to prison as a martyr. In a conversation with Reed, van Velsen 
argued that:  
 
[Mackay's] not doing any good here, and in Nyasaland he could be really 
useful. It's all very well this talk about getting in technicians and people with 
special skills from Europe - but these people are just there to do a job. Their 
hearts not in the thing like Peter's - he could be of immense value in 
Nyasaland. And what does he think he'll prove if he goes to jail. Africans won't 
say, "look there's a European whose ready to go to jail". They'll just say, "Oh, 
it's all right for Europeans, they can afford to go to jail, it's not like it is for 
us."94 
 
A party at Mackay's house on the 18 May 1963 saw Garfield Todd, Hardwicke 
Holderness, and a gathering of many other white critics of the Rhodesian state ('a 
kind of gathering of the last of the liberals', as Reed noted), all of whom were 
convinced that Mackay would be wasted in prison, especially as the situation in 
Malawi was demanding attention.95 On 27 June, Hastings Banda was reported as 
stating to a rally that: 
 
Whites were welcome in Nyasaland, but they must understand this is our 
country. If they did not accept this they would have to pack up and go. [...]We 
want no arrogance from Europeans. Those days are gone. We mean to rule 
here. I mean my people to be free. Any arrogant Europeans must be shown this 
even if he must be beaten up. If a European is stubborn, or behaves badly, my 
boys-in-white [bodyguards] will show him how tough they are.96 
 
In stark contrast to earlier promises regarding non-black citizenship, Banda now 
appeared to be tolerating whites only on their subservience to black Africans. The 
threat of vigilante violence heightened the concerns of white radicals, well aware of 
how majority rule elsewhere on the continent was being associated with anti-white 
violence. A few days later, Banda did a public about-face on the subject, almost 
certainly due to pressure from the British. As reported in a South African newspaper: 
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[Banda] urged his supporters not to beat up any Whites and to keep peace and 
calm. "If any European is giving trouble, do not beat him up or swear at him. 
Leave and go to your chairman of the Malawi Party." A report would then go 
to the Malawi headquarters and Dr. Banda added, "I will know how to deal 
with that European. You yourselves do nothing."97 
 
This inconsistency was a common feature of race relations between African 
nationalists and white radicals across the continent. It was a fact of life for one 
member of the executive to say something entirely at odds with a statement by 
another, and even for an individual to contradict themselves. Some of this 
uncertainty can be explained by the white radicals’ exclusion from the highest levels 
of nationalist policy debates and the internal divisions of the nationalist movement as 
a whole. However, with the limitations of the available sources, it is also difficult for 
academics to ascertain the thought processes behind many public statements or 
decisions. This makes the eventual pronouncements and shifts in policy seemingly 
arbitrary, when the reasoning behind them may have been clear to those at the time. 
 
iv. ZAPU-ZANU Split 
 
Whilst the potential independence of Southern Rhodesia was being negotiated 
between the British and the RF at the Victoria Falls Conference in June and July 
1963, conflicting visions for the future were generating tensions within the 
nationalist movement. Over the course of four weeks in July and early August, two 
factions of ZAPU moved against each other in a series of coups and counter-coups. 
Since the flight of the ZAPU executive from the country in February 1963, the two 
'elders' (Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole) found themselves in a struggle for 
power amid attempts to draw members of the executive with common ideals to their 
camps.98 Although these divisions had been bubbling under the surface since 1959, it 
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was only by mid-1963 that the white radicals became aware that a new phase had 
developed, as Reed noted: 
 
A move against Nkomo's leadership is now only a matter of time. As a 
European there is nothing I can do and it is essential not to get involved in this 
[...] But I am worried that the younger nationalists, like our students, may move 
too soon or ineptly and get themselves discredited, perhaps permanently.99 
 
Reed's reluctance to involve himself in any internal struggle was intrinsically tied to 
an awareness of racial identities. The involvement of white radicals would 
complicate matters as whichever faction received white support would be liable of 
being labelled 'sell-outs', 'imperialists', or 'white stooges'. Indeed, the factional 
disagreements were already motivated in part by Nkomo's interactions with the white 
state. Leopold Takawira, for instance, had been at odds with Nkomo since February 
1961 over the NDP's provisional acceptance of the revised Rhodesian constitution.100 
As a former multi-racialist, Nkomo's willingness to negotiate with white powers had 
been used against him before. But with the election of the racialist RF, a larger 
number of Africans had begun to question whether there was anything to be gained 
by engaging with white Rhodesians. Furthermore, Nkomo's relationships with white 
radicals (particularly Guy Clutton-Brock and Garfield Todd) has raised questions 
about his belief in black nationalist ideologies.101 The Salisbury white radicals 
therefore elected to remain outside of the party politics. 
 Now living in Dar es Salaam, Terence Ranger did not feel the same anxieties 
about being involved as the distance from both the RF and the other white radicals 
afforded him a latitude that others lacked. Whereas white radicals in Rhodesia risked 
arrest for openly supporting the nationalists, Ranger was able to air his views in 
Tanzania with the only risk being his own standing with the leadership. As he 
recalled: 
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I gave a press conference to [the Zimbabwe nationalists] and other African 
exiles and got my first taste of the greater difficulties of being a white 
nationalist in the outside world. The general tenor of the meeting was that the 
people of Zimbabwe were cowardly and unprepared to fight. I felt a populist 
indignation at this libel and said that the leadership were to blame rather than 
the people. This did not please the Zimbabwean political exiles who 
complained to London. Chikerema defended me. "This is just Terry speaking. 
If you want him as a member you have to accept that he will speak his 
mind."102 
 
Chikerema's recognition that there remained benefits to non-black participation was 
echoed by others in Rhodesia. On 6 July, Reed was approached by one of the anti-
Nkomo nationalists, Nathan Shamuyarira (a lecturer at the UCRN in Adult 
Education). Shamuyarira had been a prominent member of the IASR and CAS before 
joining ZAPU in 1962 at the request of Stanley Parirenyatwa.103 Given his multi-
racialist credentials and Reed's position as Chairman of the Salisbury City branch, 
their conversation was an obvious effort to gauge the mood of the non-black radicals. 
 
[Shamuyarira] says there will from now be a serious split. He asks me about 
the City Branch and I say that in my view the Europeans will have to keep 
strictly out of this - accepting the leadership that emerges but taking no part in 
the quarrels about who shall lead. Nathan fully agrees.104 
 
The split between Nkomo and Sithole became irrevocable by the end of July, despite 
the failed attempts by Todd and Clutton-Brock (the 'friends of African nationalism') 
to 'heal the rift'.105 Sithole had drawn to his side Mugabe, Takawira, Morton 
Malianga, Shamuyarira, and Henry Hamadziripi, as well as a dozen other leading 
nationalists, all of whom Nkomo suspended from ZAPU.106 
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 Despite their promises to not get involved, many of the non-black radicals 
went back on their word. When Sithole and Takawira were arrested at Salisbury 
airport, their bail was paid using funds raised by Asian and Indian ZAPU 
supporters.107 Mackay produced a strongly anti-Nkomo article on the split for the 
Malawi News, as well as arranging meetings between the anti-Nkomo faction and 
Hastings Banda, and actively tried to get James Chikerema to side with the 
separatists. Upon hearing of this, Reed wryly noted: 'Peter, though he argues there is 
nothing Europeans can do, seems to be remarkably busy in the matter.'108 Yet 
Mackay's initial hostility to Nkomo and those who stayed with him quickly passed 
and after 1964, he would involve himself with ZAPU to an extent he never had 
before. In Dar es Salaam, Ranger began to find himself siding more and more with 
the anti-Nkomo faction, and formed a close friendship with Victoria and Herbert 
Chitepo (Rhodesia's first black lawyer). The result, as Nkomo recalled, was an 
uncomfortable incident involving Ranger at the Chitepos' house in Dar es Salaam. 
 
I found Victoria [Chitepo] sitting with Dr. Terence Ranger, a liberal-minded 
white man who had just been expelled from the university in Salisbury by the 
Field regime. Victoria walked straight out of the room, leaving Dr. Ranger to 
make it clear I was not welcome in the house.'109 
 
Nkomo's dismissal of Ranger as a 'liberal-minded white man' demonstrates how the 
labels attached to the non-black radicals are highly subjective. Because Ranger had 
turned against Nkomo, the ZAPU president deliberately shifted Ranger from a 
radical nationalist to a white liberal. Nevertheless, Ranger's association with the anti-
Nkomo group had seemed likely from the outset. In his own words: 'I had delivered 
the Zambian letter in June 1963; my friends were among the rebels; I admired 
Sithole.'110 Furthermore, a letter to Shamuyarira had been stolen by ZAPU supporters 
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and given to Chikerema as evidence of Ranger's apparent support for the rebel 
nationalists. The result was that by March 1964, Ranger found himself 'cut off from 
ZAPU.'111 As Reed noted in his diary, 'I get the impression Terry is now completely 
identified with [the anti-Nkomo faction], though not Shelagh [...] On the ZAPU side 
I am regarded as having remained neutral.'112 
 It is easy to suggest that the non-black radicals aligned themselves along 
political lines, but the situation was far more complex. Personal relationships 
influenced all aspects of their attitudes. Edwin Lichtenstein, for instance, explained 
his support for the anti-Nkomo faction came 'largely because of the personalities 
involved, [...] Robert Mugabe and people who were then associated with him.'113 
Mackay's long association with some of the senior anti-Nkomo leaders, such as 
Takawira, also goes some way to explaining his temporary shift to their camp. 
(Mackay described Takawira with fondness in his autobiography: 'It was Takawira, I 
felt, travelling on his own journey of discovery, who epitomised the national hope of 
a better world to come.'114) With the uncertainty that dominated the nationalist 
leadership, personal relationships proved a crucial factor in determining where the 
radicals' allegiances lay.  
 Interestingly, the white radicals became something of a commodity in the 
struggle (despite the associated criticisms) as they offered international legitimacy to 
whichever faction counted them as supporters. Knowing that Sithole's reputation as 
an intellectual would likely gain him the support of students, Nkomo asked Stephen 
Lombard and Judith Todd to arrange a clandestine meeting at the UCRN in the 
middle of July 1963.115 In another reversal of his previous anti-white rhetoric, 
Nkomo addressed a group of white, black, and Indian students and informed them 
that the liberation of Zimbabwe would require the participation of all individuals, 
whatever their race. The next day, however, one of those in attendance anonymously 
                                               
111 Ibid., p.163 
112 Reed, 'Monday 16 March 1964', Diary, Vol.103 
113 Edwin Lichtenstein, interviewed by I.J. Johnstone (20 November 1983) 
114 Mackay, We Have Tomorrow, p.73 
115 Judith Todd, interviewed by author (10 December 2015) 
176 
 
published a statement in the African Daily News pledging the support of the ZAPU 
student body to the anti-Nkomo group.116 Whilst factionalism would come to 
dominate student politics on the UCRN campus for the next two decades, its origins 
lay with the Nkomo-Sithole split of 1963.117 
 African nationalist leaders also attempted to consolidate support from the few 
Indian radicals. On 13 July 1963, Suman Mehta (an active supporter since the NDP's 
formation in 1959) was informed by Enoch Dumbutshena that the ZAPU Salisbury 
City Branch was going to be expected to 'send delegates to the conference which 
Joshua [Nkomo] is calling in three weeks time to settle the leadership.' As Reed 
noted in his diary, 'at the moment, it looks as if [Enos] Nkala and the rebels in the 
Executive will accept this challenge (Leo Takawira will be here on Monday). If this 
is so, then the City Branch ought to be represented - but I am convinced not by any 
non-Africans.'118 When Reed next spoke to Mehta on 1 August, he reported that the 
latter's 'talk with Sithole has converted him completely against Nkomo.' The same 
day Shamuyarira again contacted Reed regarding white involvement with any new 
party. 
 
He says, they [the anti-Nkomo faction] will want Europeans to join them 
whatever capital the other side tries to make out of this. Then [Shamuyarira] 
says a curious thing: "In fact we may welcome a little neutralisation by 
Europeans."119 
 
What Shamuyarira meant by 'a little neutralisation' refers to the concerns of former 
multi-racialists (like Shamuyarira and Chitepo) in siding with vocal anti-white 
nationalists. Although the Sithole faction were united in their rejection of Nkomo's 
leadership, there remained inherent divisions about race in their version of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. According to Masonda Bwalya (a UCRN student who 
sided with Sithole), throughout July and August 1963 there were frequent 
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discussions about racial policies within the African students on campus,120 and it was 
agreed that including whites from the outset would immediately temper the anti-
white rhetoric of any new faction. 
 The official announcement on 8 August 1963 of a new African party named 
the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) therefore saw public re-
affirmations to non-racial ideals.  
 
Sensing the need for a new party, and having dedicated ourselves to the 
liberation of our country so that all people, regardless of the colour of their 
skin, their race, their religion and their sex, may enjoy equality, opportunity 
and full citizenship based on one man, one vote, we wish to declare that we 
have formed the Zimbabwe African National Union.121 
 
The founding ZANU policy statement described the party as 'a non-racial Union of 
all the peoples of Zimbabwe who share a common destiny and a common fate, 
believing in the African Character of Zimbabwe and democratic rule by the majority, 
regardless of race, colour, creed, or tribe.'122 The similarities with the wording of the 
SRANC, NDP, and ZAPU charters were striking, if somewhat unsurprising given the 
prominence of established nationalist leaders in ZANU. Although the new generation 
(including Robert Mugabe) were beginning to make their voices heard, they 
remained lower in the hierarchy and familiar racial policies dominated the discourse 
of ZANU to begin with. Shamuyarira was immediately tasked with obtaining 
tangible non-black support, as Reed recalled, 
 
Nathan [Shamuyarira] phones me and suggests I come down to his office 
where he asks me if the City Branch thinks a new party should be formed. I say 
that we have been - at least in the committee - more concerned what to do if 
new parties were formed than to decide whether they ought to be. He tells me 
[...] Non-Africans will be welcome in the party. "And not", says Nathan, "just 
tolerated as they were in ZAPU."123 
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Reed, however, was reluctant to engage with the new party. 'If I were an African I 
should be with Sithole. But as a white man, I am not sure. Sithole's party is largely a 
complaint against African leadership and I am not sure we whites can make such 
complaints.'124 As with the initial stages of the split, these reservations saw many 
non-black radicals confine themselves to specific passive types of support on both 
sides of the split. ZANU, for instance, came to rely on the wealth of non-black 
radicals to survive, and particularly the white and Asian communities. 'The party had 
the whole second floor of the Vanguard House in Railway Avenue as its 
headquarters, because the flat belonged to an Asian, Mr Adams, who was our 
sympathiser,' explained Maurice Nyagumbo.125 The Catholic Church proved to be 
another important source of funding, due in part to a few radical bishops, and 
remained largely impartial.126 The multi-racial Mambo Press and Moto newspaper 
were both significant supporters of ZANU and ZAPU, and Aloysius Haene (the 
Bishop of Gweru) provided financial support towards printing ZAPU membership 
cards and posters, whilst also funding ZANU's first Party Congress.127 
 Although some like Clutton-Brock and Garfield Todd made clear their 
support for Nkomo soon after the split,128 others remained circumspect. Persuaded by 
the American Quaker Margaret Moore, Reed met with Sithole on 13 August. Yet 
despite an agreement with Sithole on many issues, Reed resolved to avoid declaring 
his allegiance, partly because Nkomo had established a new organisation only a few 
days earlier, the People's Caretaker Council (PCC).129 Formed at a meeting on the 
Clutton-Brock's Cold Comfort Farm (a multi-racial cooperative run on land owned 
by the Haddons near Salisbury), ZAPU/PCC was defined as a social organisation 
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rather than a political party, did not register supporters, and therefore operated with a 
less-rigid view of membership.  
 Unlike ZANU, there was no mention whatsoever of race in the founding 
principles, only geography. It was 'a people's movement in which all people who 
were born or lived in Zimbabwe could be members.'130 Zimbabwean nationalism as 
envisaged by ZAPU/PCC did not require the historic claims to land, race, or society. 
As well as being a means of ensuring non-black participation, the rejection of racial 
rhetoric was a simultaneous distancing from the multi-racialism that had tainted all 
previous nationalist groups. With the fracturing of the nationalists, white-dominated 
multi-racialism became an even more prevalent insult and this distancing was crucial 
to ensuring claims to legitimacy. Following the first ZAPU/PCC congress where 
ZANU were denounced as 'imperialists' controlled by Americans, accusations against 
Sithole of being a 'sell-out' became commonplace.131 One press release published in 
August 1963 by Benjamin Madlela (ZAPU/PCC representative in Dar es Salaam) 
highlighted the time Sithole had spent in the USA as a sign that he was no longer a 
'genuine' African nationalist. 'There for over three years, he was ordained in religion 
and imbibed American culture. Whilst in the United States and from that angle he 
wrote his book on African Nationalism,' wrote Madlela. The document also 
denounced all ZANU leaders as multi-racialists.132 Sithole and the other 
'intellectuals' were labelled as less-Zimbabwean because they had spent less time in 
Zimbabwe than many of the ZAPU/PCC's leaders, and were therefore deemed less 
likely to take the necessary actions for self-liberation because they were 'thinkers and 
not do-ers'.133 Mugabe, for instance, was described as 'a distinguished scholar who 
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had travelled Africa and who possessed three university degrees'134 but lacked the 
'steel to banish the British when called upon.'135 
 ZAPU/PCC was not exempt from these accusations either and the 
environment generated made prominent white radicals including Reed and Leo 
Baron question how their relationships with Nkomo were perceived. 'Many within 
the black nationalist elite criticised Nkomo's dependence on white advisors [whilst] 
at the same time he was accused of failing to consult his black colleagues,' notes Fay 
Chung,136 and the old accusations of white men pulling the strings of African 
nationalism were increasingly regurgitated. One such example was an article 
published in The Battle Cry (ZANU's newspaper), as Terence Ranger recalled:  
 
I told John [Reed] of ZANU statements, “some really distasteful stuff”, 
reviving the old canard about Garfield Todd beating “naked African girls” and 
alleging that the PCC was run by the Haddons, [Ahrn] Palley, Leo Baron and 
“other imperialists”, who took bribes down to Joshua in Gonakudzingwa. It 
wrote of ZAPU/PCC as “recanting, revisionist, recoiling and infested with 
white settlers – a multi-racial mixed grill”.137 
 
Even ordinary ZAPU/PCC supporters were aware of the labelling of their leaders as 
'stooges, sell-outs, dissidents and counter-revolutionaries',138 particularly in the 
townships where disagreements routinely broke out between the supporters of 
different factions. 'We were always being called names [by ZANU supporters]. They 
would say, "you are dogs of the British. You are puppets for the varungu,"' 
remembered Patience Mzingezi.139 
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 These divisions also took a more violent turn. Describing the situation in 
April 1964, the Salisbury Police Commissioner stated that 'there was almost a state 
of civil war between supporters of rival nationalist parties in the African 
townships',140 leading Timothy Scarnecchia to assert that 'Harare and Highfield were, 
by the beginning of 1964, much more chaotic and violent than the leaders of ZAPU 
and ZANU were willing to admit.'141 If the nationalist leaders could not control the 
violence within their groups, there were genuine fears that it would soon become 
explicitly racialised, and the white state and the white radicals would find themselves 
involved. Indeed, when he was arrested and imprisoned in late 1963 for again 
refusing to serve in the Rhodesian military, Mackay explained his refusal was based 
upon a fear 'that the army might be used to repress African nationalist movements'.142 
When Mackay was finally released in February 1964, the untenable situation in 
Rhodesia for his kind of proactive contributions resulted in him establishing a 
refugee camp in Zambia with Clutton-Brock for Africans fleeing the violence in the 
Congo.143 
 In April 1964, Ian Smith became the leader of the RF and Prime Minister of 
the increasingly divided nation.144 The African nationalists were quick to recognise 
the dangers represented by Smith's staunch opposition for African nationalism. In a 
press statement released on 14 April, ZANU 'called on the African people to gear 
themselves for an inevitable head-on collision now that the “most reactionary 
element” have the day in Southern Rhodesia,’ and for unity with ZAPU/PCC, despite 
their differences in opinion, in order to 'present a united front to the white regime.'145 
Smith wasted no time in demonstrating to the white population that he would not 
tolerate organised African nationalism. On 16 April (less than 72 hours after Smith 
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took office), Nkomo and a host of other nationalist leaders were handed detention 
sentences of varying lengths.146 Timothy Scarnecchia records that Nkomo had 
already been arrested in October and December 1963, as well as in January 1964,147 
and each time Nkomo had relied upon the white lawyer and 'very good friend', Leo 
Baron, to fight the charges.148 In April he was not so lucky. Sentenced to ten years 
detention, he was moved to Gonakudzingwa (an isolated camp for African 
nationalists, located near the Mozambique border). This division of the nationalist 
leadership into detainees, exiles, and underground leaders proved to be an important 
factor in the development of Zimbabwean nationalism and is explored in the 
subsequent chapters. 
 In light of the relentless attacks, Reed criticised George Nyandoro 
(ZAPU/PCC's Secretary General) on 18 April for the party's 'bitter exclusion of the 
ZANU men'. Nyandoro replied 'he would rather have traitors and self-seekers 
working against the party outside it than inside it.' Clarifying this statement, he 
added, 'no-one is being excluded [...] Nkomo was asked should we accept these 
people, Takawira though he was Capricorn, Herbert Chitepo - etc; he said yes, accept 
them if they want to come in, accept everybody.'149 The recognition given to the 
multi-racial histories of individuals showed the persistence of anti-partnership 
politics as well as the importance of gaining members despite their potentially 
problematic reputations. 
 Having only recently returned to Rhodesia after several months away, Reed 
found himself questioning his own future within Zimbabwean nationalism. 'Should I 
go back and join the PCC, in spite of [...] friends in ZANU, or keep out of politics, or 
try to work for the university’s future under an African Government resenting 
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insolent intellectuals?'150 He would eventually side with ZAPU/PCC, as would 
Garfield Todd who informed a press conference that: 
 
I have been invited to assist the PCC in a number of small ways and have 
agreed. There are a number of us who want to help because we believe there 
are now only two alternatives for Southern Rhodesia – negotiation or a national 
tragedy. The time for negotiation is particularly short because that is the first 
stage. There are a number of white people I know who are tremendously 
concerned at the way things are going.151 
 
Although still more liberal than radical, Todd's public support for Nkomo and the 
vocal anti-white policies of ZANU's members made ZAPU/PCC far more appealing 
to non-black radicals. As Fay Chung explains, 'ZANU was said to be a minority 
group of black intellectuals who opposed the entry of whites into black nationalist 
politics. They were accused of practising a form of reverse racism.'152 Under the 
determined drive of Nkomo, ZAPU/PCC were keen to make a clear distinction 
between those whites who buttressed colonialism and those who were 
distinguishable from black Africans only by their skin colour and Nkomo reaffirmed 
his personal views in a May 1964 national message: 
 
I wish to warn you against creating racial animosity. We do not hate any 
particular race. We hate evil and whoever associates with such evil. Let us 
prove to all in this country and outside that our fight has only one motive – to 
free this country from the forces of evil and that all men and women in 
Zimbabwe, irrespective of their racial origin, should live a better and fuller 
life.153 
 
Although this was primarily a public relation move, there was little doubt that 
Nkomo still believed in the importance of non-racialism for the future of Zimbabwe. 
In his 1984 autobiography, Nkomo explicitly discussed the impact non-black 
participation had for Zimbabwean nationalism during this period. 
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I have mentioned that there were people of Indian descent and coloured 
citizens in that camp [Gonakudzingwa], fellow-members of our party and 
colleagues in our cause. I know that we did have some white people on our 
side. [...] We did what we could to show that our fight was not a racial one, 
against the whites, but for all the people of the country. From white supporters 
outside we received previous help.'154 
 
Nevertheless, there were still ardent disagreements within the ever-shrinking group 
of Salisbury non-black radicals as to their role. Almost a year had passed since the 
first discussions about non-racialism in the nationalist split and the uncertainty had 
not abated. As Guy Clutton-Brock informed Reed on 6 June, 'support African 
Nationalism - ZAPU if you like. But there is nothing at present to be done with the 
Nationalists.'155 A week later, Mackay expressed the opposite view. 'He [Mackay] 
disapproves of this feeling that it is still best for Europeans to steer completely clear 
of the in-fighting; though in fact he has gone and even if secretly much beyond 
neutrality in favour of ZANU.' Yet as Reed noted, even Mackay was less certain as 
to whether whites should be members of the nationalist parties: 
 
He talks about some small European group, working for the Nationalists - both 
sides - but not of them, and this is attractive enough as an idea. But in practice 
when does it emerge? There is no political possibility of a European party 
committed to the Africans. And outside politics is there anything more to be 
done than isn't already being done - or could as well be done by SRLAW[F], 
and the loose liberal groups that raise money to send Todd and Holderness to 
London. Peter has the notion of a small devoted band of selfless servers, 
reviled by the Europeans and by one or perhaps both sides among the Africans, 
carrying on and helping the future to be born.156 
 
Mackay's vision for 'a small devoted band' would see fruition in his own actions, 
ferrying nationalists across central Africa, and with later groups at the UCRN. Yet 
for the first half of 1964, the white radicals were reduced to the very roles that they 
saw as being the purview of white liberals; namely providing support for the families 
                                               
154 Nkomo, The Story of My Life, p.133 
155 Reed, 'Saturday 6 June 1964', Diary, Vol.101 
156 Reed, 'Saturday 13 June 1964', Diary, Vol.101. Emphasis in original 
185 
 
of the detainees. Whilst black ZANU and ZAPU/PCC supporters were continuing the 
sporadic violence across Rhodesia that saw dynamite explode at a Salisbury 
newspaper office, an African shot dead by a policeman, the attempted derailing of a 
mail train, and a failed bomb attack in a Checkers supermarket,157 the white radicals 
were discussing house parties and plans to dispatch 'crates of Readers Digests' to the 
detainees.158 
 This limbo ended abruptly on 5 July 1964. Rhodesians across the country 
awoke to the news that a white Rhodesian named Petrus Johannes Andries 
Oberholzer had been killed the night before in the rural Melsetter area of the 
country.159 Although it was not immediately made clear, the culprits were ZANU's 
first guerrilla unit to operate inside the country, the self-styled 'Crocodile Gang'. Why 
they had attacked an unarmed man and his wife and daughter was not published in 
the press. Yet according to the Zimbabwean journalist, Peter Godwin (who claims to 
have witnessed the crime scene first hand as a child) a note was left with the body. It 
read: 'This is the work of the Clocadile Gang [sic]. We will keep on fighting until all 
white settlers are going and our land is returned. Viva Chimurenga!'160 The murder 
marked a turning point in the liberation struggle, and provided a bleak foreshadowing 
of the racialised violence that was about to erupt and John Reed's diary entry when 
he heard the news was sombre. Under a newspaper cutting of the post-mortem results 
which confirmed the brutality of the assault, he wrote only one line: 'The first 
European to be killed...'.161 
 
Conclusion 
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This chapter has examined the turbulent period between the banning of ZAPU in 
September 1962 and the consolidation of a violent, racialised, and divided 
Zimbabwean nationalism by July 1964. It has explored how the key tenets of African 
nationalism in the nation had shifted in response to domestic and global influences, 
and how race came to underpin national identities more than at any point prior. It 
highlights the escalation of anti-white rhetoric within the nationalist movement 
(particularly the leadership) and shows how the irreversible split between 
Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo in the summer of 1963 created spaces for a 
revision of non-black participation in the nation building efforts of the Zimbabwean 
nationalists. Finally, it argues that the destructive effect of a staunchly anti-
nationalist Rhodesian state created previously unforeseen challenges for non-black 
radicals, and demonstrating need for the adaptation of their activities. 
 The underlying element of this chapter is once again uncertainty. At no point 
was Zimbabwean nationalism a static ideology. The place of race within the 
movement was continuously shifting to the extent that it was impossible for non-
black radicals to ascertain whether they were needed, or indeed welcome, within the 
cause. As violence became an integral part of the movement and white participation 
became a burden rather than a benefit, it became clear that the utility of white 
radicals would be thrown into question once again. 
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Chapter 5 
The Rise of Black Identity Politics: ZAPU and ZANU in 
1964 
 
Introduction 
 
1964 marked a significant turning point for race in Zimbabwean nationalism. 
Whereas the period prior had seen non-racial nationalism dominate (albeit 
perilously) the African movement, now a liberation ideology based on black identity 
politics came to the fore. Catalysed by a repressive RF government, escalating 
African violence (including against white settlers), and growing anti-white 
sentiments, the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders became increasingly supportive of a 
movement where black Africans worked for their own liberation and excluded non-
black participants. 
 This shift introduced important new dimensions into the Zimbabwean 
nationalist struggle for the African nationalists, the non-black radicals, and the 
Rhodesian state. This chapter seeks to explain exactly what these changes were and 
how 1964 marked an important change from the context and nationalist thinking of 
earlier periods. By focusing on the discussions about race and about the imagined 
future Zimbabwean nation, the chapter highlights the transnational connections and 
escalating violence between and against black Africans as an explanation for the rise 
of a new racially-conscious form of nationalism revolving around 'blackness'. To 
explore the period properly, the chapter is broken down into four sections. 
 The first section drops the narrative aspect present so far throughout this 
thesis to examine the specific conceptual theories of racial nationalism that emerged 
in 1964. It situates the discourses of the African leadership and the actions of the 
leaders as regarding non-black radicals into the global and pan-African context, and 
explores how events and ideologies influenced these developments. Section two 
examines the role of violence during the summer of 1964 and how the nationalist 
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agenda began to reflect a militaristic liberation ideology. Anti-white sentiments 
combined with disordered and decentralised nationalist groups led many non-black 
radicals to reluctantly distance themselves from the townships they had previous 
been active during the NDP and ZAPU eras. 
 The third section assess the contributions of the non-black radicals to the 
struggle, including the Indian community, and how institutions like the UCRN 
provided a focal point for the persistent non-racialism of the radicals. Situated within 
the context of the banning of both ZAPU/PCC and ZANU, the section argues that the 
persecution of dissenting voices within Rhodesian society demonstrates the genuine 
concerns of the RF about non-black participation. This repression is expanded upon 
in the final section which focuses on the role of restriction or exile in shaping 
Zimbabwean nationalism. Divisions between detained nationalist leaders and those 
in exile provided space for competing visions of the Zimbabwean nation to struggle 
for legitimacy. The positioning of non-black radicals in the midst of these factions 
and their reception by African leaders highlights the distinctions between public and 
private racial and nationalist rhetoric and the importance of personal relationships in 
shaping debates about the Zimbabwean nation. 
 
i. The Rise of Black Identity Politics: racial thinking by 1964 
 
As the previous chapters have shown, Zimbabwean nationalism was never a static 
movement. The underpinning ideologies were constantly adapting to external and 
internal stimuli, particularly regarding racial thinking. When multi-racial partnership 
lost its allure in the mid-1950s, non-racial nationalism emerged as its successor, and 
between 1957 and 1961, the SRANC and NDP had promoted a broad-reaching 
doctrine of inclusion. Participatory rights in the struggle and the imagined post-
colonial nation were ascribed regardless of skin colour and non-black radicals were 
invited to participate, even as elected party members. Yet these tolerant policies 
belied an underlying racialism. After 1961, this simmering anti-white/pro-black 
ideology became increasingly popular amongst the nationalist leadership, encouraged 
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by a resurgent distrust of racially cooperative movements, the repression of African 
nationalists, and the growing American and South African-led intellectual movement 
focused on 'blackness'. What emerged amongst Zimbabwean nationalists in early 
1964 was a 'black identity nationalism'. 
 The rise of 'black identity nationalism' was not unique to Rhodesia, however 
it occurred there much later than in other African colonies. Since African politics 
was driven by elites, it was necessary for these elites to recognise the limitations of 
colonial systems before they conceived as working outside of them. As Toyin Falola 
explains: 
 
[The African elites] would work within the European system, as long as the 
system was just and fair. [...] But as the system itself became either repressive 
or antagonistic toward the elite, the intelligentsia became more critical of the 
system, rejecting the moderate ideas propounded [by those within the system].1 
 
In Rhodesia, this rejection was delayed by the appeasement offered by multi-racial 
partnership, and the necessity of dealing with an entrenched white settler population 
(as opposed to in purely economic or exploitative colonies). As multi-racialism lost 
its allure after 1957 and the Rhodesian state grew hostile to African nationalism, the 
racial component of African politics became increasingly dominant. The 
ZAPU/ZANU split in 1963 further exacerbated the positioning of race within 
Zimbabwean nationalism with both factions seeking to identify themselves as more 
'Zimbabwean' and less 'European', and drawing on a black identity nationalism to 
achieve this goal. 
 One aspect of this shift was the rejection of prominent involvement by white 
radicals in nationalist politics. Although both ZANU and ZAPU/PCC were more 
dismissive about non-black participation than their predecessors, it was ZANU who 
were more extreme. Some point to external influences on this radicalism, particularly 
as international supporters became increasingly involved. Gugu Ndlovu, the daughter 
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of Edward Ndlovu (ZAPU's national secretary), pointed to Chinese influences in 
particular. 
 
I have to wonder if ZANU's political attitudes and behaviours were influenced 
at all by the Chinese. [...] For me, the Chinese were not embracing everybody 
and trying to include everyone [...] and I'm wondering if on an individual level 
as a member, how it would have affected your thinking and your reasoning.2 
 
The impact of racialised Chinese nationalism has been explored elsewhere,3 but the 
conflict generated by multiple conflicting influences was evident in ZANU's 
struggles to define racial policy. Edgar Tekere (ZANU's Deputy Secretary for Youth 
and Culture) classified ZANU's stance as: 
 
(1) the doctrine of self-liberation: that freedom which relied on the intervention 
of others was not worth having; (2) non-racialism, i.e. blindness to race, as 
opposed to multi-racialism, which sees and accepts racial multiplicity and 
“partnership”.4 
 
Neither stated principle is particularly different than those of the NDP or ZAPU. 
However, the association of 'non-racialism' with 'self-liberation' complicates Tekere's 
defined meaning of non-racialism beyond 'blindness to race'. Within the context of 
rejection 'the intervention of others', non-racialism as defined by ZANU appeared a 
justification for excluding poorly-defined 'others'. Once again, Brubaker's theories of 
'insider-outsider' nationalism explain this division, and it is racial identities that 
provide the key feature behind categorisation. David Moore highlights such rhetoric 
as a deliberate part of 'ZANU's effort to carve out a space of authenticity and 
autonomy for what could be termed the "African experience" in opposition to 
ZAPU's more universalistic claims.' Moore expands further that by 1964, '"multi-
racialism" in the white liberal-ZAPU-PCC lexicon apparently meant much less than 
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majority-rule, while ZANU's phrase of "non-racialism" was supposed to embody true 
democracy.'5 
 ZANU's adherence to this discourse meant even ZAPU/PCC's leaders found 
themselves in a position where non-black supporters exposed them to criticism. As 
the party containing the greatest number of former multi-racialists from the CAS and 
IASR, ZAPU/PCC found itself negatively tainted by association. Although multi-
racialism had provided 'contacts, quickly transferred into firm friendships' between 
white radicals and 'a number of equally disillusioned African members, [...] in later 
years Capricorn had become a term of abuse, synonymous with "sell-out" among 
Central African nationalists,' explains John McCracken.6 With this criticism of multi-
racialism reaching its zenith, Joshua Nkomo had no choice but to respond. In a 1964 
document ('The Case for Majority Rule in Rhodesia') ZAPU/PCC's leader explicitly 
denounced non-racialism and non-black supporters. 
 
I am well aware of the fact that there are many well-meaning European men 
and women who have spent their lifetime working for and with the African 
people. 
 Some of them have contributed very important services; others have quietly 
worked to bring human equality in the country; others still have altruistically 
worked to improve the lot of Africans; and still others are working quietly to 
bring about majority rule in the country, sincerely believing it is the only and 
best way to secure peace and prosperity in the country. 
 All this is true; all this I know. But it is too little, ineffectual and incapable of 
changing the wrong course and direction followed by those who want a 
destination only known to themselves, and by people who are bent on 
destroying the country and themselves. [...] One has to be an African to know 
and to feel what is going on. I do hope that some people among us will be 
spared to write the history of this dismal period that we are passing through.7 
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Although Nkomo had been critical of white participation in the nationalist struggle 
before,8 this document marked the first time he had placed emphasise on the 
necessity of being 'African'. This was a direct result of the racialisation of African 
nationalism more broadly and an extension of existing concerns regarding the 
motivations of non-black radicals. The empathy of the similarly marginalised was a 
strong motivation for participation, yet it did not facilitate access to the fundamental 
grievances that drove African nationalism. 
 Whilst these debates occurred primarily amongst the elites, there was an 
opening of spaces for discussion at all levels of the African nationalist movement. 
Middle-class and educated Africans challenged views within the letter pages of the 
African press (the African Daily News and Bantu Mirror), although only the literate 
and those with the time and inclination to write letters could participate.9 Informal 
venues (including beer halls, working men's clubs, and trade union societies) and 
official party meetings and rallies, facilitated discussion within working class 
Africans in urban and rural areas. As Enocent Msindo explains, throughout all these 
spaces 'there were important debates about the identity of the imagined "nation-to-
be".10 Between May and July 1964, a series of events took place around Salisbury 
involving members of the ZANU and ZAPU/PCC elites and branch members, with 
race the focal point.  
 On 12 June, the Rhodesian National Affairs Association (one of the oldest 
non-political multi-racial discussion groups) held a lunch-time meeting, attended by 
Edson Zvogbo (ZANU Deputy Secretary-General). Zvogbo had spent time in the 
USA and South Africa,11 and the conversation revolved around the role of whites in 
an independent Zimbabwe. The ZANU representative insisted the struggle was not 
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racial: 'the implementation of majority rule is itself a task requiring both African and 
European [...] There is no question that one group will be excluded from the result on 
the basis of their race alone.' However, in reference to the CAS Salisbury branch's 
statement a few days earlier that former members now in ZANU or ZAPU/PCC 
should persist with multi-racialism,12 Zvogbo replied: 
 
ZANU's executive includes a number who began their careers in politics with 
the Capricorn Association, but all of these individuals have now realised the 
route to a liberated nation lies with the Zimbabwean people working for 
themselves. [...] There is no place anymore for Europeans within such a 
movement.13 
 
Although they limited themselves to discussing the role of non-blacks in 
Zimbabwean nationalism, what Tekere, Nkomo, and Zvobgo were all emphasising 
was the necessity of creating a new form of nationalist ideology, rejecting external 
methods and structures (such as multi-racialism). The reasoning was that a non-
African agenda would only work to misdirect the impetus of black Zimbabwean 
nationalism. Between 1956 and 1964, thirty-three African nations had gained 
independence. Yet the Rhodesian situation (specifically the white settler population) 
meant the routes to majority rule seen elsewhere were not applicable. The rise of the 
RF, the collapse of the CAF, and Ian Smith's increasingly ardent demands for 
independence regardless of British policies meant the Zimbabwean nationalist 
struggle had more in keeping with Algeria than white-settler states like Kenya. 
Because British colonialism had won out over settler interests in Kenya in the 1920s, 
white society in southern Africa was stronger and more entrenched, and thus able to 
better resist African and colonial metropole efforts to enforce change.14 
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 Consequently, when multi-racialism failed in Rhodesia, inspiration was taken 
from the struggles of other nationalist and anti-colonial movements including 
racially-exclusive ideologies. Zimbabweans were forced to reject previously 
accepted routes to independence that had worked in Zambia and Malawi and 
construct a new liberation ideology based upon their collective black identity as a 
means of perpetrating their struggle within nation state borders. Pan-Africanist racial 
thinking had shifted from black communities acting in opposition to colonial rule, to 
black states working to assist those neighbouring nations still under white rule.15 
National agendas began to adopt greater racial overtones due to the solidarity 
amongst black Africans. There was a development of what Veera V. Williams calls 
'African self-consciousness' brought about by four factors in individuals: an 
awareness of a black identity and African heritage, the recognition of black 
institutions (practices, customs etc), the participation in liberation and development 
efforts for black people, and the resistance to oppression against black 
communities.16 Such thinking encouraged the racialism associated with pan-
Africanism of the mid-twentieth century. This insistence on being a black African in 
order to participate in the struggle was a logical response to the rejection of multi-
racialism and the persecution of the nationalists by the white state. Yet on the surface 
it also seems to have been fundamentally incompatible with the proclaimed non-
racialism of ZAPU/PCC and particularly ZANU.  
 The explanation for this contradiction lies with black identity nationalism 
being seen more as a constructive ideology than a destructive one, particularly in 
regards to the nation building efforts. Race was turned from a weakness to a strength, 
and utilised in conjunction with the size of the African population and the unity of 
pan-African solidarity based on 'blackness'. Kenneth Kaunda (black Zambia's first 
President) explained clearly why this focus on skin colour and race was so important:  
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Colonialism, for all its benefits, devalued man. It created elite societies in 
which man's worth was determined by an irrelevant biological detail - skin 
pigmentation. And, even more serious, the colonialists set out to destroy our 
self-confidence. They dinned into the African mind the idea that we were 
primitive, backward and degraded, and but for their presence among us, would 
be living like animals. The result is that even today [...] you will find a certain 
sector of the population suffering from a "Bwana" complex. They cannot stand 
on their own feet as free men but must look over their shoulder all the time for 
the approval of the white man.17 
 
Kaunda's appeal to reclaim blackness as a positive identity was the same motivation 
behind Mugabe's cultural programme during the NDP period and a well recognised 
concept by the 1960s. In 1967, Frantz Fanon explicitly summarised the feelings of 
dependency and inadequacy experienced by black people in white-dominated 
societies in his work Peau Noire, Masques Blanc (Black Skin, White Masks). 
Approaching the subject as a psychoanalyst and revolutionary thinker, Fanon 
explained that if a black person's inferiority belief came from living 'in a society that 
derives its stability from the perpetuation of this complex, in a society that proclaims 
the superiority of one race' then the solution was the 'need for combined action on the 
individual and the group.'18 
 
The black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, turn white or 
disappear; but he should be able to take cognizance of a possibility of 
existence. [...] My objective, once his motivations have been brought into 
consciousness, will be to put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) 
with respect to the real source of the conflict - that is, toward the social 
structures.19 
 
Blackness was consequently perceived as being a vital tool in the nationalist agenda 
and consequently Zimbabwean nationalism after 1964 rejected the imposed colonial 
socio-political structures because they were foreign and therefore an imposition of 
                                               
17 Kenneth Kaunda, A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris from Kenneth Kaunda, 
President of Zambia (London, 1966), pp.20-21. "Bwana" is Swahili for "Master" or "Boss", 
a term employed by whites during the colonial era. 
18 Fanon, Peau Noire, p.99 
19 Ibid., p.100. Emphasis in original. 
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non-black culture on African society. Pan-Africanism and transnational black 
liberation ideologies became increasingly useful tools for defining a nationalist 
movement where the key distinction revolved around skin colour. Although the 
Nigerian academic Toyin Falola explains the new direction in terms of anti-
imperialism rather than anti-colonialism,20 his core argument remains applicable to 
the Zimbabwean case study:  
 
Pan-Africanism added an additional dimension – that of colour: imperialists are 
white, victims are black. Very powerfully, an ideology constructed out of skin 
colour and anti-imperialism merged in such ideas as Negritude, Blyden’s 
“African personality,” a host of home-grown socialistic ideas, communism, 
socialism, and Marxism.21 
 
'Negritude' was another expression of the black consciousness espoused by W.E.B 
Du Bois, Leon Damas, Aimé Cesaire, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and Steve 
Biko,22 and as David Moore has shown, the foreignness of these individuals did not 
prevent the Zimbabwean nationalists from embracing their ideas.23 
 Indeed, the benefits of this black identity nationalism lay in the broadness of 
the support it could create. Compared to national identities, blackness was a concept 
that was truly transnational and black men and women could share solidarity with 
others in their struggles regardless of locale, making it particularly useful alongside 
the liberation nationalism of ZANU and ZAPU/PCC. American groups like the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and especially the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the United States both played important roles in 
shaping the liberation ideals and thus the nationalist ideologies of the African anti-
                                               
20 The presence of white settlers in Zimbabwe demands that colonialism is the more apt 
description in this case. 
21 Falola, Nationalism and African Intellectuals, p.124 
22 See Reiland Rabaka, The Negritude Movement: W.E.B Du Bois, Leon Damas, Aime 
Cesaire, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and the Evolution of an Insurgent Idea (London, 
2015) 
23 See Moore, 'The Contradictory Construction' 
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colonialists.24 Indeed, the shift within the black American community about 'the most 
effective means of addressing the community's problems' mirrored the changes 
occurring in Zimbabwean nationalism.25 As Cleveland Sellers explains: 
 
the SNCC began in 1960 as a decentralized coalition of largely African 
American student groups that adhered strictly to Gandhian principles of 
nonviolence and sought to obtain equal citizenship rights through integration 
and other reforms. By 1967, the majority of SNCC's members considered 
themselves part of an "emerging Third World coalition of revolutionaries."26 
 
According to Robin Hayes, there was a dialogic exchange of 'ideas, strategies, 
people, and organisations' between the US and Zimbabwe, facilitated by the 'process 
of racial identity formation that occurred within each of these movements.' Hayes 
expands; 
 
Activists and organizations within these movements believed that both racial 
identities and racist practices were transnational phenomena. As a result, they 
were open to engaging black anti-racist movements that were active in other 
countries.27 
 
Several Zimbabwean nationalist leaders had lived in the USA prior to 1964 
(including Edson Zvogbo, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Enoch Dumbutshena28) and the 
networks established by these individuals played an important role. In 1967, the 
SNCC was involved in promoting a fundraising dance in New York for ZAPU's US 
Student Branch, due to Dumbutshena's personal connections to Stokely 
                                               
24 See for example Penny M. Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and 
Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, 1997); George J. Sefa Dei, Reframing Blackness and 
Black Solidarities through Anti-colonial and Decolonial Prisms (Cham, 2017); and Tunde 
Adeleke, Africa in Black Liberation Activism: Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, and Walter 
Rodney (London, 2017) 
25 See Robin Hayes, 'The Dialogic Relationship Between Black Power and African 
Independence: A Case Study of SNCC's Role, 1960-1970', Post Identity, Vol.4, No.2 
(2005),pp.1-13, p.2 
26 Cleveland Sellers, The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a Black Militant and the 
Life and Death of SNCC (New York, 1973), p.188 
27 Hayes, 'The Dialogic Relationship', p.3 
28 Cary & Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders, p.208, 135, 7 
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Carmichael.29 Two of the leading American Methodist ministers in Rhodesia also 
acted as a channel. Bishop Ralph Dodge was a close acquaintance of Joshua Nkomo, 
whilst his colleague Reverend Robert Hughes was a long-term friend of Martin 
Luther King, Jr.30 On a number of occasions they worked to connect the 
Zimbabwean leaders with American activists, although the outcome of these efforts 
is unclear. Nevertheless, the general interactions did facilitate the racialised 
nationalisms adopted by the Zimbabwean nationalists. Dumbutshena was well aware 
of this and situated his own ideological shift in terms of the growing black identity 
politics throughout the world. As he explained, 'black races everywhere are in the 
process of winning for themselves national pride and identity. To do that they must 
rid themselves of the stigma of inferiority derived from their colonial subjugation.'31 
 Yet not all nationalist leaders were eager to denounce non-racial nationalism. 
A few openly lamented an ideology centring around black identity, including 
Stanlake Samkange. A member of the CAS until its disbandment in 1965, 
Samkange's views had been reinforced by his experiences of Luther-King's peaceful 
multi-racialism in the USA between 1957 and 1960. Samkange despised the racial 
overtones Zimbabwean nationalism had adopted. In August 1964 he wrote to 
Terence Ranger, 'mourning the death of his father's inclusive and tolerant 
nationalism' in the face of this racial thinking.32 As a result, Samkange distanced 
himself from Zimbabwean nationalism and moved to the USA to undertake a 
doctorate in philosophy.33 Others shared Samkange's views. Sylvester Tawonezwi 
Bgoni (former chairman of the Mufakose NDP and ZAPU branches and the 
Salisbury District PCC) stated: 'I don't believe in racialism. [...] I believe that this 
country is for both black and white, and the Black and White must live side by side 
                                               
29 Hayes, 'The Dialogic Relationship', p.14; & Adeleke, Africa in Black Liberation, p.138 
30 See Dickson Mungazi, The Honoured Crusade: Ralph Dodge's theology of liberation and 
initiative for social change in Zimbabwe (Gweru, 1991), p.93 
31 Dumbutshena, Zimbabwe Tragedy, p.81 
32 See Terence Ranger, Are We Not Also Men? The Samkange Family and African Politics in 
Zimbabwe, 1920-1964 (London, 1995). Stanlake's father was the Reverend Thompson 
Samkange was a one of the first African politicians to pursue multi-racial advancement. 
33 Cary & Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders, p.33 
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on equal terms.'34 Given the uncontrollable nature of the violence dominating African 
politics by 1964, the fear was that the wishes of the majority and the instability 
created made this equality unlikely.  
 
ii. Disorderly Disruption: Intra- and inter-racial violence in 1964 
 
The attack on Petrus Oberholzer in July 1964 changed the fundamental relationship 
between violence and Zimbabwean nationalism. Although aggressive actions had 
been increasing, thus far they had been largely intra-African or against state 
infrastructure. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems justified to portray Oberholzer's 
death as the inevitable next stage for a Rhodesian society increasingly separated 
along racial lines and a Zimbabwean nationalism resolved to dismantling the white 
state. Oberholzer was killed not because of his political views, but simply because he 
had white skin. When attacks on rural whites increased during the 1970s, 
Oberholzer's death began to look like a precursor to the violent strategies employed 
by the nationalist movements wholesale against white settlers. Yet, as Terence 
Ranger notes, it remains unclear whether ZANU's leadership had formally adopted a 
policy of anti-white violence or whether Oberholzer's death was simply the actions of 
a ZANU group tasked with causing unrest within a rural area.35 As was discussed 
earlier, social protest creates spaces for political violence which cannot be easily 
controlled by organised leadership.36 This makes the connection between the 
Crocodile Gang's actions and Zimbabwean nationalism's racial thinking difficult to 
ascertain.  
 Situated in the broader context of anti-Rhodesian violence, the murder of 
Oberholzer demonstrates how concerned Zimbabwean nationalists were about the 
strength of the RF. Joshua Mpofu (Chairman of ZAPU/PCC's Makhokhoba Branch) 
                                               
34 'Sylvester Tawonezwi Bgoni', biographical material, Diana Mitchell Papers, BC 969 H.51, 
University of Cape Town Library, Cape Town, South Africa 
35 See Terence Ranger, 'Violence Variously Remembered: The Killing of Pieter Oberholzer 
in July 1964', History in Africa, Vol.24 (1997), pp.273-286 
36 See this thesis, p.177 
200 
 
was a vocal advocate for increased military actions and points to the racially divisive 
political context as being the most important motivation. 'The swing to the right [of 
the white electorate] made many young Africans feel that there was no other option 
to achieve freedom other than by war,' he explains.37 The political scientist Graham 
Kinloch argues that because any socio-cultural or political differences within white 
Rhodesian society were mostly superficial, distinctions between the white state and 
population are impossible.38 Such claims have led others to justify the later targeting 
of white civilians on the basis that by simply being resident in the colony, white 
citizens tacitly supported and benefited from the oppression of the African people, 
and thus become viable military targets for the nationalist forces.39 
 Accounts of violence against white civilians have been given recognition far 
exceeding the number of casualties or significance within the liberation struggle,40 
but the emergence of violence against white targets (rather than specific elements of 
the white Rhodesian state) is important nonetheless as it marked the beginning of the 
black identity nationalist struggle. Although attacks on white civilians had been 
taking place since 1962,41 the frequency of these incidents was beginning to worry 
the RF. Throughout the summer of 1964, the number of violent incidents and attacks 
throughout Southern Rhodesia increased dramatically. Accompanied by daily 
                                               
37 Mpofu, My Life, p.82 
38 See Kinloch, Racial Conflict 
39 See for instance, Sibanda,, The Zimbabwe African People's Union, p.171 
40 This is due to the RF's propaganda efforts like the infamous Massacre of the Innocents 
(Salisbury, 1977). The continuing popularity of memoirs or military histories written by 
white Rhodesians has also seen the relatively few attacks on white civilians dramatised and 
given precedence in the narrative of white Rhodesia under siege. For more see Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, Rhodesia: The Propaganda War (Salisbury, 
1977) 
41 According to a Rhodesian government document produced in August 1964, there had been 
8 attacks by black Africans on whites between September 1962 and August 1964. All had 
involved white individuals caught up in urban unrest during periods of township violence, 
such as township officials. See 'Schedule Contraventions Section 37(A)(1)(A), Chapter 39, 
Law and Order Maintenance Act, 16-9-62 – 26-8-64', Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, 
S.R.C.(B)(64)329, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa 
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township violence, grenades were thrown into several hotels and the South African 
High Commissioner's house, and a railway line and post office were attacked.42 
 The spaces for individual autonomy created by civil unrest as well as the 
continuing presence of non-black nationalist supporters, were also utilised by the 
Rhodesian state, and a white Rhodesian agent named John Brumer was allegedly 
behind some of the violent acts attributed to the nationalists. In late 1963, Special 
Branch had Brumer (a former member of the CAS) make contact with the old multi-
racialists Leopold Takawira and Ndabaningi Sithole whilst the three were imprisoned 
together.43 Sithole was quick to take Brumer into his trust and in March 1964 
allegedly asked Brumer to bomb a number of targets around Salisbury, including the 
Prime Minister's office and the BSAP's sports club. Bill Crabtree (a CIO officer) 
recalls that with the assistance of a Special Branch explosives expert, Brumer instead 
detonated a bomb at an electricity sub-station,44 and another attack on the railway 
line near Bulawayo on 5 August was also credited to him.45 Brumer was 
consequently made ZANU's emissary to Zambia, a role which he continued for 
several years, providing information to Rhodesian intelligence services the whole 
time.46 
 Brumer's sudden rise to prominence within Sithole's inner circle caused 
disruption with a ZANU leadership already wary of being labelled 'sell-outs'. Fay 
Chung explains that Brumer's 'entrustment with the most delicate of tasks' despite 
being 'a person they did not know' caused increasing alarm amongst the ZANU elite. 
                                               
42 Wood, So Far and No Further, p.226 
43 See Chung, Re-Living the Second Chimurenga, p.107; Roy Christie, For the President's 
Eyes Only: The story of John Brumer, Agent Extraordinary (Johannesburg, 1971) 
44 Bill Crabtree, Came the Fourth Flag or Dombashawa (Lancaster, 2002), p.256. Fay 
Chung states that it was the Kopje post office in Salisbury city centre 
45 Martin & Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, p.20 
46 According to Valentine Musakanya (Zambian Secretary to the Cabinet), Brumer was so 
influential that he succeeded in getting the Permanent Secretary and Under Secretary in 
Kaunda's office removed, as well as 14 white Special Branch officers working with them 
who had suspected his role with Rhodesian intelligence and thus keep his cover intact. See 
Valentine Musakanya & Miles Larmer, The Musakanya Papers: The Autobiographical 
Writings of Valentine Musakanya (London, 2010), p.104 
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'It is also relevant to note the anti-white sentiments of the majority of the old ZANU 
leaders, and Sithole's misplaced trust in Brumer aroused bitter suspicion,' adds 
Chung.47 When the Minister for Law and Order announced that 'Rhodesia was up 
against organised thuggery, some of it [...] directed by Europeans,'48 it further 
undermined the legitimacy of African nationalism by removing any sense of 
independent agency from the black African leaders. As Brumer's involvement had 
shown, the Rhodesian state were not above instigating disorder. Stories circulated of 
white police officers being found at the scene of vandalism, as an article in the 
Central African Examiner in June reported.  
 
A European police officer [was] apprehended in the disguise of an African, by 
African police at 1 a.m. one morning in Highfield. There is very strong 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that he was running away from the house of 
a "moderate" African whose window had just been broken by a stone.49 
 
In the confused and violent environment of the townships, these stories stirred up 
distrust of all whites, even those who had long been nationalist supporters. The ADN 
editor Eugene Wason recalled 'the only European who dared to walk through the 
townships at night was an American Methodist minister, the Rev. Robert Hughes.'50 
None of the white radicals would enter the areas, as they regularly had whilst 
members of the SRANC, NDP, or ZAPU. The scale of the unrest and the death of 
Oberholzer had both sown doubts that the nationalist leaders were no longer able to 
control their members and this worry was exacerbated when Sithole was arrested in 
June 1964 and sentenced to a lengthy jail term.51 With Nkomo, Sithole, and many 
lieutenants restricted, questions were asked about whether the violence was even 
being deliberately orchestrated. Due to the relatively self-contained nature of the 
                                               
47 Chung, Re-Living the Second Chimurenga, p.107 
48 Reed, 'Sunday 29 November 1964', Diary, Vol.101 
49 Quoted in Judith Todd, Rhodesia (London, 1965), p.111 
50 Wason, Banned, p.57. Hughes was a personal friend of Martin Luther King, Jr., and would 
be deported from Rhodesia in 1964 for his activities in support of the nationalists. See 
Clayborne Carson et al. eds., The Martin Luther King, Jr., Encyclopaedia (Westport, 2008), 
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51 Wason, Banned, p.60 
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townships, the RF and the Rhodesian police had willingly permitted 'factions to 
battle against each other at the cost of township residents with little complaint from 
white voters.'52 Race was a key component as the Mayor of Salisbury at the time, 
Frank Clements, acknowledged. 
 
Official policy for a while was to intervene as little as possible in the party 
gang warfare. So long as the two parties were breaking their competitors' heads 
and burning their property, and so long as the victims were, with the rarest 
exception, Africans, they were not only doing harm to each other but to the 
whole African cause.53 
 
Yet despite their concerns about the violence and racialism and relegated to an 
auxiliary role by the anti-white ideology, many white radicals nevertheless 
maintained that there was a place for them in the struggle. They utilised their public 
salience to draw attention to the African issues and encouraged others within their 
own racial communities to support African nationalism. On 7 August 1964, an article 
written by Judith Todd was published in the student magazine Unicorn calling for 
white students to 'further African aims' and denouncing any who refused to engage in 
politics.54  
In a charged multi-racial gathering in Bulawayo on 16 August, a number of 
ZAPU/PCC supporters vocally denounced the RF for its insistence on 'dragging 
Rhodesia into the dark against the wishes of her majority.' In attendance was Athol 
Allenby (a young BSAP officer) who noted down the names of those who spoke out 
against Ian Smith. Allenby recalled one young white man (possibly Steven Lombard) 
who declared that it was '[to] Nkomo that the Europeans should look for a future in 
Rhodesia, as he was the only one who could protect you from the African'.55 In a 
speech on 9 August, the American Methodist Bishop Ralph Dodge similarly pointed 
to Nkomo as the most viable option. Dodge called on white Rhodesians to fulfil their 
obligation as Christians and protest against the RF's handling of the violence in the 
                                               
52 Scarnecchia, Urban Roots, p.134 
53 Frank Clements, Rhodesia: The Course to Collision (London, 1969), p.33 
54 'A Piece of the Continent', Unicorn (7 August 1964) 
55 Athol Allenby, interviewed by author (26 November 2015) 
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African townships, and to assist those Africans in restriction or detention.56 When 
Dodge was declared a prohibited immigrant a few days later, his case provided a 
focal point for those non-racial nationalists and the non-black radicals to rally 
behind. ZAPU/PCC and the Salisbury Asian Association both released statements 
condemning Dodge's prohibition, as did a number of white radicals and liberals.57 By 
now a familiar explanation, it was Dodge's personal connection with Nkomo that 
ensured such a public stance by ZAPU/PCC and these connections proved to be 
increasingly important as the repression of the nationalist movements increased.  
 
iii. The Banning of ZANU and ZAPU/PCC: The role of Indians in the 
development of Zimbabwean nationalism 
 
On 26 August 1964, the Rhodesian state clamped down on African nationalism once 
again with Desmond Lardner-Burke (Minister of Law and Order) stating in 
Parliament that public safety was being threatened by the actions of the nationalists 
and ZANU and ZAPU/PCC were now considered proscribed organisations. Both had 
used 'violence wherever possible to embarrass the Government', explained Lardner-
Burke.58 Police immediately moved to search, question, and detain nationalist 
supporters, the majority of whom were black Africans. However, a number of 
sympathetic non-black radicals were also visited. At 4am on 27 August, two Indian 
ZAU/PCC supporters' homes were searched and their occupants (Manilal Naran and 
Ramandbhai K. Naik) questioned by police. At the same time, another Asian 
ZAPU/PCC member named S. Joseph had his home in Kezl searched by the BSAP.59 
 Although only three of the large number of nationalists targeted by police, the 
news coverage afforded to Naran, Naik, and Joseph sheds light on the salience 
attached to their racial identities. The dozens of arrested blacks were a statistic, yet 
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these three Indians were explicitly named and interviewed; a clear reflection of the 
unusualness of Indian involvement with the African cause. Despite the participation 
of a number of younger, radical Indian men (including Hasu Patel, Laman Lalloo, 
and Buga Bukhat) there had only been one Indian detained to date - Ramandbhai K. 
Naik in 1961. This was surprising given how the young Indian radicals had been 
personal acquaintances of the nationalist leaders and active contributors to the 
African cause since the foundation of the NDP. From driving people to the 
Mozambican border, to cheering Nkomo's speeches in townships, the Indian radicals 
had contributed what they could to Zimbabwean nationalism. In doing so they forced 
the nationalist leaders to address what position the Indian population held in the 
imagined Zimbabwean nation. Were Indians to be tolerated as foreign settlers in the 
same manner as whites, or were they to be treated as another racial group that had 
been victims of European colonial imperialism and accommodated into the national 
reconstruction process in Zimbabwe as equals? 
 The importance of these questions and the general reluctance of the Indian 
population to engage with African nationalism, spurred these young Indian radicals 
to take matters into their own hands. Much like John Reed's perception of being an 
'ambassador' for the white race, the Indian radicals sought to influence their 
community and ensure that their voice would be heard in the nationalist debates. In 
an interview, Patel recalled: 
 
Our job was to be visible, to be assuring the Indian community that they need 
to move but that it is quite okay to move, and to identify with majority rule [...] 
and to be seen at public events of the ANC, NDP, things like that.60 
 
As was discussed in chapter two, the Muslim and Hindu communities had often 
isolated themselves from other racial groups in Rhodesia. 'There was some resistance 
from some of the older groups because they were the immigrant families. So it took 
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time for us to change the mood,' explained Patel.61 Furthermore, working within 
exclusively Asian groups, even the most liberal Indians consequently found it 
difficult to engage with non-Indians despite sharing the same political beliefs. The 
most obvious example of this is the absence of Indian radicals (barring a few 
exemptions) in John Reed's diaries, correspondence between the white supporters, or 
the recollections of white radicals. For instance, Terence Ranger's autobiography 
mentions the young radical Indians only once, and Peter Mackay's not at all.62  
This lack of interaction is best explained by what Anna Weinrich terms the 
'elaborate pattern governing race relations' in Rhodesia. Due to the hierarchical 
nature of racial segregation in the nation, any race's given a sense of superiority over 
another (even without being the topmost within a society) leads to an 'insistence on 
conformity' and a desire to maintain their social standing.63 Patel highlights that the 
Indian community sought to 'remain in the politically "middle" position - neither 
allying ourselves with the Europeans nor with the indigenous Africans,'64 precisely 
because they sought to guard their own superiority. As Weinrich explains, 
 
this superior status [...] can only be maintained by a rigid conformity of all 
members of society to generally accepted norms. Any deviation, even by 
members of the dominant race, evokes sanctions forcing the deviant members 
back to conformity.65 
 
The 'young Turk' Indian radicals66 were thus subject to pressures for conformity, 
including an expectation that they socialise only within their racial communities. 
Utilising Michael Banton's theories of racial formation,67 Weinrich argues that self-
contained racial communities meant 'contacts across the colour line become 
depersonalised, communication is impaired, and the knowledge which members of 
                                               
61 Ibid., 'Sports diplomacy' was an effort by Patel and other young Indians to bridge the 
racial divide by playing sports like table tennis against non-Indian groups. 
62 See Ranger, Writing Revolt, p.94 
63 Weinrich, Black and White Elites, p.4 
64 Hasu Patel, 'The Indian Dilemma', Dissent, No.16 (18 February 1960), p.6 
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207 
 
the separated races have of each other is generally confined to stereotypes.'68 The 
small number of Indian radicals involved with the Zimbabwean nationalist 
movement further exacerbated the issue. Between January 1960 and May 1965, only 
nine Asians were prosecuted under LOMA compared to thirteen coloureds, 58 
whites, and 6,301 black Africans.69 
 This theory of racial 'conformity' also explains why it was white radicals who 
attracted the greatest wrath of white Rhodesian society. When non-conformists in 
dominant racial groups gained publicity, it was because they were undermining the 
strict racial divisions in the Rhodesian nation. As Patel argues, 
 
in the white community, in parliament and government, people like Terry 
Ranger and John Reed were seen as traitors to the whites, they were seen as 
prominent targets. The black nationalists they could handle one way or another, 
or so they thought. We [the Indians] were viewed as less important.70 
 
 
The handful of white radicals involved with the nationalists were therefore regarded 
as dangerous deviations from the social norms and had to be dealt with accordingly, 
given the fragile racial hierarchy. Conformity theory further explains why the 
African nationalists were publicly depicted as being outside of their own societies. 
'Police and soldiers have been placed in the area of Highfield so that they may sort 
out those people who are worrying you,' warned signs posted in the Highfield 
township in August 1964.71 
 Efforts to control the image painted of Zimbabwean nationalism came to a 
head that same month over the newspaper, the ADN. Much to the chagrin of the RF, 
the European-owned ADN provided detailed coverage of the urban violence, openly 
criticised the RF, and was somewhat sympathetic to the nationalists. Under the 
leadership of a white editor, the Scottish-born Eugene Wason, the ADN frequently 
                                               
68 Weinrich, Black and White Elites, p.4  
69 Palley, The Constitutional History, p.626 
70 Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (15 December 2015) 
71 'Checkpoints in Highfield', Rhodesia Herald (27 August 1964), p.10 
208 
 
published letters and articles written by supporters of the nationalist movements.72 
Consequently, when a State of emergency was declared in Highfield, the RF tried to 
push a controversial banning order on the newspaper through Parliament.73 Made 
aware of the proposal by several MPs who opposed the bill, a number of UCRN 
students and faculty immediately organised a demonstration outside Parliament for 
that afternoon and around a hundred black, white, and Indian men and women joined 
the peaceful multi-racial protest, holding signs and copies of the ADN outside the 
entrance to the building.74 A public statement of support for African nationalism was 
also released. 'This move by a desperate Government is an attempt to stifle the 
impossible - African Nationalism and any form of criticism,' the students 
proclaimed.75 
 As usual, the presence of non-black participants caught the attention of the 
RF and the Rhodesian press and the front page of the next day's Rhodesia Herald 
featured a prominent photo of the white ZAPU/PCC members Judith Todd and 
Wendy Clarke. The two women were part of the 90 demonstrators (including 
'Africans, Asians, and Europeans') arrested later in the day.76 Given the large number 
of detained students, Todd noted ironically that 'the police had no option but to adopt 
non-racial methods in dealing with us and we were herded together in the cells - 
Africans, Europeans and Asians.'77  
Although all of the detainees were eventually released, the mass trial of 81 
students a few weeks later indicated how fearful the Rhodesian state had become of 
any dissenting individuals. Having avoided the protest itself, Reed attended the trial 
in following weeks. 'Gradually the long rows of benches fill up. Eighty one 
[accused]. Almost all Africans. Perhaps 10 European men including Hilary Jenkins, 
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the only member of staff among them.'78 All of the demonstrators were cleared on a 
technicality, meaning the focus now shifted to the six 'leaders' who were tried the 
following week.79 Given the tendency to focus on white radicals more than any other 
racial group, it was unsurprising that the Rhodesian police blamed white protestors 
for instigating the unrest. Alongside Judith Todd, three white male students (Stephen 
Lombard, John Tassell, and Michael Cowen) were charged and tried separately, as 
well as two young black men (Byron Hove and Mabvuta Zvichavanetsa).80 All were 
handed suspended sentences. For many observers it seemed strange that the 
government had gone to the trouble of charging 81 students for simply protesting an 
issue of censorship. However, as Reed wryly noted, once the occupations of the 
protestors were taken into account, the move seemed more deliberate: 'I wonder what 
the government are after? I suppose to fix the university finally; to have suspended 
sentences over the heads of a fair proportion of the students and so quieten the whole 
place down.'81 
 The ADN arrests also demonstrated the shifting anatomy of the white radical 
group in Rhodesia. Individuals had regularly become more or less involved at 
different points, particularly on the fringes of the movement, and the transnational 
nature of white radicalism meant migration had a regular impact on the group as a 
whole. By 1964, even the core group had felt the effects of this mobility: Peter 
Mackay was in Zambia, the Rangers in Tanzania, the Lichtensteins in London 
(alongside others), leaving a greatly reduced and isolated original cohort. White 
radicalism thus became reliant on a new generation (in Mannheim's definition) to 
take up the mantle. This new generation was not necessarily younger than the one it 
replaced (although it contained younger elements), nor was it comprised of people 
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with fundamentally different identities (indeed many traits such as education, class, 
and social marginality remained prevalent).  
 Hilary Jenkins, for instance, was the only UCRN lecturer arrested during the 
ADN protests and shared many traits with the older cohort including being highly 
educated (a graduate of Rhodes and Cambridge) and a personal history of multi-
racialism (having worked with an Anglican mission school in South Africa for 
several years).82 Yet Jenkins also had more in common with younger radicals like 
Judith Todd than Reed, Ranger, or Mackay ever had, and the changing environment 
of the UCRN was largely responsible.83 When Ranger and Reed had been the face of 
white radicalism on campus, informal relationships had existed between the faculty 
and students who supported African nationalism. Through dinners at the Rangers' 
house or Reed's sharing of his car with students going to NDP's township meetings, 
there had been a distinctly social aspect to white radicalism that surmounted 
otherwise significant divisions. Such activities had ensured that the UCRN was 
quickly branded as 'troublesome' by the RF. As an editorial in the South African 
newspaper The Star stated: 'Ever since it [the RF government] came to power it has 
regarded the University with distrust born out of the anxiety that it was a breeding 
ground for extreme African nationalism and therefore a considerable political 
threat.'84 
 Admittedly the RF was not the first Rhodesian government to raise concerns 
about the UCRN's connections to African politics. White lecturers and students 
suspected of being sympathetic to African nationalism had been subject to vetting, 
surveillance, and even open harassment by Rhodesian intelligence services since the 
UCRN's foundation in 1956.85 As Tapiwa Zimudzi argues, reports exaggerated the 
danger posed by the staff and students:  
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[Special Branch portrayed] the UCRN as a "hotbed of politics", where an 
"ultra-liberal pressure group" led by Walter Adams and comprising Ranger, 
Reed, Faber and other staff, actively encouraged racial integration on and off 
the UCRN campus [and] urging African students, as well as some white 
students, to support African nationalist parties.86 
 
Reed's accounts of campus politics present a different picture. Adams is depicted as a 
moderate conservative and ardent anti-nationalist; the faculty only spoke politics 
with students who approached them first; and an equal number of students were 
against African nationalism as were for it. The reality was likely somewhere in 
between Reed and the RF's versions, and consequently the Rhodesian state remained 
largely unwilling to act against the small number of radicals. Even by 1964, the RF 
could still permit dissent on campus for a variety of reasons. The UCRN was located 
on the outskirts of Salisbury, away from both the African townships and the white 
suburbs, and somewhat isolated from broader society. The concept of 'academic 
freedom' was also intrinsically tied to the concept of a respectable institution and was 
necessary to attract new academics. As Marshall Murphree (a UCRN lecturer) 
argued, 
 
it is a particular and paradoxical characteristic of universities that they can only 
effectively perform their role of analysing and reformulating the components of 
societal and cultural heritage in terms of particular sets of contemporary 
relevance by assuming a critical and oppositional stance to the status quo.87 
 
Yet although dissent was somewhat tolerated, limits were imposed on how far white 
radicals would be permitted to go and a number of academics were restricted or 
deported for their activities.88 It was thus somewhat surprising that in 1964 a number 
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of radical academics were permitted to join the university, including the South 
African John Conradie and the Italian political economist Giovanni Arrighi.  
 A staunch Marxist and committed anti-colonialist, Arrighi's outspoken nature 
endeared him to some of the Salisbury white radicals (like Reed), but brought him 
into confrontation with many others. As Reed noted in the aftermath of another 
round of 'exciting arguing' between Arrighi and UCRN faculty,  
 
clearly Giovanni is having a powerful impact on the staff [...] There has been 
not so much influence as impact; not so much Giovanni's ideas - though 
knowing him and in a way needing to please him I have done a good deal of 
Marxist reading I wouldn't have been doing otherwise - as his fierceness, 
intolerance, and passion. We got to know each other by quarrels about the 
majority independence committee and then a closeness from sharing risks or 
possible risks. I am shocked to hear other people criticising Giovanni - but I 
don't defend him - partly I suppose because I don't share his intellectual 
approach and it was his fear under attack - but partly because I am embarrassed 
by the way he has backed me over, uneasy that I may be regarded as 
Giovanni's man.89 
 
As Reed noted, the fundamental divisions between the white radicals persisted 
despite the cohesion provided by the RF's repression, the anti-white politics of the 
nationalists, and the growing racialism in broader Rhodesian society. Although the 
many within the UCRN persisted in the belief that 'the College was the last stand of 
the concept of a non-racial society', the UCRN was not entirely sheltered from 
broader socio-political chances.90 The segregation which had seemed to be narrowing 
under Garfield Todd and Edgar Whitehead was being rapidly reintroduced. For 
instance, on 29 August 1964, Bulawayo's only multi-racial hotel 'closed its doors to 
Asians, Africans and Coloured people'.91 
 This racialisation of society was reflected in tensions on the UCRN campus 
between those who supported African nationalism and those who did not. At a 
meeting in September regarding the students arrested during the ADN protest, there 
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was a clear division between the 'overwhelming' majority who were 'in full support 
of the students who had demonstrated', and 'a small, vocal section' who were 
'opposed to the demonstration and antagonistic to those who had participated' and 
who booed the arrested students.92 Whilst most students were supportive of the 
nationalists, a sizeable portion of the white students (and several of the faculty) 
actively worked against the African cause. Some offered to supply the police with 
information regarding the activities of 'known troublemakers' at the university, 
including 'who they spoke to, what they said, and where they went.'93 When 
Ndabaningi Sithole was jailed in October 1964,94 several RF supporters complained 
in the UCRN newspaper Unicorn 'about the small nest of white students who, in the 
guise of "liberals" influenced by multiracialism, employed their energies in anti-
government activities.'95 
 Towards the end of September, the RF reaffirmed its domination of the white 
electorate in a contested by-election between Roy Welensky and Clifford Dupont.96 
Judith Todd's account of the election result announcement provides a graphic 
reminder of the isolation these white radicals faced due to their political beliefs and 
the prevalence of racial conformity theory in white Rhodesian society. Already alone 
in an overwhelmingly pro-RF crowd and repeatedly asked who she would have voted 
for, Todd replied, 'Joshua Nkomo actually.' Her response was met with disbelief and 
aggression. 
 
I felt a hand on my shoulder and turned around again. A man of about fifty was 
staring at me. “What did you say my girl?” [...]“She says she supports 
Nkomo,” the first questioner stated. [...] “My girl,” said the man who had put 
his hand on my shoulder, “if you say things like that we’ll string you up on that 
lamp post.”97 
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Whereas white radical men were mainly seen as acting from a purely political 
standpoint (barring the accusations involving sexual abuse of African women98), 
young white radical woman (like Todd or Wendy Clarke) were often regarded as 
having been led astray or acting amorously. These assertions became so incorporated 
into the colloquial narratives of white radicalism that many white Rhodesians 
primarily remember Todd within this context. 'Garfield Todd and his daughter 
supported them [African nationalists]. She slept with them, you know,' recalled 
Markham Batstone (a BSAP officer).99 Such views were a reflection of the explicit 
criminalisation of sex between black men and white women (the so-called 'Black 
Peril') that dominated Rhodesian segregation throughout the twentieth century.100 
'Whites shared a conceptual language for crisis and it was corporeal,' explains Jock 
McCulloch, arguing that miscegenation became a scapegoat for the socio-political 
weakness of the Rhodesian state.101 It is notable that the same accusations did not 
follow the married white radical women like Shelagh Ranger, Molly Clutton-Brock, 
or Eileen Haddon.  
 
iv. Nationalism in Restriction: Gonakudzingwa and Wha Wha 
 
The mass imprisonment or restriction of the nationalist elites and a large number of 
their urban supporters during the summer of 1964 created an air of uncertainty for all 
involved. As John Day neatly summarises, the banning of the PCC and ZANU 
'ended one era for the nationalist movement and inaugurated another.'102 Denied any 
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formal structure within Rhodesia and with most of the senior figures detained or 
restricted, the nationalist movements were forced abroad or underground. In 
combination with the anti-white sentiments, the non-black radicals struggled to find 
their place within the official party structures. Many of the 'original' generation of 
radicals battled self-doubt over their continued participation in a violent, 
underground movement. ''We whites, running around, asking to be allowed to help. 
They [the nationalists] don't need our help, and perhaps we ought to be glad of this,' 
lamented John Reed in September 1964.103 
 Given the challenges to their involvement, some radicals remained convinced 
that financial assistance and welfare support were the most appropriate means of 
contributing. Membership fees from the ordinary grass-root supporters generated a 
lot of revenue, but it was the middle-class white, Indian, and Asian supporters who 
were able to provide the logistics needed to run a political party. For instance Amra 
Bukhat (a young Indian radical) provided office space for ZAPU,104 Peter Mackay 
assisted the Nyasaland ANC with publishing and distributing several newspapers, 
and Shelagh Ranger mimeographed NDP material for distribution. The white-run 
SRLAWF had also been supporting detained black Africans and their families for 
five years by this point, yet even its future was unsure.105 On 21 October 1964, at the 
house of Axel Sommerfelt (a recently arrived Norwegian lecturer), a gathering of 
white radicals provided a roll-call of those sympathetic to the nationalist cause. 
Representing the NDP-era cohort were Eileen and Mike Haddon, Jaap and Ruth van 
Velsen, John Reed, and the Sommerfelts, accompanied by the newly arrived 
Giovanni and Sisa Arrighi. As Reed bitterly noted, the meeting descended into a 
'shouting match' over the 'hopelessness of the Africans and the Europeans who 
support them' and 'the uselessness of welfare work.'106 
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 This doubt was a reaction to the perceived failing of African nationalism 
elsewhere, particularly the Malawi Cabinet Crisis. Colin Baker's summary of the 
incident highlights why the crisis was so disturbing to the white radicals. Within 
three months of independence: 
 
all save one of [Hasting Banda's] cabinet ministers resigned or were dismissed. 
All but one of the former ministers fled the country. A number of actively pro-
Congress Europeans, including a former cabinet minister, fearing for their 
lives, followed them. Severe fighting, including killings and arson, occurred 
between the followers of the former ministers and Banda's supporters.107 
 
Peter Mackay was particularly disillusioned, due in no small part to his personal 
connections with many of those involved.  
 
I had followed the events in Malawi from a distance and found them hard to 
believe, difficult to understand and impossible to accommodate. In a few 
rushing weeks the triumph that was Malawi had become a tragedy; the unified 
efforts of so many people over so many years had been undone; the model had 
been defaced. In the settler states of southern Africa and further afield among 
those who did not wish Africa well, they could say, "You see."108 
 
Incidents like the Malawi crisis made the inactivity of the African nationalist 
leadership following the banning of ZANU and ZAPU/PCC appear even more 
dangerous. Eileen Haddon and Giovanni Arrighi were both vocal critics on the 
stagnancy of the movements, as well as the dependency of the detainees on white 
financial support. Discussing the situation with Haddon at the start of 1965, Reed 
reported: 
 
It looks almost as if the Africans have given up trying. It is not, as it is 
sometimes put, that they are hesitating to turn to violence. The situation is 
violent through and through. It is that violence is being successfully employed 
against them and they are failing to use violence effectively back. 
 
He continued:   
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Giovanni wants a complete withdrawal from "good works" activity to make 
things easier for the detainees and restrictees. Only desperation can provide the 
energy now needed by the nationalists - or is it not that despair has already 
taken hold of them and that this is why nothing is being done?109 
 
Arrighi's observation about the extent of non-black financial support was astute. 
According to Jocelyn Alexander, 
 
detainees increasingly relied not on the state but on the expanding [...] work of 
international organisations [...] which funded legal representation, helped 
detainees and prisoners with study materials and access to degree programmes, 
and provided welfare support for the families of detainees.110 
 
Although those involved in welfare work were becoming frustrated, they 
nevertheless continued to go to great efforts to ensure that the nationalist detainees 
were afforded the assistance they needed. One avenue of support was in the shape of 
the Majority Rule Independence Committee (MRIC). The MRIC was a multiracial 
group established after the banning of ZAPU/PCC by Enoch Dumbetshena, John 
Reed, Guy Clutton-Brock, and Arrighi. The group had the explicit support of Joshua 
Nkomo and the other Gonakudzingwa detainees and was intended to be a legal 
means of protesting the RF's continued independence negotiations with Britain. In 
many ways, the MRIC was an effort by one of ZAPU/PCC's most vocal supporters 
of non-racialism (Dumbutshena) to preserve Zimbabwean nationalism's inclusivity. 
However, the political marginality of the MRIC, its inclusion of prominent non-black 
radicals, and its close association with only the restricted ZAPU/PCC leaders 
generated issues within the nationalist leadership as a whole. 
 In October 1964, Giovanni Arrighi travelled to Lusaka to meet the 
ZAPU/PCC leaders in exile.111 Given the remoteness of those in Gonakudzingwa and 
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in exile abroad, Arrighi had found it difficult to fully integrate himself with the 
highest levels of leadership and the trip to Lusaka was thus the first time he met 
some of the most senior leaders, including George Nyandoro, James Chikerema and 
Jason Z. Moyo. When Arrighi returned to Salisbury, he brought with him a stern 
message from Nyandoro (the most senior ZAPU/PCC leader not restricted or 
detained) that 'the Majority Rule Independence Committee was to be disbanded at 
once - there must be complete inactivity.'112 Nyandoro's decision was in direct 
contradiction to the support the MRIC had received from the Gonakudzingwa 
detainees, and clearly indicated the uncertainty surrounding where genuine authority 
lay. After a discussion with Arrighi, John Reed highlighted the lack of clarity, 
worsened by the division of the nationalist movement between detention and exile. 
 
There were often differences between the views in Gonakudzingwa and those 
of the exile leadership in Lusaka. Giovanni looked at the situation logically. 
Whatever their relative rank in the party monarchy, those being held in 
restriction inside Rhodesia were unable to act and the decisions that prevailed 
must be taken in Lusaka. I felt it was more complicated than this, and that there 
was a real danger, that as a small group of whites, we could easily find 
ourselves charged with sowing dissent between the two groups.113 
 
Both Jocelyn Alexander and Munyaradzi Munochiveyi have written on how 
restriction camps affected structures of authority within the Zimbabwean nationalist 
movement.114 As Alexander explains, the isolated detention of the camps forced the 
detainees to construct for themselves a 'coherent, efficient and symbolically 
compelling alternative [...] to the Rhodesian state.'115 To a degree the restriction 
camps acted as a microcosm of Zimbabwean nationalism, where black, Asian, Indian 
and coloured detainees 'sought to imagine an inclusive - if rigidly hierarchical - 
social order and nationalist mythology, alongside a rule-bound and expert 
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bureaucracy.'116 The detainees were presented with the opportunity to practice the 
non-racial nationalism they had propagated since 1957, away from the presence of a 
white population. The bridging of class, generational, gender, religious, ethnic, and 
racial divides (albeit amongst supporters of the same political movement) provided a 
possible construct of a Zimbabwean nation. As Nkomo himself recalled,  
 
The few policemen at the Vila Salazar frontier post [Gonakudzingwa] had to 
tolerate this [political activity]. They soon grew relieved that we were keeping 
order with no need for any intervention from them. It was our strict policy to 
behave politely to all our guards, and to show them that we had nothing against 
white people as such, only against the system of government that denied the 
rights of black people.117 
 
One critical observation is that there were no white detainees at the camp, and 
therefore the anti-white stance of some nationalist leaders could not be challenged by 
close confinement with sympathetic whites.118 
 Although neither Alexander nor Munochiveyi fully address it,119 the isolation 
of the camps also created struggles for authority between the restricted nationalists 
and those in exile.120 Into the midst of this complex situation were placed the non-
black radicals because of their ability to convey messages between the detainees and 
exiles. Few Africans could afford a car or the fuel required to travel hundreds of 
miles, and travel permits also presented significant challenges. As with Mackay's 
efforts with the Nyasaland ANC during the late 1950s, or Ranger in Tanzania after 
his deportation, this mobility endeared the white radicals to the nationalists and 
reinforced their utility to the cause. However, this was the first time they had been 
tasked with acting as go-betweens for factions within the same party. Consequently, 
                                               
116 Ibid., p.2 
117 Nkomo, The Story of My Life, p.125 
118 It should also be noted that the majority of those nationalist elites who had expressed 
anti-white views were members of ZANU and therefore restricted in Wha Wha rather than 
Gonakudzingwa. 
119 Munochiveyi skirts the issue with regards to the prisoners' challenges to the 'inside-
outside divide that detention and imprisonment created' through the smuggling out of prison 
writings. See Munochiveyi, Prisoners of Rhodesia, p.301 
120 See for example Nkomo, The Story of My Life, p.117 
220 
 
their insertion into high-level politics made it likely that they could be accused of 
being more than simple messengers, particularly in light of the lingering accusation 
surrounding multi-racialism and white influences.  
 Nevertheless, many non-black radicals still perceived this mobility as a key 
component of their own place within Zimbabwean nationalism and the journeys 
undertaken often became something of a rite of passage. In interviews, many non-
black radicals proudly recall a 'pilgrimage' to Gonakudzingwa restriction camp where 
the leaders of ZAPU/PCC were being held. Given that Gonakudzingwa was located 
near the Mozambique border, some 400 miles from Salisbury and with no tarred 
roads for a quarter of that distance, this was not an easy journey to make. Yet at least 
three separate groups of non-black radicals visited Gonakudzingwa in the months 
immediately after the August 1964 proscriptions. These visits served a variety of 
purposes. Some were purely social, whilst others were personal demonstrations of 
solidarity with the detainees.  
One trip was made in October 1964 by four UCRN lecturers on behalf of the 
Salisbury welfare groups. Accompanying John Reed were Axel Sommerfelt, Jaap 
van Velsen, and Giovanni Arrighi (who had returned from Lusaka only a few days 
earlier). The visit ostensibly had a respectable objective. 'I spent most of my time 
there logging complaints and needs which our Legal Aid and Welfare Group could 
deal with,' recorded Reed.121 However, it also served a second, clandestine purpose, 
and the four lecturers took possession of various letters from Nkomo and others 
which they were instructed to deliver to the ZAPU/PCC executive in Lusaka.122 
Frustrated at being unable to physically contribute to the struggle in other ways, the 
group were quick to agree.  
However, the radicals also knew their presence at the camp opened them up 
to suspicion by the white state, exacerbated by the RF’s established perception of the 
UCRN faculty. Reed, Arrighi, Sommerfelt, and van Velsen had already attracted the 
attention of the CIO and Special Branch. However, as Reed noted, 'all this was legal, 
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though the government could assume we were active as couriers for what they 
regarded as a banned terrorist organisation.'123 Ironically, the RF’s fears were correct. 
On 24 October, Reed and the Arrighis drove up to Lusaka for the official celebration 
of Zambian independence. With them came the letters from the Gonakudzingwa 
detainees. After being searched at the Zambezi border ('if it was because we were 
visiting Gonakudzingwa a week before, a careful eye was being kept on us'), they 
eventually successfully delivered the documents to the ZAPU/PCC officials in 
Lusaka.124 
 The second group to visit the ZAPU/PCC detainees in Gonakudzingwa 
comprised three UCRN students - Judith Todd, Stephen Lombard, and Peter Fry – 
and the Drum magazine journalist Dick Walker.125 An anthropology doctoral 
candidate from Cambridge conducting long periods of fieldwork in rural Chiota, 
Fry's experiences with Zimbabwean nationalism were markedly different than those 
based on campus. As he recalled: 
 
I didn't spend much time at the University, I was stuck out in the countryside. 
[...] Jaap van Velsen, every time I'd come into town, he'd throw me back out 
again, and say "no, you have to be back there. [...] I was very alienated, I was 
totally alienated from this entire world [of nationalism on campus].126 
 
Nevertheless, Fry kindled a friendship with Lombard and through him, Todd and 
when the latter two planned a visit to Gonakudzingwa, they asked Fry to join them. 
Despite lasting only a couple of days, the journey provided an insight into both the 
relationship between the nationalists and the white radicals, but also the anatomy of 
the group of whites sympathetic to the African cause.  
 
We drove to Gonakudzingwa. I felt really proud that Judy and Steve had let me 
go, I thought that was wonderful. She was a member of ZAPU from early on, 
and most of these guys in Gonakudzingwa were ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo, Josiah 
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Chinamano, Joseph Msika. That was a major event, I felt very proud of that, 
that I was at least integrated into that small group of white people who were 
related to African nationalist politics.127 
 
The trip served two roles. First, it reminded the nationalist leadership that there were 
white men and women willing to support their struggle. In the racial isolation of the 
restriction camps (containing no white detainees), it would have been easy for the 
anti-white racialism of the nationalists to grow unopposed. Visits by non-black 
radicals forced the issue to remain salient. Secondly, the visit helped the non-black 
radicals understand how the Zimbabwean nationalist ideology was developing in 
restriction. For Todd, her lasting (and idealistic) memory of the trip was of African 
nationalism’s inclusivity. 
 
I thought as we sat there that night, how this place above all others illustrated 
the way in which the Government mock the values they use to justify the things 
they do to the people of Zimbabwe. The glowing fire picked out the faces of 
teachers and students, chiefs, scholars and businessmen, old men, young boys 
and women, evangelists and farmers – people who themselves represented the 
various facets of the Christian and the civilised standards Smith so endlessly 
talked about, and who were banded together, Indian, African, Eurafrican and 
European to achieve the democracy and justice he was claiming to uphold, 
their unity destroying the charges he made that African nationalism was a 
racist, anti-white movement. Gathered together we were a non-racial group.128 
 
When Todd, Lombard, Walker, and Fry left after only a few days in the camp, they 
found themselves burdened with 'dozens of letters', like the lecturers who had 
preceded them. As Todd recounts: 
 
All mail to and from Gonakudzingwa is censored and we were afraid we might 
be stopped by the police and searched and that the letters would be taken from 
us. We hoped though, that they would not search me, so the women restrictees 
helped me tie the letters under the shift dress I was wearing - all over me, like a 
stiff crackling layer of skin.129 
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Such precautions turned out to be unnecessary but Todd's willingness to assist the 
nationalists despite the severe punishments, further endeared the non-black radicals 
to the nationalists.  
 In contrast to the visits by UCRN lecturers and students, the third group to 
visit Gonakudzingwa in late 1964 complicates the typical understanding of racialised 
mobility in Rhodesia. It is also the only account of Indian radicals visiting detained 
nationalists prior to UDI, despite the presence of prominent Indians like R.K. Naik in 
the camp. Consisting of Hasu Patel, Amra Bukhat, Suman Mehta, Laman Lalloo, and 
Buga Bukhat, the group were the same young, radical Indians that formed 
relationships with many nationalist leaders during the period of the NDP and their 
own involvement with the NDP City branch in 1960. In explaining why the Indian 
radicals made the long and arduous trip to the restriction camp, it is their connections 
with the nationalist leaders which proved important. As Patel recalled in an 
interview: 
 
In '64, I came back [from London] and said to our people here, "Our leaders are 
in Gonakudzingwa, in the restriction camp, what are we doing? Why don't we 
go and see them?" This was in 1964 when there were no roads from Masvinga 
to Gonakudzingwa, you had to go through farmland. Amra Bukhat had an old 
black Mercedes, I remember, so he was the driver [...] His [Bukhat's] was the 
only car which was solid, his Mercedes.130 
 
Across all accounts of non-black radicalism during this period, the ownership or 
access to a car is a common theme in facilitating mobility. Reed make reference to 
his purchasing a car after arriving in Rhodesia in 1957, and the efforts he made to 
give African students lifts to NDP meetings.131 Peter Fry similarly recalls lending his 
car to black friends in Salisbury whilst away on fieldwork, and the police interest this 
action garnered. As he recalled: 'the police [...] did appear once in their Land Rover 
with a dossier of my movements – and the movements of my car which I had lent to 
                                               
130 Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (15 December 2015) 
131 See for example, Reed, 'Thursday 7 February 1957', Diary, Vol.74 
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friends in Harare - that was quite impressive.'132 Even Joshua Nkomo mentions how 
the nationalists utilised individuals with vehicles to great effect during the early 
1960s.133 However, it was Mackay whose contributions to the Africa cause utilised 
vehicles far above all others, and who recognised the significant attached to such 
endeavours. Referring to his regular passenger-carrying journeys across southern 
central Africa, Mackay explained: 
 
When my own course took me from time to time across the Zambezi I could 
feel that I was breaching the divide [between colonised and decolonised 
Africa], perhaps in some small way moving towards it demolition, and under 
the sun and the stars I could find a sensation of freedom. The journeys would 
end in recklessness, but it was a calculated recklessness. [...] But as I travelled 
the Freedom Road there could be no recklessness at the wheel; there was 
instead the obligation to reliability, for I was carrying people to a new life of 
hope which must not be dashed in a tangle of metal and blood.134 
 
Patel also recognised that even with a car, a journey (in this case to Gonakudzingwa) 
was anything but easy given the conditions in rural Zimbabwe. 
 
So we went to Masvinga, stayed with N.J. Patel's family overnight there. [...] 
We stayed at that place overnight because at that time we had strip roads, we 
didn't have full tar, and then after Masvinga you didn't really have much of a 
road at all. And Gonakudzingwa was on the border with Mozambique, 
Malvenia they called it, the border post. So we went there, we drove I don't 
know how long.135 
 
When the group finally arrived at Gonakudzingwa's boundary after almost two days 
of travelling, they remained uncertain whether they would actually be granted entry. 
Visitors were permitted at the discretion of the officers on duty and certain 
restrictions applied, including not sleeping in the buildings erected by the 
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133 For example, see Nkomo, The Story of My Life, p.81. The targeting of cars in nationalist 
attacks during 1963 and 1964 was a particular side effect of this awareness of the importance 
of transport in the liberation struggle, to the extent that anybody caught setting fire to a car, 
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The Zimbabwe African People's Union, p.89 
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225 
 
government for the restrictees.136 The fact the visitors were Indian also raised 
problems with the police unsure whether to treat them as Europeans or Africans. The 
RF was notoriously irresolute when it came to classifying minority racial groups 
within their strictly racialised structures. For instance, the Residential Property 
Owners (Protection) Bill classed ethnic Chinese citizens as European, yet the 
Ministry of Education considered Chinese as Asians,137 and the Chinese-
Zimbabwean Fay Chung found herself isolated at the UCRN because of the 
institution's uncertainty over where she fell in the residential laws of the nation.138 
'Evidently the Yellow Peril had no significance in Southern Rhodesia at that time. 
The Black Peril was all that mattered’, explained Grace Keith,139 and the result was a 
certain amount of legal and social uncertainty. As Patel recalled: 
 
So we went there, we pitched up at the perimeter and these security people said 
"what do you want here?" And we said "we've come to see our leaders". Very 
brash. So we waited a while and they talked and talked. We were actually 
admitted. [...] And we spent a few hours. Chinamano was there, Nkomo was 
there, all kinds who I forget.140 
 
Again, the visitors departed bearing a number of letters which they had been 
instructed to post in Salisbury, away from the scrutiny of the Gonakudzingwa police. 
As with Todd, Patel saw the visit as being less about the physical opportunities to 
support the anti-colonial struggle than it was about the ideological bolstering 
afforded by these interactions. ‘Things like that we did, just to show solidarity. […] 
It was like solidarity in Poland,’ he recalled.141 
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 Nevertheless, such activities made those involved well aware of the 
precariousness of their continued liberty in Rhodesia. On 29 October 1964, Terence 
Ranger warned John Reed 'we should make what realistic plans are needed. I 
suppose it is reasonable to assume that you will be picked up and detained or 
restricted, especially after your membership, however aborted, of the Enoch 
[Dumbutshena] committee and the sinister sounding Smith attempt to pin the blame 
on the whites.'142 Reed's reconnaissance of potential escape routes saw him travel to 
Dar es Salaam in December to visit the Rangers but also see how the university there 
was developing. The trip afforded a number of notable incidents for Reed, including 
his first encounter with a member of the ZANU elite, Noel Mukono. The encounter 
turned out to be accidental ('Terry tells me he only met them by chance at the airport 
where they had come to meet someone') but Reed still found the situation 'a bit 
alarming' given his own vocal support for Nkomo and ZAPU.143 
 Ranger also arranged for Reed to talk to the Tanzanian Academy on the 
subject of 'Cultural Aspects of the Struggle between Black and White in Central 
Africa'. 'What I talk about is the rejection of liberalism by S.R. [Southern Rhodesian] 
Africans as a rejection of European culture,' Reed noted in his diary.144 Liberalism's 
association with whites, as Reed saw it, was the reason multi-racialism had failed and 
why non-racial nationalism was being replaced by an ideology focusing on black 
identity. This was a discerning observation for 1964: as Reed noted, 'I am surprised 
myself by how coherent it all seems to me.'145  
Although pro-black rhetoric within the nationalist leadership had become 
increasingly common, it was unusual to hear a white radical publicly associate race 
with the development of Zimbabwean nationalism. Robert Mugabe's NDP cultural 
reclamation programme had focused on the physical aspects of European culture, but 
the distancing from European political ideologies had been less clearly defined. 
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Indeed, many within the audience appeared to find this reasoning too abstract, as 
Reed lamented: 'from the questions it looks as if most of the Africans in the audience 
have not understood what I was saying'. The concept of rejecting existing power 
structures for their foreign nature was not one that was immediately obvious to the 
predominantly Zimbabwean crowd. When faced with the rejection of ideologies for 
being associated with white European culture, some ordinary nationalist supporters 
were unable to integrate this concept into their own personalised ideas of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. Attempts to define Zimbabwean nationalism were further 
exacerbated by the rise of the RF and the closing down of discursive spaces between 
the African nationalists and their supporters - most visibly signified by the banning 
of the African Daily News and the restrictions on township meetings. As Enocent 
Msindo explains, the consequences would fundamentally shape Zimbabwean 
nationalist discourse in the coming years. 
 
the leaders became the megaphones, and its membership, the ears. Anti-
government information dissemination became top-down and none of the 
African recipients of this nationalist propaganda and media campaigns had any 
alternative space to answer back or debate issues in the new party presses.146 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the year drew to a close, it was apparent that 1964 had marked a turning point for 
the non-black supporters of the nationalist movements. The outlawing of ZANU and 
ZAPU/PCC, the escalating intra-party violence in the African townships, the death of 
Petrus Oberholzer, and the growth of the RF had all drastically worsened the 
situation in Rhodesia. 'The year had seen white nationalism whipped to boiling point 
and black nationalism ruthlessly suppressed,' summarised Judith Todd.147 
 For the non-black radicals, taking risks now came to define commitment. A 
satirical article published in the South African newspaper The Star on 25 November 
1964 emphasised just this sentiment:  
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At parties where White liberals gather "for mutual consolation and 
admiration," the correspondent says, the greeting, "Hello, old boy, booked that 
room next to mine in the camp yet?" is now common. 'Such a restriction camp, 
intended for Whites with unpopular views, may or may not exist, says the 
correspondent, but "a certain status can be acquired by stating firmly your 
definite knowledge that you are on the guest list."148 
 
After comparing these 'liberals' to 'anarchists in the old Russia', the tongue-in-cheek 
article continues: 
 
just knowing Africans on a calling basis gave status among liberals. Now it is 
essential to know an African under restriction - and the choice is wide, but the 
names are dropped in a hushed voice and with a glance over the shoulder.149 
 
The humorous observations sadly quite accurately mirrored how many white radicals 
felt by the end of 1964. In light of the nationalists' anti-white stance and the RF's 
increased repression, they had been limited to acting as fund-raisers, messengers, and 
representatives for their races. However, the ascribed roles and the commitment of 
the radicals would be put to the test in the most dramatic of ways in the coming 
months as the radicals found themselves faced with an increasing number of 
opportunities to contribute to the nationalist cause that went beyond 'welfare work'. 
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Chapter 6 
Uncertainty and Untaken Trajectories: Zimbabwean 
nationalism and UDI, 1964-65 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This final chapter focuses on the period immediately preceding the Rhodesian 
government's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965; a 
controversial seizure of self-government by the white minority that would come to 
define the future of the Rhodesian nation. Backed into a corner, the Zimbabwean 
nationalists were forced to embrace military conflict in order to achieve their aims. 
Certainly, this fitted neatly into contemporary observations of the inherent violence 
of all anti-colonial struggles. As Frantz Fanon argued in 1961 with reference to the 
Algerian case; ‘colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with 
reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state and it will only yield when 
confronted with greater violence.’1 The adoption of increasingly antagonistic 
attitudes by both groups, so the argument goes, had made it apparent that the 
endemic political violence in the townships throughout 1963 and 1964 was fated to 
expand from a predominantly intra-African conflict to a broader intra-racial one. 
From November 1965 onwards, Zimbabwean nationalism became a liberation 
movement which sought to turn the violence of the colonial system against their 
colonial masters. The necessity and popularity of action saw the nationalists gain 
popular support on unprecedented scales, both domestically and internationally. The 
Liberation War would last until 1979 and claim thousands of lives, and the 
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Zimbabwean nation to emerge would continue to perceive itself in predominantly 
terms of this struggle for decades to come. 
 Yet prior to UDI, the situation was markedly different. Following the banning 
of both ZAPU/PCC and ZANU in August 1964, the period is portrayed as a 
relatively quiet span in which the Zimbabwean nationalists were focused on 
transition and recovery, hampered by the repressive legislation of the RF.2 The 
removal of many nationalist figureheads as well as a large number of the ranking 
party officials complicated party structures, exacerbated by the divisions between 
those nationalists in exile and those in restriction. Supporting the perception of a 
broken nationalist movement is a 1965 survey of white Rhodesians in which 70 per 
cent of the respondents ‘did not believe that the nationalists had widespread African 
support’ and a majority agreed that ‘African nationalism was not in itself perceived 
as a threat.’3 As Joshua Mpofu (a ZAPU branch leader) recalled, the nationalists 
‘were operating at half capacity due to either mass arrests or retreat of comrades 
from the heat of political activism under constant surveillance by security branches.'4 
Even accounts of the period by the senior nationalists gloss over these years: Joshua 
Nkomo spares only four pages to the two years between 1964 and 1966, and Maurice 
Nyagumbo only three.5 
 Through its opening up of discursive spaces, this environment saw alternative 
trajectories considered by those within the nationalist movements. Some (including 
many non-black radicals) hoped for British military intervention on behalf of the 
African people. Others wanted an immediate declaration of war against the white 
state. The last few lingering multi-racialists hoped the RF could be persuaded to 
accommodate black advancement alongside their own white supremacist policies. 
The uncertainty within Zimbabwean nationalism provided opportunities for a re-
imagining of the nationalist ideology and nationalist movements, much as physical 
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locations like restriction camps or parties in exile did. In light of the racialisation of 
Zimbabwean nationalism and Rhodesian society in 1964, key discussions took place 
around an inclusive versus exclusive liberation movement, the outcome of which had 
an important impact on the non-black radicals.  
 This chapter therefore focuses on two themes. First, the conflict within the 
nationalist executive between those who sought to resist a shift to racialised violence 
and those who did not. The rise of a black identity nationalism (discussed in the 
previous chapter) and the rejection of non-racialism had made the contributions of 
non-black radicals increasingly precarious. Factors such as transnationalism 
(including connections and comparisons to white radicalism in South Africa), and the 
anatomy of the non-black radical group are explored for their impact on the imagined 
post-independence Zimbabwean nation. With the alternative trajectories being 
discussed and the shifting composition of the non-black radical cohort, internal 
disagreements about strategy and identities came to the fore. 
 The second theme is the RF's increased persecution of non-black radicals in 
the build-up to UDI, and the how such criminalisation induced a mood of 
despondency, including reflections on the necessity of their involvement with 
Zimbabwean nationalism. The chapter assesses and chronicles how the activities of 
some non-black radicals developed during this period, and explains why there was a 
shift away from radical liberalism to violent radicalism within several members of 
the core faction. Described as a largely-ignored period of 'fascinating interaction 
among the surviving white radicals,'6 the motivations of the non-black radicals are 
explored in light of the nationalist's anti-white rhetoric and the RF's open hostility.  
 
i. South African and Rhodesian radicals: sabotage versus goodwill work 
 
In December 1964, Joshua Nkomo released a Christmas statement in the 
Gonakudzingwa News, a newsletter produced by the ZAPU/PCC nationalists 
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restricted to the isolated camp and 'done up with a picture of [Nkomo] on the front, 
and greetings and thanks for coming in several languages'.7 The statement read:  
 
This message is not only for Christians, but for all the people throughout the 
world regardless of race, colour or creed. [...] I ask for the elimination in our 
country of greed, arrogance, selfishness, and falsehood. [...] To us, the people 
of Southern Rhodesia where selfishness and ruthlessness on the part of the 
racial minority have gravely hampered the interests of the majority, I commend 
this message.8 
 
Nkomo's condemnation of the racialised problems faced by the Rhodesian people did 
not go unnoticed. Nkomo had long been regarded as being a more vocal supporter of 
non-racialism than many other senior nationalists, his increasingly frequent anti-
white public rhetoric notwithstanding. As Eugene Wason, the banned-African Daily 
News editor, recalled in his memoir: 'I thought then, as I think today, that 
reconciliation between the races would be easier under Nkomo than under Sithole. 
Nkomo understood Europeans. [...] He was in no sense a racialist.'9 
 However, by the time of Nkomo's Christmas message, race had become an 
increasingly prominent issue on the social and political agenda.10 In particular, the 
worsening situation in the Congo during the last months of 1964 iterated the apparent 
dangers of black rule for white settlers and provided fuel to the RF's anti-nationalist 
and anti-communist agenda. A report in the Rhodesia Herald on 25 November 1964 
was demonstrative of the fears within the white settlers of African nationalists taking 
power. Under images of white children protected by white Belgian soldiers, the 
article stated ‘two hundred and fifty white hostages were herded together for an hour 
at the Patrice Lumumba Monument in Stanleyville this morning while the Congo 
rebels decided what to do with them. Then the rebels machine-gunned the crowd.’11 
Another account spoke of Belgian paratroopers rescuing white settlers from 
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'murderous crowds of blood-thirsty Africans'.12 Enoch Dumbutshena was enraged by 
the picture being painted of independent Africa. 'Settlers in Zimbabwe deride 
independent black states and mockingly refer to the mess that independence 
produced in the Congo in 1960. They talk freely of the raping of white women and 
the killing of missionaries,'13 he wrote. 
 Accompanying this depiction of events in the Congo and the political turmoil 
in Ghana were similar stories from central Africa.14 In Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda had 
recently stated his intention to remove the exclusively-white seats in Parliament, an 
issue so distressing to the RF that they raised it with the British government. 'Control 
[in Rhodesia] would stay in white hands [...] until the Africans treated the whites in 
the same way that whites currently treated them,' argued Ian Smith.15 The irony in 
the statement was missed by all in the room. Meanwhile in Malawi, the ruling party 
declared in January 1965 that 'if Europeans and Asians wish to give the party their 
moral or other support, they are free to do so, and their support is welcome. But they 
cannot enrol as members.'16 The situation worsened the following month when Major 
Peter Moxon (one of Hasting Banda's most prominent white supporters) was 
declared a prohibited immigrant, with Banda warning other 'Europeans not to meddle 
in politics.'17 
 Given this international context, white Rhodesians became increasingly 
reluctant to persevere with racial integration (in the words of Reverend Cecil 
Alderson, the Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland).18 In January 1965, The Star was 
unequivocal with where the blame lay. 
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A few years ago, the people of Rhodesia were prepared to accept a wide 
measure of integration with good grace. Why, now, the swing? Many theories 
can be advanced but probably the strongest is reaction against the disastrous 
failures of Black Africa. With every new atrocity in the Congo, every new act 
of political savagery by African against African in Rhodesia, the opinion of 
many Europeans hardens a little against Africans in general. To them, the 
"wind of change" has become tainted with blood.19 
 
White Rhodesians felt isolated on the continent and so retreated into the racialised 
'laager' mentality idolised in their pioneer column histories of the 1890s. They 
perceived themselves as stoically defending white Rhodesian civilisation against an 
onslaught of violent, uneducated, racist blacks.20 Zelda van Greunen (a schoolgirl in 
Marandellas) recalled the sense of distrust that pervaded the white community. 'It 
was impossible to know which of the blacks supported the terrorists. So you just 
didn't trust any of them. The only people you could trust were your own kind.'21 
 Thus when news emerged from South Africa that a radical white anti-
apartheid group had been broken in the midst of a widespread bombing campaign, 
the reaction amongst white Rhodesians was one of heightened paranoia about those 
in their own country sympathetic to the nationalists. Bob Swift (former deputy-head 
of the Rhodesian CIO during the liberation war and the first years of independence) 
explained:  
 
We could protect ourselves from the Africans - they were clumsy and left 
documents, incriminating stuff, in their houses and on their dining tables [...] 
The ordinary troopers could deal with them. But when it was a European chap 
trying to destroy your country [...] there was some real trouble there. We'd seen 
in South Africa that they were smart and organised and had the support of the 
Reds. What then do you do?'22 
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The unearthed group, the African Resistance Movement (ARM), was 'composed 
mainly of middle-class South African whites, who had set themselves the task of 
helping to bring about the destruction of apartheid and the fall of the National Party 
government.'23 Working in association with the ANC and the SACP (thus feeding 
into the fear of white communists directing African violence), the ARM was one of 
several organisations in South Africa that used violence to achieve their aims. 
Between 1961 and 1964 the group carried out bombings and sabotage against the 
apartheid state to great public attention. Yet such actions were largely symbolic. As 
Peter Mackay noted, they 'went about demolishing electricity pylons - in substitute to 
windmills - to demonstrate their disapproval of apartheid'.24 Following a 
controversial bombing at Johannesburg railway station in July 1964 in which one 
white woman was killed and 23 other whites injured, the ARM was exposed by the 
testimony of the captured bomber (Frederick John Harris). Almost thirty members 
were arrested and handed sentences varying from fifteen to two years.25 Harris was 
sentenced to death and executed in April 1965, becoming the first and only white 
South African executed for actions against the apartheid state.26 
It is impossible to ignore the transnational connections that existed between 
the white radicals in Rhodesia and their counterparts in South Africa and the impact 
such connections had. One of the earliest voices of Rhodesian white dissent was 
Doris Lessing. Married to a South African communist, this connection had been 
noted as 'a threat to internal security' by the European Desk of Special Branch in 
1956.27 Eileen Haddon's connections with the Black Sash movement in South Africa 
were similarly highlighted in Special Branch's personal file on her.28 Other South 
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Africans who actively supported the Zimbabwean nationalists included the journalist 
Theo Bull (editor of the Central African Examiner), the UCRN student Stephen 
Lombard, the lecturer John Conradie (whose involvement in a ZAPU cell would 
generate headlines in 1966), and Jack Halpern (a Jewish journalist and childhood 
refugee from Nazi Germany).  
In more than one case, the experiences of South African radicals 
demonstrated to the Rhodesian radicals the reality of involvement with a violent 
liberation struggle. One interaction came in Lusaka in 1964 where Peter Mackay was 
running a transit centre for the International Refugee Council for Zambia. In August 
1964, Mackay was approached by Dennis Higgs, an ARM member fleeing the South 
African courts. Given Mackay's support for the ARM ('a band of South African 
Europeans, brave and quixotic'29), it was unsurprising that Higgs turned to Mackay 
for assistance. 
 
Higgs, with British citizenship and a British passport, managed to elude his 
hunters and reach Lusaka. He had come to the office where I was setting up 
shop - for word had gone round - to ask if he should acquire a gun. I said no. It 
is true that I was not fully aware of his activities in South Africa, nor at this 
time was I conscious of the South African capacity for revenge, but the fact he 
was concerned for his safety should have given me pause. [...] Instead I 
suggested locked doors and keeping an eye open.30 
 
Shortly after, Higgs was kidnapped at gunpoint by South African police.31 For 
Mackay, the incident provided an 'extreme indicator of the milieu' in which he was 
now working and the very real threat of imprisonment that faced all supporters of the 
African cause.32 
 Just as the white Rhodesians frequently looked to events in South Africa 
(albeit with morbid fascination) so too did the white radicals, particularly given the 
more extensive actions of their counterparts to the south. As an example, during the 
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237 
 
small period between 7 and 20 November 1964, the following events regarding non-
black radicals in South Africa were all covered extensively in the Rhodesian press. 
Four coloured men were charged with attempting to bomb a post-office, a power 
sub-station, and the University College of the Western Cape;33 the ARM and SACP 
member, Frederick John Harris, was sentenced to death;34 two white men and a white 
woman were imprisoned for furthering the aims of Communism;35 another two white 
men and a white woman (confessed members of the ARM) were found guilty of acts 
of sabotage;36 two white men, two Indian men, and one coloured man all pleaded not 
guilty to being members of the national high command of Umkonto we Sizwe, the 
military branch of the ANC, as well as two charges of sabotage;37 and 14 other white 
men and women were charged with breaking the Suppression of Communism Act.38 
The writings of the non-black radicals in Rhodesia during the winter of 1964-
65 make clear that they were well aware of the actions of the South African radicals. 
Whilst Mike and Eileen Haddon holidayed in France, Peter Mackay and John Reed 
both paid visits to their families in Britain. Yet in the true spirit of transnationalism 
these relocations did little to hamper their interactions with one another. For the 
duration of his time in London, the Haddons leant Mackay their car, and Mackay and 
Reed also met twice whilst abroad.39 However, these meetings served only to 
reinforce to Reed how precarious the white radicals' position was in Rhodesia and 
how limited their contributions in comparison to the South Africans. A dinner in 
December 1964 was a particularly sombre experience. Mackay was again facing 
imprisonment for refusing to register for Rhodesian military service and his 
resolution to challenge the issue in court had opened the white radicals up to 
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persecution by the RF. The execution of the ARM member Harris had also 
reaffirmed the real risks facing the white radicals, as Reed noted. 
 
Peter himself seems very resolute in going up against what are now becoming 
appalling risks. "What they [the RF] really want to do," says Peter, "is to string 
up a white man." I don't think this is true. But they may find themselves 
without much choice. The risks of war. The chance, which in wartime anyone 
is expected to accept not as a matter of bravery but as a matter of course, of 
being killed.40 
 
The widespread support by white Rhodesians and the RF to the death sentence 
handed down to Harris was impossible to ignore. During the late 1970s, Tim Tanser 
was the detained ZANU leaders' state-appointed lawyer and a 'whole-hearted 
Rhodesian who emigrated to Zimbabwe after independence', in his own words. He 
ardently believed in the non-racialism of the law, particularly with regards to 
violence. 
 
We knew there were some European radicals within ZANU and ZAPU who 
wanted to embark on a campaign of sabotage, even if it meant killing 
Rhodesians. [...] If they'd done it, I believe they'd have been hanged. There was 
a clause in the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act that specified mandatory 
hanging for using bombs and that applied to everybody whatever their skin 
colour.41 
 
The infamous 'hanging clause' was introduced in December 1964 along with a 
mandatory thirty-year sentence for the possession of explosives.42 In 1966 both 
would come back to haunt the lecturer John Conradie, yet for non-black radicals in 
1965 the risk of execution or even imprisonment remained low. 
 This was particularly evident when considering the history of punishment 
meted out to that point. From Guy Clutton-Brock's arrest in February 1959 through 
till February 1965, not a single white radical in Rhodesia had been held in custody 
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for more than 24 hours.43 The simple fact that these were white citizens or foreign 
residents granted white dissenters a leniency not afforded to their black compatriots 
and the racial overtones of supposedly non-racial laws did not go unnoticed by 
broader Rhodesian society. When a group of white men destroyed a car in Bulawayo 
on 5 November 1964 because it bore an anti-independence slogan, a letter printed in 
the Rhodesia Herald asked: 
 
I wonder if the Government will be restricting those European hooligans [...] or 
is the Law and Order Maintenance Act only applied to Africans, and 
intimidation of Europeans by Europeans perfectly legal?44 
 
In March 1965, one of the few black Rhodesian MPs asked about the races of those 
currently in restriction. 'There were no Europeans, Asians, or Coloureds restricted at 
Wha Wha [the ZANU camp]. At Gonakudzingwa [the ZAPU/PCC camp] three 
Asians and three Coloureds were under restriction,'45 replied the Secretary to the 
Minister of Law and Order. The restrictions of John Reed, Terence Ranger, and 
Stephen Lombard in September 1962 generated much publicity in the Rhodesian 
press precisely because such events were a rarity, as did the arrests of a coloured and 
Indian man in February 1965.46 
 The deportations of non-black radicals were similarly accompanied by 
extensive press coverage, particularly given the high proportion of white radicals 
declared prohibited immigrants.47 These included Michael Faber (the radical 
economist) in 1959, the Rangers and Jack and Sophie Halpern in 1963, and Robert 
Hughes and Ralph Dodge (the American Methodists) in 1964. In 1965, L.K. Weiner 
(an American missionary) was deported after penning a sonnet criticising the use of 
police dogs against African protestors.48 Marieke Clark (a British teacher at Inyati 
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mission) was deported in November 1965 for possessing four ANC pamphlets 
smuggled from South Africa. Her position as 'an educator of impressionable children' 
raised the Rhodesian state’s hackles, despite her having little active involvement with 
the nationalist parties, and the Rhodesian state paid for Clark’s flight back to 
Britain.49 
It was Jack and Sophie Halpern who provided Reed with further doubts about 
his support for the nationalists. Whilst in London in February 1965, the three met for 
dinner. Reed and Jack Halpern had been friends since the late 1950s. Halpern was a 
well-respected journalist, born to Jewish-German parents who had fled from Nazi 
Germany to South Africa during the 1930s, and a long-time liberal with deep 
hostility to race-based states. Described as 'a rather theoretical, but quite genuine, 
leftist' and anything but an 'establishment liberal' (Theo Bull's term for those who 
worked for social change from within the existing structures),50 Halpern worked first 
for the South African Institute of Race Relations, then became the editor of the 
Central African Examiner between 1960 and 1963. His arrival coincided with a shift 
in the Examiner's position from a critical supporter of government policy to 'a more 
forthright Government critic'. As Anthony King explains, 'by 1964, [the Examiner] 
was the only medium left for the expression of nationalist opinion,' due largely to 
Halpern's leadership.51  
Halpern's reputation as a radical leftist (similar to Reed and Arrighi) was such 
that in 1960 when offered the editorship of the Examiner, the CAF's Prime Minister 
Roy Welensky had 'seriously considered refusing him a permit' to work in Rhodesia. 
In a letter to Ellis Robins (president of the British South Africa Company), Welenksy 
lamented: 'I don't know what's coming over us as a people, Ellis. Are we determined 
to destroy the way of life we have built by playing into the hands of these Leftist 
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elements all the way?'52 Ultimately, Welensky's doubts were proven right and the 
Halperns were deported in 1963 for their support for the nationalists. However, both 
remained prominently involved with the anti-colonial struggles across southern 
Africa: Jack as Secretary-General for Amnesty International, Sophie with the Anti-
Apartheid Movement.  
As a leftist, Jewish, South African radical, Jack Halpern had inevitably 
formed acquaintances with many from the ARM, including Baruch Hirson, a South 
African Trotskyite academic and founding ARM member who had been arrested 
during the mass crackdown in 1964. Hirson's story was 'a march with many 
stumbles, false starts, and wrong directions,' in the words of his autobiography's 
editor,53 and consequently permits important comparisons between white radicalism 
in Rhodesia and South Africa. Issues such as the concealment of African nationalist 
materials, constant police attention, attending nationalist meetings, and the balancing 
of professional integrity with personal politics are all shared themes. Both groups 
also talked of the smallness of the circles of white radicals, and the wide-ranging 
ideologies contained within them.  
Marginality from society remained the common theme motivating their 
activities. In Hirson's case, his peripheral status came from his Jewish identity, as it 
did for Edwin and Leone Lichtenstein, Barry and Sonja Gordon, Leo Baron, Gerry 
Caplan, and Jack Halpern, amongst others.54 (One South African police officer asked 
Hirson during questioning, 'why are so many of you Jews?'55) Denis Higgs (the ARM 
member who was arrested in Lusaka) feared being discovered for being gay – an 
identity shared with John Reed, John Conradie, Peter Mackay, Stephen Lombard, 
and Peter Fry of being discovered as gay. Hirson recalled: 
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I discussed the matter [of being arrested] with Denis Higgs who was staying 
with us prior to leaving for Zambia with his African companion. The continued 
threat of discovery and prosecution under South Africa’s notorious Immorality 
Act was forcing him to emigrate, leaving his position in some doubt.56 
 
This echoes Peter Fry's fears that dominated his time in Rhodesia: 
 
I was also, as I said to you before and this we can raise at least in my interview, 
I was so terrified of being accused of being gay. That was a major factor, so I 
just had to keep all of that undercover as well. So I was busy, you know, 
producing the most innocent possible persona to everyone. Luckily because I 
was so young, people couldn't really accuse me of not having a wife and 
children at that time, so I didn't have that to worry about as much. But that was 
an important dimension of life, of which I have never spoken but now I can. 
And some of my friends had similar desires, as you may know.57 
 
As was discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, the concept that marginality 
and discrimination (whether for race, religion, ideology, or sexuality) were 
universally transferable experiences explains why the diverse group of white radicals 
were able to work together, often across national borders. Jack Halpern, for instance, 
was liable to discrimination for his Jewish identity whether in South Africa, Britain, 
or Rhodesia, just as John Reed faced prosecution for his sexuality in many countries. 
Individuals could thus empathise with others in similar positions regardless of 
national identities or other fundamental differences. 
 Nevertheless, the broader comparisons between white radicalism in Rhodesia 
and South Africa demonstrate many differences that these commonalities could not 
overcome. Hirson's talk of cells, pseudonyms, and decentralisation are in stark 
contrast to the informal, less structured, and disorganised Rhodesian movements.58 
Reed's diaries regularly refer to discussions over dinner or drinks at others' homes, 
and the impromptu meetings to make important decisions where only one or two 
radicals were present. Hirson's account of seeking support from a Kibbutz in Israel 
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for sabotage training was also incomparable to anything the Rhodesian radicals did 
prior to 1965, as was the nine-year sentence Hirson was handed for his role in the 
ARM.59 Nine years was more than the cumulative sentencing of all Rhodesian white 
radicals to that point. 
By far, however, the largest difference lay with the non-racial avenues for 
political expression. Outside of the struggling African trade unions (already largely 
subsumed into the nationalist cause),60 there were few spaces for the non-black 
radicals and African activists to cooperate within a political organisation that was not 
African nationalist. Whilst the non-racial SACP had a long history of activity, the 
Southern Rhodesia Communist Party formed in 1941 had disappeared within the 
decade without making a broad impact.61 The left-leaning Rhodesian white radicals 
(including Reed, Arrighi, and Clutton-Brock) were consequently forced to position 
their beliefs as secondary to African nationalism. Forced to coexist with other 
radicals espousing a wide range of political views, the leftist elements were further 
forced to temper their personal opinions on issues ranging from economic reform to 
violence. The latter proved particularly divisive. A pronounced aversion to violence 
from many white radicals ensured the orchestrated sabotage campaigns in Rhodesia 
remained the exclusive purview of the black nationalists.62 The disastrous outcome 
of the ARM's bombing campaign only reaffirmed this belief, as Reed discovered in 
conversation with Jack Halpern: 
 
What Jack finds most depressing is that [Hirson's] lawyer - who has been over 
here [London] since the conviction - says he is now convinced the thing was 
not worth attempting - they all made themselves believe they had a real popular 
movement behind them but in reality it was nothing. As he drives me back to 
the underground, Jack remarks from the South African experience it is 
completely foolhardy for Europeans to get involved in sabotage - it is just too 
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easy to pick the Europeans up or go on until somebody talks (or even easier in 
SR, where the number of Europeans is so much smaller).63 
 
The small number of Rhodesian white radicals was a perennial feature of non-black 
radicalism. No more than fifty whites had actively supported the Zimbabwean 
nationalists between 1957 and 1965, and this small number ensured an 
interconnectedness driven by personal relationships which a larger movement could 
not have obtained. Reed's friendships with Terence Ranger, Jaap van Velsen, Axel 
Sommerfelt, John Conradie, and Giovanni Arrighi (all  academics sympathetic to the 
nationalists) ensured a radical presence on the UCRN campus even when individuals 
left temporarily or permanently. When Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock sought to 
establish a new multi-racial venture in Rhodesia, Mike and Eileen Haddon offered 
their farm as the location,64 and it was Judith Todd who rescued the Clutton-Brocks' 
daughter Sally from school bullies in 1959.65 Demonstrated through the social 
gatherings at each other's homes, the personalisation of white radicalism 
demonstrated that a belief in African nationalism was often enough to overcome 
conflicting personal political beliefs.  
Yet this interconnectedness was also a negative. Because of the close-knit 
nature of these radicals, nearly all were known to the Rhodesian state. The familiarity 
with one another ensured that the anonymity practised by the ARM was impractical. 
As Reed recorded in June 1965, 'Eileen [Haddon] tells me that of course they are 
watching every move I make but I am too useful to them for them to arrest and 
restrict me. By keeping an eye on me they can tell easily what is going on.'66 Even 
the radicals' most peaceful activities did not go unnoticed by the Rhodesian state.67 
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Referring to a pro-nationalist demonstration in November 1965, a Special Branch 
report declared: 
 
European nationalist sympathisers, including the University College group can 
always be relied upon to assist in any "suitable" demonstration, should a 
favourable opportunity present itself. [...] The Eileen Haddon ultra-liberals and 
the University College pro-African Nationalist groups entered into the spirit of 
the Airport demonstration with considerable fervour.68 
 
The March 1965 annual report of the Secretary for Law and Order was similarly 
explicit in its condemnation. African nationalists in Rhodesia, it argued, had 
provided 'a classic example of the use of the Communist methods of subversion from 
within [...] materially assisted, even though innocently, by the naive approach of 
idealistic ultra-liberal organisations to the problems facing the country.'69 Whether 
this was a deliberate misrepresentation, or a failure to comprehend the white radicals' 
motivations, the stance explains why the RF nevertheless remained keen to act 
against the UCRN. 
 
ii. Divisions and disagreements within the white radicals 
 
Because of the state repression and the knowledge that they were likely under 
heightened surveillance, there remained an element of uncertainty about the place of 
non-black radicals in the nationalist cause. Only a few days after dinner with the 
Halperns, Reed was back in Rhodesia and discussed the matter with Eileen and 
Michael Haddon. The period of introspective doubt brought about by the restriction 
of the nationalist leaders and the banning of formal nationalist parties saw some 
white radicals (like Giovanni Arrighi) doubt the effectiveness of continued 'good 
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work' activities. The Haddons were more disheartened by the apparent stagnation of 
the nationalist parties, as Reed noted in his diary: 
 
In talking with Eileen, we [the white supporters] seem to be getting nowhere. 
There seems no chance of breaking the present situation, and Africans are not 
ready to rise or even to take risks; of course rebellions do not require the 
support of the majority but the support they have must be absolute. [...] The 
Haddons say that there is now nothing Europeans can do. This is not in the last 
resort our struggle because we can always go away. And perhaps now all we 
can do is to go away. To hear the Haddons talk of leaving is certainly new to 
my ears.70 
 
One evening in March 1965 at the Blue Boar pub in Salisbury, Mackay clashed 
heads with Arrighi, van Velsen, and Reed over the future of non-black radicalism. 
Frustrations within the group had reached a boiling point over the failure of the 
African nationalists to respond to the RF's actions. 
 
Peter is, really, quite inexcusable telling Giovanni that he has no place poking 
his nose into these African matters, and why doesn't he concern himself with 
Sicily if he is so interested in the problems of underdeveloped areas; but Jaap 
becomes so angry at Peter and shouts so much that I can't help feeling on 
Peter's side. And this belief of Peter's that whites must always keep in the 
background, although usually irritating has a certain quality about it. And I 
have already had a quarrel with G[iovanni] myself during the afternoon about 
his insistence on a firmly consolidated line and his accusation that I agree to a 
thing one day and go back on it the next.[...] Peter believes - or at least has 
said, on different occasions - that the things I have done - have done more harm 
than good.71 
 
The disagreements between what is typically portrayed as a small, like-minded, and 
homogenous group are indicative of the problems that came with a movement based 
only on one shared goal. Arrighi and Mackay were at opposite ends of the political 
spectrum and had little in common apart from their support for Zimbabwean 
nationalism. Arrighi's Marxist ideology ensured a belief in using socialism as a tool 
for the national liberation. As a committed anti-communist, Mackay found this idea 
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offensive. 'These people coming here and trying to impose their own idea and 
categories which are completely foreign to Africa, instead of trying to understand 
what is going on, instead of being ready to learn from Africa and Africans,' he 
complained to Reed, Arrighi, and van Velsen.72 
 Jaap van Velsen, whose own experiences in the Dutch resistance during the 
Second World War shaped his contributions to the African cause, was also frequently 
at odds with Mackay over the role whites should play within the African movement. 
Despite warning students to avoid any active involvement that could jeopardise their 
studies, van Velsen frequently did the opposite. As Peter Fry recalled, van Velsen 
warned him: 'Peter, you'll probably feel strongly about African nationalism. You will 
not involve yourself in politics, this is not where you are supposed to be. If you wish 
to have an effect on politics then write to your equals, write to your peers.' Yet only a 
few months later, Fry witnessed van Velsen participating in pro-nationalist student 
protests on the UCRN campus. 
 
I witnessed one scene of this, of Jaap was telling them [the students] what to do 
basically, it was good advice. And I said "But hang on Jaap, you told me that 
we weren't supposed to be directly involved in African politics?" So he said, 
"Well Peter, I wasn't, I wasn't involved. All I was doing was sticking a red-hot 
poker up their arses, that's all I was doing!"73 
 
van Velsen's reluctance to convincingly commit to supporting Zimbabwean 
nationalism infuriated Mackay. '[Mackay] is bitter about Jaap. "All this talk but what 
has he ever done - except slosh someone at a swimming pool and that probably did 
more harm than good,"' Reed noted.74 van Velsen was similarly unimpressed by 
Mackay's zealous belief in martyrdom: 'Jaap speaks very stupidly of Peter. Going to 
jail was just a way of drawing attention to himself. After all, what good did it do.' 
Arrighi was similarly unconvinced, warning that: 'Peter will be a most dangerous 
influence in Lusaka' on the ZAPU government in exile. With all these vocal 
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arguments and criticisms, it was unsurprising that Reed ended his diary entry on a 
frustrated note: 'I am very annoyed by all this.'75 
 When fundamental disagreements were so prevalent, it is amazing that the 
white radicals interacted with one another at all. The explanation lies with the 
significance attached to separating ideological differences from personal 
relationships. As Peter Mackay explained:  
 
It was possible in these times for political differences to breach personal 
friendships, such was the imperative of Africa’s call to freedom. The cause 
came first and many among those serving it would fall out with each other over 
differences about the ways and means of doing so.76 
 
When Reed met Simpson Mutambanengwe (ZANU's Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
and a former student) in January 1965, their politics were laid aside. It was 'good to 
see Simpson and be able to talk. I hope we may be able to keep open a personal 
contact across the political division,' recorded Reed.77 Outcast for their beliefs by 
white Rhodesian society, and further whittled down by deportations and restrictions, 
the necessity of preserving relationships despite personal differences was thus 
something of a necessity. 
 The importance of personal relationships also extended to the black 
nationalist leaders. In February 1965 and in response to the anti-white incidents in 
Malawi, Joshua Nkomo issued a statement. 
 
We do not regard the Europeans as a separate entity, but as part and parcel of 
the population of the country. [...] Under the majority rule which he called for, 
they would be treated as individuals and exactly the same manner as every 
citizen of the country.78 
 
The primary targets of the statement were two visiting British officials, Arthur 
Bottomley (Labour MP and Commonwealth Relations Minister) and Gerald Gardiner 
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(Lord Chancellor). Both were in Rhodesia to 'discuss matters with the government 
and meet a representative cross-section of opinion,'79 and had met with Nkomo the 
day before and with ZANU's leadership on 1 March. Utilising the opportunity 
afforded by their brief removal from the isolated restriction of Wha Wha, Leopold 
Takawira made a passionate speech, pleading for white Rhodesians not to judge the 
Zimbabwean nationalists on the actions of Africans elsewhere. As the Rhodesia 
Herald reported, Takawira argued:  
 
For the past 70 years the African had worked well with the European. The 
“excuse” that some Europeans were afraid of a majority government was not 
justified “because we cannot be judged by what happens outside our borders. 
We claim to be judged by our record.”80 
 
Both Nkomo and Takawira's speeches were not well received by white Rhodesians. 
One individual highlighted previous declarations by Ndabaningi Sithole denouncing 
multi-racialism as directly refuting the current proclamations.81 Even some historians 
(notably J.R.T. Wood) have dismissed the statements as merely attempts to appease 
British sentiments.82 Yet the rhetoric of Nkomo and Takawira was completely in-
keeping with the non-racialism publicly espoused since 1957 and as if to reaffirm 
this belief, Arrighi and Reed received an incredible welcome upon their arrival at 
Gonakudzingwa only a few days later. As Reed recorded with some amazement:  
 
We wonder how exactly we shall know when we arrive at Vila Salazar 
[Gonakudzingwa]. After all there is no station building. But we need not have 
worried - for the train draws up in a tumult of bobbing skin hats and singing 
and we jump down into a great crowd of men, who gather round to shake our 
hands and help us to carry our luggage. [...] We had not sent any word that we 
were coming but we are already well enough known, and we walk back to the 
camp with Josiah Chinamano and Willie Musarurwa.83 
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As there were no press present to document their arrival and Reed had no incentive 
to exaggerate their reception in his diary, the question has to be asked to what British 
sentiments the restricted nationalists were appealing with such a display of affection? 
The obvious answer is that this was a genuine reaction to the arrival of two 
committed supporters of the nationalist cause, at a time when these people were few 
and far between. It was also a response to a very public demonstration that there 
were still white radicals who wanted to see majority rule established, despite the 
increasingly anti-white nationalist rhetoric.  
 However, Reed and Arrighi's visit was not solely a social one as such 
excursions provided an opportunity for visitors to carry with them correspondence 
from nationalists elsewhere. All involved recognised the importance of this mobility. 
'[Nkomo] directly asks Giovanni about the report, which apparently Giovanni 
mentioned to him that he was writing for Lusaka the last time he was here. We have 
not brought a copy of the report with us, because Lusaka told us not to. Giovanni 
says he will explain tomorrow.'84 The report was one of a number of papers Arrighi, 
Reed, and van Velsen were asked to 'write on request or rewrite' for ZAPU during 
1965, covering current events such as the Rhodesian negotiations with the British 
government or the likelihood of a UDI, and providing suggestions on how the 
nationalist struggle should proceed.85 
 Nkomo also took the opportunity to ask Reed, 'before anything else [...] 
whether they [the nationalists] could expect any cooperation from any of the whites' 
in Rhodesia.'86 This question left Reed confused. Apart from the small group of 
white radicals, most sympathisers had already come forward. '[Nkomo] did not seem 
happy with my answer that there was no considerable group among the Europeans 
that could possibly be looked to for help.'87 The reason for this incident was clarified 
the following month when Willie Musarurwa (Nkomo's aide) wrote to Eileen 
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Haddon, asking her to try and approach any whites who would be willing to 'find 
some common ground' with the nationalists and encourage them to make the trip to 
meet with the ZAPU leadership. Already Nkomo had met with Hardwicke 
Holderness and Robert Tredgold, as well as Ahrn Palley (the independent MP for 
Highfields).88 Reed observed the likely reason for this political gambit. 
 
It occurs to me that Bottomley may have told Nkomo that he has got to ally 
himself in some way with the other forces in the country which are opposed to 
Smith. [...] Eileen thinks that at Gona[kudzingwa] they are now quite out of 
touch with feeling among Europeans and seeing no other way out, have felt 
driven to try and make an alliance with whatever opposition to the Rhodesia 
Front they can find among the whites.89 
 
The timing of this drive so soon after the British visit suggests that this search was 
brought about at the behest of the British government. A multi-racial alliance 
involving ZAPU would relieve the concerns of Harold Wilson's government who 
were 'appalled' about 'the latest events in the Congo where Belgian paratroops and 
white mercenaries had assisted local troops in [...] freeing white hostages.'90 Reed 
and Haddon thought as much and said so to the nationalists at the start of May and 
the response by Musarurwa is arguably one of the most significant documents for 
understanding race and citizenship in mid-1960's Zimbabwean nationalism. 
 
As I said in my last letter we need European support. This is not a sudden 
realisation; right from the outset we tried our best to get European support. Our 
country is different from many former colonies in that it has a settled European 
population, many of whom were born and bred here and are true Zimbabweans. 
It is important we convince Britain that we don't stand for African interests 
alone but for the rights of all Zimbabweans. European support is also important 
to convince our people right now that this battle is not against the white people, 
and our intention is not to drive away Europeans, but to establish basic rights 
for all.91 
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Musarurwa's letter contained several important points, especially the recognition that 
the racial aspect of Zimbabwean nationalism had to be addressed. The apparent 
acceptance of non-black people in the post-independence Zimbabwean nation 
demonstrated a pragmatism to the specific racial context of Rhodesian society and 
the settler population. For Nkomo and ZAPU to recognise that non-black individuals 
would have to be included in the nation-building efforts was notable. Nevertheless, 
this remained a private letter between personal acquaintances, aimed at reassuring 
two respected white radicals that the movement they supported was not racialist. The 
words on one of the African leaders did not always translate into party policy and 
consequently Reed dismissed much of the letter, noting that 'from this it looks as if 
the move to gain Europeans support is considered and serious, even if it does not 
reflect a fundamental change in policy.'92 
 However, ZAPU's search for non-black support also ensured that the white 
radicals remained in the angry gaze of the RF. At the Salisbury Ex-Servicemen 
Association's annual dinner in March 1965, the guest of honour was Desmond 
Lardner-Burke (the Minister for Law and Order) who delivered a surprisingly 
explicit speech condemning white involvement with Zimbabwean nationalism. 
 
It is not a native African movement. It is a communist movement, a Red 
movement led by certain residents in this nation of all races and their Peking 
and Moscow masters [...] We have banned those organisations intent on 
overthrowing a democratic government through violent means - and restricted 
those who instigated the violence - but the disturbances in the townships have 
not abated. The reason is simple. Those involved are still out there and escape 
punishment because they use others to do the real work whilst they hide behind 
university walls and welfare and aid groups.93 
 
Although the condemnation was explicit, the anti-communist rhetoric was routine by 
this point. Besides the fact that some radicals were openly leftist and ZAPU and 
                                               
92 Reed, 'Thursday 27 May 1965', Diary, Vol.102 
93 'Minister welcomed to Annual Dinner', Newsletter of the Salisbury Ex-Servicemen 
Association (13 March 1965), No.18, p.1, in the possession of Roland Letchworth-Mills, 
Cape Town, South Africa 
253 
 
ZANU both had association with the Soviets and Chinese, respectively, the pairing 
of African nationalism with Communism was deliberate. As Sue Onslow explains, 
there were attempts to portray Rhodesia as being at 'the cutting edge of the struggle 
against Communism and a stalwart trying to uphold Western civilised standards', and 
consequently to unify white (and international) support behind the RF.94 Fears of 
Communism were tied into the apparent brutality of African rule elsewhere in very 
effective propaganda,95 as Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo explain. 
 
Anti-communist rhetoric and propaganda was used by RF politicians to 
undercut the democratic space of the liberal element of the white community. It 
was a means to maintain the solidarity of the European population, and was 
used as a tool to transcend race.96 
 
Whether the radicals were actually Communist was irrelevant. What mattered was 
the accusation. Being labelled a Communist guaranteed that any opposition to the RF 
could be painted as being anti-Western and therefore anti-civilisation. Combined 
with the well-known activities of the SACP to the south, the accusations were 
enough to divert the messages any white radicals were seeking to get across. Yet not 
all of the white radicals were truly concerned. After attending a meeting of the 
Current Affairs Association with Arrighi and Axel Sommerfelt in April, Reed noted 
wryly: 'Josiah Chinamano is speaking. A large number of African students and a 
sprinkling of Europeans. I find it all very boring. The innocent nationalist, friend to 
all. Perhaps I am a communist as Lardner-Burke says.'97 
 Nevertheless, the growing attention being paid to the white radicals was 
concerning, particularly for Reed. 
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I wonder whether I have ever seriously faced up to the chance of disaster - 
getting restricted or, more likely and much worse, sent to jail. Life is often 
almost insupportable even now. Yet still I drift on from day to day - just 
keeping up, managing more or less to discharge the days requirements.98 
 
As events in the summer of 1965 would prove, the chances of disaster were 
beginning to mount. 
 
iii. Elections and repression:  
 
The announcement that a general election was to be held in May 1965 forced the 
Zimbabwean nationalists and their non-black supporters to assess the future struggle. 
Discussing the election with the Clutton-Brocks at their Cold Comfort Farm, Reed 
found them already thinking how best the nationalists could utilise the election.  
 
We sit in the descending sun on old car seats and Molly serves tall beakers of 
tea and slices of ginger cake [...]Guy at least doesn't believe the nationalists 
ought to take part in the elections - or at least I think he does not believe they 
ought not for strategic purposes to do something they do not really believe in. 
But he sees no point in attempting to face the present regime with violence, and 
talks about the need to go round and effect a change of heart in the whites.99 
 
Clutton-Brock's suggestion to ignore the election was taken to heart by the ZAPU 
leadership with Nkomo stating on 2 April 1965 that 'as far as we are concerned, it 
does not exist'. Neither ZANU nor ZAPU put forward any candidates.100 A last 
minute suggestion by Eileen Haddon that 'since this is a white man's constitution, B-
roll blacks should not vote for black men but white men' and fifteen liberal whites 
should therefore run for the B-roll seats ('15 Palleys in 15 Highfields', as Reed noted) 
was rejected by Nkomo.101 
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 However, a protest organised by UCRN students on the eve of the election 
demonstrated that not all nationalist supporters were ignoring the election entirely. 
As Ian Smith tried to address a meeting at the Rhodesia Memorial Hall in Salisbury, 
he was heckled by a crowd of about forty students. Most of the protesting students 
were black (leading RF supporters to shout 'go back to the bush') but a small number 
were white and as the heckling continued, Smith announced that 'he could see that 
while the majority of the students were African, they were being led by 
Europeans.'102 The only protestors arrested were three white men and a white 
woman, and the trial of two of these (an English UCRN student couple named Roger 
and Laura Farmworth) remained in the news for some weeks. Eventually found 
guilty, the couple were fined and deported but their supposed role as leaders of the 
protest was dismissed by the magistrate.103  
 Despite such disruptions, the election continued unabated. Yet the scale of the 
RF victory was surprising even to its most optimistic supporters. Winning all fifty A-
roll seats with an unprecedented 79.3% of the vote, the RF cemented its position as 
the ruling party in the nation.104 Ahrn Palley was one of five independents to win a 
B-roll seat, including an Asian, and ten African candidates,105 whilst the only 
coloured MP (George Raftopoulos) lost his seat.106 The RF's victory marked an end 
for multi-racialism. In a symbolic example of this demise, Garfield Todd had 
attempted to meet with Ian Smith in June utilising 'a convention that former premiers 
could from time to time call on their successors for discussions', but was refused an 
audience.107 Both the CAS and the IASR officially disbanded that same month.108 
'The Capricorn African Society had failed in its call for a common patriotism and the 
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Interracial Association had been unable to inspire a communal sense of sharing,' 
explained Mackay.109 
 The electoral result also had a huge impact on the mental state of the white 
radicals. In mid-May, Reed travelled to Lusaka with Arrighi, taking various letters 
and papers to the ZAPU leadership from Gonakudzingwa. On his return, he wrote an 
unusually pessimistic diary entry. 
 
Although at Lusaka all seemed to go well, I have been deeply depressed ever 
since. Partly I am afraid. I am frightened of being sent to jail. I find in myself 
no real determination, no courage. Nothing can carry me through this except 
indecision. I know when it is too late I shall have nothing but regrets. Partly a 
hatred of violence, or rather a horror, a drawing back and though I might be 
glad to discover I have no love of violence it is so closely associated with the 
recognition of my own cowardice that these two seem to me only aspects of the 
same thing: all that is good - or all this is in my character of which I with my 
character approve, and all that is weak and despicable seem to spring from a 
simple and compelling desire: what can I call it but the desire for quiet. To be 
uninvolved, unanxious, unconcerned. To stay at home in the evening and read 
a book. To be my own master but to exercise mastery not in assertion but in 
withdrawal.110 
 
Yet he added, with typical self-diminishment of his contributions, 'I have always 
forced myself to get involved; I have not stayed at home of nights.'111 Participation 
by the non-black radicals was neither easy nor expected. It took great effort to 
continue to act when not wanted by a majority of the nationalist leadership, 
persecuted by the state, and outcast from their own society. To potentially lose one's 
job, one's liberty, and even one's life (as Frederick John Harris did) in the name of a 
struggle in which you are not fully included required strength.  
 Now buttressed by their mandate from the white Rhodesian population, the 
RF adopted 'frantic efforts to silence the African nationalist opinion and voice by 
every available means, while carrying out a Nazi-like brain washing campaign 
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among the population'.112 The widespread detentions of nationalist leaders (including 
Ndabaningi Sithole113) as well as a fundamental change in access to the restricted 
nationalists, were accompanied by the declaration of a State of Emergency in the two 
rural areas containing restriction camps.114All visitors were banned from 
Gonakudzingwa and any large meetings were prohibited within the five separate 
camps which comprised the restriction area.115 
 Both Reed and Arrighi had returned from Gonakudzingwa only that morning 
to find the UCRN in a state of uproar. Highlighting the confusion of such events, a 
very confused Reed recorded in his diary: 
 
I am puzzled to find some of the drawers of my desk are empty [...] Then 
G[iovanni] comes in to tell me that there has been a panic in our absence - Sisa 
[Arrighi] on hearing the one o'clock news yesterday naturally assumed we 
would run into the police unexpectedly and especially feared that they would 
find the paper on economic planning. She goes to Richard [Whitaker] and Axel 
[Sommerfelt]. Together they get into my office very fast and take away 
anything that might interest the police - in case we have both been arrested.116 
 
Reed was more than grateful: 'It is remarkable what careful friends we have.'117 
Others were not so fortunate. Leo Baron (Joshua Nkomo's 'wonderful lawyer and 
good friend'118) was restricted to Bulawayo for twelve months.119 As with the 
restrictions of other whites, Baron's case generated more attention than the thousands 
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of restricted black Africans.120 In an interview with the South African The Star, 
Baron stated angrily:  
 
The order against me is absolutely nonsensical. The restriction order says it is 
based on the belief that I have actively assisted in activities prejudicial to the 
maintenance of law and order in Rhodesia. My only actions have been strictly 
legal. I have been Mr. Nkomo's legal advisor for many years.121 
 
Many white Rhodesians assumed that Baron's restriction was an attempt by the 
government to prevent legal but confrontational activities. A Herald editorial entitled 
'What has he done?' called for the Minister of Law and Order to provide evidence as 
to 'how he justifies such grave action against a servant of the Courts.' It continued:  
 
Mr. Baron claims that some of his submissions have been successful, but “can 
hardly think” that the Minister regards such successes as being prejudicial to 
law and order. “Naturally” to think otherwise would be to suggest that the 
Minister is attempting to intimidate the Courts by issuing a not-so-roundabout 
warning that judicial insistence on upholding the Law will be construed by the 
Executive as prejudicial to Order, and punishable.122 
 
Discussing the situation with Eileen Haddon, Reed noted: 'it goes with the 
expounded theory that what the government is above all afraid of is constitutional 
activity by Africans or on their behalf. This is why Leo Baron has been restricted and 
why Michael and herself [Eileen] were restricted from visiting Gonakudzingwa.'123 
Evidently annoyed by the publicity Baron's case had received, a speech to Parliament 
on 10 June saw Desmond Lardner-Burke explicitly warn 'Nkomo's white backers' 
that their activities would not be permitted for much longer, regardless of the legality 
of their activities. 
 
The actions of certain members of this country of all races has compelled me to 
sign restriction orders against them to maintain law and order. Others from all 
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walks of life – including individuals at our university – are constantly coming 
before our notice because of their subversive activities. Legitimate political 
activity is one thing – and is welcomed by the Government – but subversion 
which threatens the security of our country, is quite another matter and will not 
be tolerated. This is a warning to those involved.124 
 
A clamp-down was expected imminently. Over lunch with Axel Sommerfelt and the 
Arrighis, Reed discussed the possibilities of restriction or arrest and the likelihood 
that a number of them would soon be in jail.125 A visit to Guy Clutton-Brock saw 
Reed receive advice from the former detainee for when he was arrested: '"You must 
try and educate these fellows [the police]," [Clutton-Brock] says. "They haven't 
really got much of a clue you know what motivates a chap like you."'126 The 
following weekend, Eileen Haddon and Reed sat 'drinking coffee and brandy and 
contemplating the unpleasantness of going to jail; Eileen for publishing some 
subversive thing in the Examiner, and myself, well for putting a foot wrong 
somewhere.'127 
   
iv. "Petals in a flower": The Roles of Non-Black Radicals 
 
Lardner-Burke's sweeping warning highlighted that even more reserved white 
radicals were at risk. Ahrn Palley (the liberal MP) was particularly troubled. A 
former multi-racialist, Palley and his wife Clair (a legal scholar) had previously been 
vocal critics of the nationalists and had condemned the 'radical' NDP: 'the danger of 
the political philosophy preached by these organisations to the untutored masses of 
this country lies in their belief in political violence rather than constitutional political 
development,' Palley had declared in 1959.128 By 1965, however, Palley was a 
supporter of African nationalism insofar as it was non-violent and operated legally. 
His vocal support in Parliament for ZAPU forced the RF's more nefarious activities 
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into the public sphere 'without resorting to un-civilised means,' in the words of one 
white Rhodesian.129 His public image also shed light on Zimbabwean nationalism to 
the Rhodesian public. As Morris Hirsch explains, 'he gave African Nationalism 
respectability, but alone amongst this group of its supporters, although resented, he 
came to be admired by White Rhodesians as well as the Africans for whom he 
fought.'130 (Ian Smith would later describe Palley as 'one of the most able politicians 
this country has produced', adding that 'although our political philosophies did not 
coincide, we always respected one another and maintained friendly relations.'131)  
 Much like the black Rhodesian MPs, Palley is frequently written out of 
Zimbabwean nationalism as a liberal sympathiser whose participation in Rhodesian 
politics only legitimised the state. Joshua Nkomo makes only one mention of Palley 
in his autobiography and passes no comment on his contributions.132 Others 
including Garfield Todd, Diana Mitchell, Terence Ranger, and even Eileen Haddon 
are also regularly rejected as being radicals, despite their often-significant 
contributions to the struggle. In 2003, Rob Sacco (father to ZANU-PF's last white 
MP) condemned Mitchell, Ranger, and Haddon for 'their ineffectual lack of any real 
commitment to a Zimbabwe that exists for the comfort of all its people, not simply 
for that of whites, liberal or otherwise.' He went on: 
 
As has been questioned in the press recently, how many whites did fight for the 
Patriotic Front during the war of liberation? And how many of these fought for 
an African nationalist agenda? The answer to the latter question is perhaps 
three: Jeremy Brickhill, John Conradie and Clutton-Brock. Where were the 
rest? And where are they now?133 
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When I asked the Zimbabwean-Indian academic Hasu Patel about such attitudes, his 
reply was a cautious rebuttal: 
 
I think it is a bit unfair. It's just that we had different degrees and different 
ways of supporting, not all of them were necessarily critical, but they all came 
together, like petals in a flower - each petal in itself means nothing but when 
you put the whole thing together as a flower it makes sense.134 
 
In the context of late 1965, the analogy of petals in a flower is particularly apt. 
Whilst Ahrn Palley continued to criticise the RF in Parliament over a number of 
pertinent issues, others were variously assisted the nationalists. Guy Clutton-Brock 
was at the centre of things; 'busy in the common front - now trying to bring the 15 
black MPs and Nationalists together', reported Reed at the start of August.135 The 
South African John Conradie (newly appointed UCRN lecturer in history) began 
making frequent journeys between Salisbury, Lusaka, and Dar es Salaam whilst 
working on a thesis pertaining to Zimbabwean nationalism from 1935-1962.136 
Conradie utilised the visits to interview prominent nationalists to act as 'a courier 
between resistance groups in Harare and the ZAPU leadership in Lusaka'.137 The 
increasingly radical Garfield Todd engaged himself in communications with 
nationalist leaders, notably James Chikerema in Lusaka to whom Todd paid a brief 
visit.138 
 Peter Mackay, meanwhile, was engaged in ferrying people, goods, and 
messages across central Africa in his work with the Zambian International Refugee 
Council and various nationalist groups. It was this period which earned him the title 
'the warden of Freedom Road,' as one of his former passengers emphatically titled 
him.139 Armed with his trusty 'two-ton' Land-Rover purchased second-hand with 
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funds raised by the refugee council, Mackay would regularly cross the Zambezi on 
the 'freedom ferry' at Kazungala, where Botswana, Rhodesia, Zambia, and Namibia 
all met.140 Mackay provides a modest yet entertaining account of these activities in 
his memoirs, but it is only a snapshot of the significant contributions these trips made 
to the African struggles across southern and central Africa.141 'In contrast to his 
academic friends, [Mackay was] a highly practical individual, capable of stripping 
down an engine when that was required just as he had been able to put together a 
printing press and make it work,' explains John McCracken,142 and it is this 'romantic 
adventurer' identity that partly explains the conflict between Mackay and the other 
white radicals.143 
 Vocal elements of the Church in Rhodesia were also demonstrating support 
for the nationalists, although the majority were still critical of violence. The Bishop 
of Matabeleland compared the situation in Rhodesia to that of pre-war Europe and 
cautioned his congregation to 'remember what happened came through the 
complacency of the many good, decent Christian folk as much as through the 
deliberate evil of the few.'144 In a speech to the Rhodesian National Affairs 
Association, Stanley Mark Wood (the Anglican Dean of Salisbury) stated that even 
practising Christians were on the side of nationalists, although they abhorred their 
methods.  
 
Nationalism is not just a political thing, although it has a political end product. 
But it is something that has risen now in the heart of Africa, and it has risen out 
of great shame. [...] All Christians share this distaste for discrimination, for 
subjugation of one man by another, and so understand African nationalism for 
its pursuit of universal justice.145 
 
                                               
140 McCracken, 'Peter Mackay', p.5 
141 For an account of his activities during this period, see Mackay, We Have Tomorrow, 
pp.272-279 
142 McCracken, 'Peter Mackay', p.5 
143 Ranger, Writing Revolt, p.165 
144 Quoted in Todd, Rhodesia, p.158 
145 'Nationalism big problem for Church', Rhodesia Herald (31 July 1965), p.3 
263 
 
The significance of such a statement from a senior figure in the Anglican Church is 
difficult to gauge. Many black nationalists saw the Church in Rhodesia as being too 
closely associated with the white state and likely to be a ‘stumbling block’ for the 
African cause.146 ‘Nine out of ten nationalist leaders have been educated at mission 
schools, and owe a great deal to missionaries; yet nearly all would say today that 
they mistrust the Church as a whole,’ Nathan Shamuyarira explained.147  
Although less than ten per cent of white Rhodesians routinely attended Church 
services, the RF's frequent use of 'the term Christianity to delineate or justify a 
secular world which was anti-communist, democratic, and civilized (that is, White 
ruled)' meant a statement of support for the African nationalists by the Church was 
afforded attention.148 Guy Clutton-Brock recognised the impact of such challenges to 
Rhodesian society. ‘The enemy front, feared, widens beyond African nationalists to 
include “communists”, “terrorists” and “hippies”. These are spied in the ranks of big 
business, liberals, Christians, socialists, in the government circles of Britain and 
America and in the United Nations and the World Council of Churches.’149 Judith 
Todd similarly noted: 
 
Liberals, communists, the heads of commerce and industry, African 
nationalists, the Press, the Church, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the 
BBC, the United States of America, Russia, China, the University College, 
traitors, quislings and an endless list of other groups and individuals had all 
been subjected to the wrath of the Rhodesian Front government.150 
 
In the face of vocal support from prominent individuals, the RF were quick to make 
clear that African nationalism and its supporters were under control in Rhodesia and 
the 'turmoil of independent black Africa would not be arriving any time soon'.151 On 
21 July, Ian Smith stated 'there seemed to be a sense of disillusionment among the 
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forces of nationalism because the revolution they had expected to take place (in 
Rhodesia) had just not materialised. They were now, in spite of themselves, inclining 
to the idea that independence was an evolutionary process.’152 A few days later, P.K. 
van der Byl (Parliamentary Secretary for Information) declared that the Land 
Apportionment Act would never be abolished, despite the hatred many Africans had 
for it.153 On 24 August, the trial of Nathaniel Nyagomo (a ZAPU/PCC member) saw 
the court told that 'the wearing of fur hats and the carrying of certain types of 
walking sticks were symbols of membership of the banned People’s Caretaker 
Council.'154 In response, Dave Tippetts (a BSAP officer at Gonakudzingwa) 
confiscated all items he could find including 'two walking sticks which were 
intended as gifts to Garfield Todd, the former Prime Minister who now supported the 
Africans, and whose daughter visited the restrictees several times.'155 (Tippetts also 
recalls how 'some [visitors] we gave "confused" directions on how to find the camp. 
Some - unfortunately - never found it.'156)  
 Despite the confiscation of walking sticks, Zimbabwean nationalism proved 
hard to fully subdue. The UCRN in particular remained a 'thorn in the side of the 
extremist sections of the ruling Rhodesian Front Party, who consider it a hotbed of 
liberalism and communism'.157 What troubled the RF most was seeing the openly 
nationalist students and faculty going largely unpunished. Nondo Mbuwa (a UCRN 
student between 1964-67) remembered: 'we protested every week against the 
government. But we were students and it seemed they [the government] just accepted 
that that was part of having a university.'158 On 27 August 1965, this toleration 
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ended. A Ministry of Education circular was distributed to all faculty members of the 
university entitled 'Conditions Governing the Award of Government Scholarships, 
Grants or Loans'. As John Reed described: 
 
This sets out a declaration which from 1966 students selected for Gov. grants 
will have to sign. In this they acknowledge financial assistance from the Gov. 
precludes them for [sp.] taking part in political activities outside their 
University of College, and undertake a) not to join a political party b) canvass 
c) display posters or wear political badges etc.159 
 
In the following days, the motivation behinds this strategy was explained by Arthur 
Smith (the Minister for Education). 'If they bite the hand that feeds them, they must 
expect what comes,' he told the Sunday Mail.160 Although supposedly indiscriminate, 
the Minister's statement did not 'suggest the restriction was going to be impartially 
operated,' as John Reed noted.161 
 
In a way this will hit European students harder than Africans - after all there 
are legal political parties they can join. [...] Though I suppose it is not likely 
that a student will lose his grant for sporting an RF favour or asking a 
sympathetic question at one of Mr. Smith's meetings.162 
 
Nondo Mbuwa willingly signed the document: 'I did not hesitate. The choice was to 
complete my studies or be made to leave. And I was still a member of ZAPU, so long 
as I didn't get caught!'163 Nevertheless, the intended intimidation was clear and the 
Association of University Teachers was quick to issue a statement condemning the 
new policy as interfering with the universal rights of free speech and the freedom of 
political expression.164 
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 Although staff politics had not explicitly been touched, many radical lecturers 
assessed where they now stood. On 30 September, Reed and Arrighi discussed the 
problem at length. 
 
What we have to decide if we are not arrested is whether we keep ourselves out 
of trouble in order to be able to go on living in the country and helping when 
the opportunity arises, or whether some kind of futile gesture has to be made 
with the immediate result of expulsion or incarceration.165 
 
Reed noted bitterly that neither option particularly appealed to him: 'Rhodesia is 
now, I believe, my home. But if I want to stay here I shall have I suppose to renounce 
my British passport and my British citizenship - perhaps forever? And probably 
affirm my loyalty to a government that I don't recognize.'166 
In October 1965, the issue of British citizenship was a particularly topical 
one. Since the RF's victory in the May election, Ian Smith's cabinet had been 
engaged in almost endless negotiations with the British government over the question 
of independence.167 By October it appeared that a UDI was inevitable.168 Harold 
Wilson's Labour government had made clear that their policy of 'No Independence 
Before Majority Rule' was non-negotiable, yet they also emphasised that they would 
not intervene militarily in the case of a UDI.169 In protest against British 
equivocation, on 2 October some 200 UCRN students (including black, white and 
Indian men and women) 'deliberately snubbed the Governor [...] when he rose to 
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make the closing speech at the annual presentation ceremony.'170 Immediately 
following the walk-out, a gathering of black, Asian, Indian, coloured, and several 
white students gathered on campus and 'for the first time at the College [...] sang the 
African nationalist song.'171 When Stephen Taylor (the white president of the Student 
Union) condemned the actions as 'puerile',172 the non-white members of the Student 
Representative and Activities Councils resigned and proclaimed their support for 
ZAPU and ZANU.173 
 In retaliation for the white radical's continued defiance, on 18 October 
Garfield Todd was restricted to his farm near Shabani for one year. Although still a 
moderate radical, Todd's transition since leaving the Prime Ministership was 
remarkable. As Morris Hirsch described, 'now [Todd] was a devotee of African 
majority rule, inevitable and just,'174 and had been due to travel to Edinburgh 
University to speak against UDI (although the RF denied that the restriction had 
anything to do with Todd's anti-independence attitude).175 The Zimbabwe Review 
(ZAPU's newspaper in London) was quick to note the coincidental timing in their 
message of support: 'Mr. Garfield Todd, a former Premier of Rhodesia and a strong 
supporter of one man, one vote and ZAPU was ruthlessly placed under restriction 
yesterday by fascist Ian Smith, only a few hours before he was due to board a plane 
for Britain.'176 The restriction order instead informed Todd it was 'based on the belief 
that you have associated yourself with the leaders of an unlawful organisation, the 
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Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU),' and had recently 'visited Zambia to get 
in touch with people aiding and abetting saboteurs.'177  
Naturally, there was a significant outcry from global liberal elements. As the 
South African newspaper The Star noted, 'the decision to place Mr. Garfield Todd 
under restriction is unlikely to cause White Rhodesians nearly as much concern as it 
will arouse overseas.'178 Even Ian Smith noted that they had 'lost some ground' with 
the international community by restricting Todd.179 The only reason why the RF felt 
comfortable to restrict Todd given the unfavourable reception was best summarised 
by the Zimbabwe Review. 'This looks like a prelude to UDI. If it is, then all white 
liberals as well as Africans are in for a rude time'.180 As if to reaffirm the point, on 22 
October, R.K. Naik (the Indian radical and ZAPU's national counsellor) was released 
from Gonakudzingwa but immediately restricted to his home in Bulawayo.181 
 The RF now seemed to be operating without concern for British demands, as 
was made evident when Harold Wilson made a last-ditch effort to secure a 
compromise on majority rule with the nationalists in late October.182 The nationalists 
had thus far been unrelenting in their demand for majority rule and no transition 
period and Wilson's meeting with Nkomo and Leo Baron (acting as ZAPU's legal 
advisor) resulted in a photograph of the three in which the uncomfortable atmosphere 
is palpable.183 The white radicals were equally unimpressed with the British response 
to the Rhodesian situation. 'Too little, too late' read a sign at what would turn out to 
be one of the final peaceful actions of the white radicals, a pro-ZAPU demonstration 
organised by Giovanni Arrighi, Eileen Haddon, and Enoch Dumbutshena to mark 
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Wilson's arrival.184 The protest ended when a police dog attacked a white female 
UCRN student 'because she was singing African freedom songs', leading 
Dumbutshena to note that even having white friends was now dangerous and 
demonstrating how violence was becoming an intrinsic part of nationalist 
activities.185 
 A couple of days after the demonstration, Arrighi admitted to Reed that 'his 
opinions have changed [...] There is no real resolution among the Africans. [...] 
Nkomo must compromise with Wilson - accept 5 years, 10 years before African rule, 
so long as the period of waiting is not under Smith or the whites here.'186 The 
assessment by the politically-astute Arrighi left Reed lamenting the missed 
opportunity for the nationalists to assert themselves as an important political ally to 
the British. 
 
We must accept that there has been an absolute failure. The Nationalists have 
neatly succeeded in doing the worst for themselves. They have impressed 
Wilson now as well as Bottomley before with their weakness and their lack of 
realism. Instead of bargaining, showing flexibility and cunning to Wilson, they 
have shown their own staunchness in the demand that he should act and 
rescue them. The chance that was surely there for them to clench something 
with Wilson behind Smith's back they have completely lost. Instead of 
relinquishing 'one man, one vote' for any period of time that Wilson wished to 
say yes, provided that the interim was under something other than the absolute 
power of the RF - they have antagonised the Labour Government, made 
themselves absurd, achieved nothing. How delighted Smith must be after all 
that Wilson spent so much time with them.187 
 
Wilson's departure at the start of November indicated that negotiations with both the 
RF and the nationalists had failed. On 5 November, a State of Emergency was 
declared. 'The regulations governing the emergency stripped the last vestiges of 
                                               
184 "Organisation of Anti-Government Demonstrations", cabinet discussion of report 
produced by Special Branch Headquarters, Salisbury, 13 Nov 1965, R.C.(S)(65)321, 18 Nov 
1965, Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South 
Africa 
185 Dumbutshena, Zimbabwe Tragedy, p.57 
186 Reed, 'Wednesday 27 October 1965', Diary, Vol.103 
187 Reed, 'Saturday 30 October 1965', Diary, Vol.103. Emphasis in original. 
270 
 
disguise from a police state masquerading as a democracy', wrote a disgusted Judith 
Todd.188 
 At 11am on 11 November 1965, Ian Smith and his cabinet signed the UDI. 
Within hours a flood of economic and political sanctions, as well as near-universal 
international condemnation hit Rhodesia.189 The refusal of Smith’s white-minority 
government to hand over power was seen as an embarrassment that needed the 
swiftest of resolutions.190 Britain was criticised for allowing Rhodesia to get to the 
point of UDI and the issue became front-page news around the world, with the 
primary debate raging over whether economic sanctions would end Smith's regime, 
or whether (as many independent African states demanded) military intervention 
would be required. Jack Halpern was convinced that a war would turn out to be 
necessary. John Reed noted bleakly: 'Jack says that economic sanctions by 
themselves will not bring down Smith's regime - unless this is with massive African 
unrest, an armed intervention.'191 Joshua Mpofu’s autobiography similarly highlights 
the feeling amongst members of the underground cells of ZAPU that UDI ensured 
violent armed struggle was now the preferable, and most likely to succeed, method of 
resistance.192 
 UDI made clear to the Zimbabwean nationalists that majority rule would not 
be forthcoming from either the RF or the British government, and a violent self-
liberation struggle would consequently be required to secure change. With the 
proliferation of violent strategies of resistance at the expense of peaceful forms of 
protest, Zimbabwean nationalism post-UDI lost many of the non-racial credentials on 
which it had been formed. A firmly anti-white ideology was consolidated after UDI, 
and the events that transpired undermined the benefits that came to Zimbabwean 
nationalism from having non-black members. Whereas the non-black radicals' utility 
had once lain with their ability to offer dissenting points of view within white 
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Rhodesian society, those who acted against the state were now labelled as terrorists 
and their views discounted by white Rhodesians without consideration. Combined 
with their physical removal from the nation, non-black radicals were no longer 
distinguished from their black brethren and the unique benefits of their racial 
identities were abandoned by a nationalist leadership whose primary focus was now 
on a insurgent war against an entrenched and strengthened white Rhodesian state. 
 Despite paying lip-service to the ideals of old, both Joshua Nkomo and 
Ndabaningi Sithole largely abandoned their plans for a non-violent transfer of power 
following UDI. Whether through the guns of their guerrillas or an intervention by 
foreign military powers, the nationalist leaders were forced to embrace violence as 
the most likely tool in their arsenal for achieving their aims. Driven by internal 
competition between the two groups and pressure from external factors, white 
radicals found themselves in a situation where their best means of contribution were 
similarly violent. John Reed (whose disdain for the brutality and bloodshed of open 
racial conflict had been persistent since his first days in the SRANC) was a reluctant 
convert to sabotage campaigns precisely because the uncertainty of the nationalists in 
the pre-UDI period had been replaced by a single-minded drive towards violent 
resistance.  
For Reed and the other remaining white radicals, Zimbabwean nationalism 
was now irrevocably intertwined with military actions. When their group was 
discovered and broken, it highlighted the unsuitability of non-black supporters acting 
in such roles and thus reduced their utility in the current paradigm of Zimbabwean 
nationalism to a point where the non-racial ideal served more to weaken than 
strengthen the concepts of a Zimbabwean nation. The racialised rhetoric spouted by 
ZANU and elements of the ZAPU leadership was repurposed to drive home the point 
that liberation would come only from the African people themselves, as nationalist 
strategy came to adopt conversion and rural support as necessary in their campaigns 
of insurgency.  
 There was little that white radicals could do in this environment, much to 
their dismay. Instead in the years to come, most were reduced to fund raisers and 
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international promoters, seeking financial and political support in nations where their 
racial identities were a benefit not a handicap. The few that engaged with the 
liberation struggle through more violent methods were the exception not the rule. For 
most, a full circle had been made with their origins as multi-racial liberals in the late 
1950s, organising protest groups and soliciting donations from larger organisations 
like the CACBA and the SRLAWF, a fact that did not go unnoticed by those who 
had been there since the earliest days. On the 27 August 1966, the same day that 
police arrested three of the ZAPU guerrillas that Peter Mackay had assisted in 
infiltrating into Rhodesia, John Reed noted in his diary: 
 
Evening, Peter [Mackay] comes round and we worry about the arrests in 
Rhodesia. There is little else we can do. I feel like we are back in Salisbury, in 
the early days of the ANC, sitting with Guy and Molly C-B [Clutton-Brock] 
and T. [Terry] and Shelagh [Ranger], planning and talking and arguing and 
worrying but not acting - a dismaying thought.193 
 
Conclusion 
 
This final chapter has explored the turbulent period between the banning of 
ZAPU/PCC and ZANU, and the RF's declaration of UDI. Throughout a complex 
series of events, actions, and reactions, one thread is clear: the pervasive sense of 
uncertainty. Neither the RF, the African nationalists, or either groups' supporters, 
were able to predict what was going to happen in the coming days or weeks or 
months. With hindsight it is easy to portray the nationalist movement as one that 
endlessly and faultlessly proceeded along a route to national liberation. It is equally 
accepted to depict UDI as the inevitable conclusion of escalating tensions both 
within Rhodesia's racial and political groups, but also between the RF and the British 
Government. Yet as the year prior to UDI showed, this was rarely the case. Rather, 
individuals and groups ventured cautiously down one path, unsure where it was 
headed or what lay along the way. This uncertainty provided opportunities for debate 
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and discussion that blind-faith-sureness never could, and despite efforts to close 
down these spaces, the uncertainty ensured that numerous elements contributed to 
the events that unfurled. Shaped by events occurring elsewhere on the continent, and 
even on their own borders, these decisions were made in light of personal beliefs and 
reflected an environment that was fluid and continually changing. 
  Nowhere was this more evident than within the ranks of the remaining white 
radicals in Southern Rhodesia. Whilst Jaap van Velsen and Peter Mackay clashed 
heads over their activities, Ahrn Palley stood up for the African cause in the RF 
dominated Parliament and Garfield Todd defended the nationalists in the press. As 
Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock tried to undermine the racial Rhodesian society, John 
Reed and Giovanni Arrighi couriered messages between detained nationalist leaders 
in Gonakudzingwa and their colleagues in Lusaka. The demonstrations organised by 
the 'ultra-liberal' Eileen Haddon, the articles written by Jack Halpern, and the 
nationalist songs sung by multi-racial groups of students at the University all 
contributed to the nationalist cause. Hasu Patel's analogy of the petals of a flower is 
an especially appropriate one when applied to the last months before UDI and it was 
through these associated activities that the white radicals demonstrated they would 
not permit the non-racial nationalism to die without a fight.  
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that the dominant theme of non-racial 
Zimbabwean nationalism for much of the period 1957 to 1965 was uncertainty. 
Uncertainty in the actions taken and the routes chosen. Uncertainty about the concept 
of a Zimbabwean citizen and a Zimbabwean nation. Uncertainty in the debates and 
discussions that arose around the role of race in a nation building ideology.  
 UDI changed this. Now violence by African nationalists came to be seen as 
the dominant route forward. As Peter Mackay explained in his memoirs: 
 
My colleagues in the political leadership of ZAPU – Chikerema, Nyandoro, 
Moyo, Silundika and Ndlovu – and their military lieutenants – Dabengwa and 
Akim Ndlovu – had been steadily moving from the uncertainty and disorder of 
early exile towards a firm command structure with support bases.1 
 
Over the next few years, Zimbabwean nationalism would become inexorably tied to 
a violent liberation struggle, and the non-black radicals along with it. In April 1966, 
the Battle of Sinoia marked the first open military conflict between the nationalists 
and the Rhodesian state and is traditionally seen as marking the start of the 
Liberation War. That same year a group of white radicals including Giovanni 
Arrighi, John Reed, and John Conradie would smuggle grenades into the country in 
order to instigate a bombing campaign against Rhodesian state infrastructure, 
comparable to the ARM's efforts in South Africa in the preceding years. Conradie 
would eventually be found guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison, the only 
white radical in Rhodesia to serve a serious prison sentence for their activities.2 In 
July 1966, not only would Peter Mackay infiltrate ZAPU guerrillas into Rhodesia 
from Zambia and Bechuanaland (Botswana),3but the UCRN found itself under 
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attack, having exhausted the RF's patience. Nine lecturers (including Jaap van 
Velsen, Giovanni Arrighi, and Axel Sommerfelt) and one student were arrested, and 
31 other students, including four whites and two Indians, suspended.4 Other non-
black radicals would continue to contribute in a variety of ways to the liberation war, 
including Paul Brickhill (whose funeral inspired this thesis), Bishop Donal Lamont,5 
Fay Chung,6 or Garfield, Grace, and Judith Todd.7 
 These individuals' contributions were no more or less significant than those 
who had proceeded them, and it could be argued that the non-racial element of 
Zimbabwean nationalism persisted despite the rise of violent liberation ideology. Yet 
in a 2015 article about the deaths of Terence Ranger, Lionel Cliffe, Nathan 
Shamuyarira, and Paul Brickhill, David Moore noted there was a unique aspect of 
Zimbabwean nationalism that was dependent on individuals and the ideas they 
espoused, and the interactions between those with different racial and political 
identities.  
 
Their passing may indicate the death of not only what Ranger called "liberal 
nationalism" [...] but something more. That would not by any means be 
nationalism as a whole, but nationalism as a contested mode of politics and 
ideology, blending liberalism, various socialisms, traditions and new idioms of 
“Africanism” born of the apostles and disciples of all of these and more from 
around the world and the new ruling classes inheriting their states.8 
 
Moore's description of the changed nature of Zimbabwean nationalism equally 
applies to UDI. Although non-black individuals would continue to participate in the 
Zimbabwean nationalist movements after UDI, the nationalist ideology itself had 
fundamentally changed. The 'black identity nationalism' explored in chapters four 
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and five had replaced the non-racialism of the SRANC, NDP, and early ZAPU. Race 
had gone from an element of consideration to the defining factor. Non-black 
participants were no longer integral to the movement but peripheral to a fight against 
white rule, their inclusion based on total adherence to the African ideology. Their 
presence no longer forced discussions about race, citizenship, and belonging in the 
Zimbabwean nation but instead raised questions of allegiance and the 'African-ness' 
of those who assisted them. Although individual relationships persisted (Joshua 
Nkomo and Garfield Todd would remain friends for many years, as did Robert 
Mugabe and Guy Clutton-Brock), these were no longer enough to ensure a non-racial 
approach to participatory rights in the imagined Zimbabwean nation. As chapter five 
showed, by 1965 Zimbabwean nationalism no longer considered race as a matter for 
discussion. To be a black African was an integral part of being a Zimbabwean. 
 This thesis opened with a tripartite question: how, when, and why did 
Zimbabwean nationalism's stance on race shift from non-racialism to a black identity 
ideology. I have summarised above how Zimbabwean nationalism changed, but 
when and why it changed are far more complex (and intertwined) questions. Once 
again, it is the uncertainty prevalent in the history of early Zimbabwean nationalism 
which explains the incremental nature of the changes that occurred between 1957 
and 1965. In the words of A.J.P. Taylor, non-racial Zimbabwean nationalism was ‘a 
turning point which failed to turn’,9 yet as a complicating case study in what Tony 
Ballantyne calls 'the messy, decidedly uneven, and ultimately incomplete 
dismantling of the empire',10the significance of race in the piecemeal development of 
the Zimbabwean anti-colonial struggle demonstrates the complex manner in which 
British decolonisation and nation formation occurred. Scholars have already begun to 
integrate gender and religion into conceptions of the late British empire 'as a set of 
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shifting, uneven, and often unstable inter-regional and global connections',11 but as 
this thesis demonstrates, race is an equally important factor in explaining this 
process, not only in Zimbabwe but across the globe. In a multitude of dead-ends and 
stuttering starts, in small bounds and large leaps, Zimbabwean nationalism reactively 
changed in response to a multitude of factors (both internal and external) that 
constantly acted upon the nationalist leadership, the non-black radicals, and the mass 
of ordinary nationalist supporters. 
 Some formative influences dated from the earliest conceptions of a 
Zimbabwean nation, as chapter one demonstrated. Social memories of colonial 
conquest and the racial formation inherent in the Rhodesian nation, childhood 
experiences of discrimination, education at the hands of white liberal missionaries, 
and encounters with radical African intellectuals and activists elsewhere on the 
continent all shaped the racial thinking of the Zimbabwean nationalist leadership. 
The emergence of white-led liberal multi-racialism in the early 1950s brought with it 
conceptions of race which argued for black Africans as being in need of education 
and guidance before they could run their own nation. When the CYL emerged in 
1956 from a younger generation of African radicals, they rejected this view of race 
and demanded majority rule but lacked the popular support to create a nation. 
 Thus when the SRANC was formed in 1957 (marking the beginning of a 
mass Zimbabwean nationalism) it was receptive to the varied antecedents from 
which it was born. The party combined both multi-racialism and African activism to 
create a Zimbabwean nationalism at war with itself over the issues of race and racial 
cooperation. It simultaneously acted as a bridge between the old and the new, 
retaining many of the same African elites in positions of leadership, and persisting 
with a trust in white Rhodesians to elicit reform which would later be regarded with 
mistrust and regret. Within a broader atmosphere elicited by Garfield Todd's 
moderately liberal Rhodesian government, the SRANC was less hostile to the 
concept of non-racialism than later parties. White settlers were not the enemy; racial 
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discrimination was, and so non-black radicals were welcomed to participate as 
members and supporters in a visible demonstration of non-racialism. 
 As chapter three showed, the NDP and ZAPU further highlighted how fluid 
the competing conceptions of race were in Zimbabwean nationalism. By providing 
financial and logistical support, forming close friendships with nationalist leaders, 
and establishing a non-racial Salisbury city branch, the non-black radicals tried to 
remove this uncertainty about their role in the struggle and helped ensure that race 
remained a pertinent theme within the conceptual and political discussions. Key 
individuals (like the Clutton-Brocks, the Haddons, the Rangers, John Reed, Peter 
Mackay, Margaret Moore, Hasu Patel, Suman Mehta, and Edwin Lichtenstein) 
actively participated in a variety of visible and discrete ways. As chapter three 
concluded, for the SRANC, NDP, and ZAPU, it was the presence of non-black 
radicals requesting inclusion which challenged racial thinking, more so than the 
legacy of multi-racialism or the existence of a white settler population. By late 1962 
when ZAPU was banned, Zimbabwean nationalism was truly non-racial in many 
regards.  
 Yet anti-white rhetoric had begun to creep into the nationalist discourse, and 
over the next two years would continue to gain salience. Consequently, the crux of 
when Zimbabwean nationalism fundamentally shifted to a black identity ideology 
was the period 1962 to 1964. As chapters four, and five showed, it was during these 
few decisive years that the leadership and ordinary members became increasingly 
and vocally opposed to racial cooperation and non-black participation. It was this 
period when the ZNP and other vocally anti-white elements made themselves heard 
and thus forced a reactionary change in the dominant nationalist parties. The rise of 
the RF and a Rhodesian population increasingly hostile to African nationalism and 
its supporters ensured that despite shared experiences of discrimination (for race, 
gender, sexuality, religion, or politics), the non-black radicals found themselves 
forced outside of the core Zimbabwean nationalist ideology. With the ZANU-ZAPU 
split, a situation was created in which even partial acknowledgement of a non-racial 
(or worse, a multi-racial) ideology ensured criticisms by more radical Zimbabwean 
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nationalist elements. The non-black radicals were pushed to the margins, relegated to 
a supportive role, and denigrated by those they had previously worked hand-in-hand 
with. By removing the non-black radicals from their position as integral to the 
imagined Zimbabwean nation, the Zimbabwean nationalist movement lost the moral 
claims it had over the RF's white Rhodesian nationalism. By the time of UDI, non-
racial nationalism was over and Zimbabwean nationalism was irreversibly tied to an 
anti-white ideology. Whilst a handful of whites would continue to contribute in 
various ways, the widespread adoption of violence limited the nature of their 
activities and encouraged a broad race-based liberation ideology.  
 This thesis began with the funeral of one white radical and ends with that of 
another. Separated by almost twenty years, the differences between the two 
demonstrate how complex and fluid perceptions of race and nationalism are in the 
Zimbabwean context. When Paul Brickhill died in 2014, his achievements went 
unrecognised outside of a small group of acquaintances, colleagues, and friends. Few 
in Zimbabwe were willing to afford him the status deserved by his contributions to 
the liberation struggle and nation building efforts. The place of whites in 
Zimbabwean nationalist discourse was tenuous and marginal. ZANU-PF and the 
Zimbabwean nation in 2014 had no desire to celebrate the existence of white 
radicals. 
 Yet in March 1995, at the memorial service in London for Guy Clutton-
Brock, the contributions of a white radical was celebrated and utilised by all. In the 
context of the end of apartheid in South Africa and a prosperous and developing 
Zimbabwe (albeit one with growing social and economic issues), Clutton-Brock 
provided a unifying figure for the nation to rally behind. When some young 
Zimbabweans questioned the decision to posthumously declare Clutton-Brock a 
'National Hero of Zimbabwe', Ruth Chinamano (the first female Zimbabwean MP) 
gave a remarkable response in Parliament.  
 
We speak of Clutton-Brock and people ask who he was. Of course you do not 
know him, where were you during the first days of stone throwing in this 
country? You were frightened, with you trousers shaking. Clutton-Brock is the 
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first man, whose wife registered me as a member of the ANC and I paid 2s and 
6d. These people helped us to go where we are. These people kept the fires 
burning after the ANC was banned. I am very sorry that Clutton-Brock died, 
but he died a hero. Whoever has declared him a hero speaks well of the dead.12 
 
At the memorial itself, the list of those who provided tributes demonstrates the 
international respect garnered by the ardent non-racial activist. Amongst others, 
Terence Ranger spoke about his friend's 'vision of a free and human Africa as a 
corner-stone of a free and humane world', Diana Collins declared him 'a remarkable 
man [...] embarrassed, at being called any kind of a hero', and Emeke Anyaoku 
(Commonwealth Secretary General) proclaimed that: 
 
[Clutton-Brock's] work, his steady courage, and his commitment laid a 
foundation of ideals of reconstruction and reconciliation which have been so 
central to the miraculous history, not only of Zimbabwe, but of Southern Africa 
as we see it today. His life was itself a successful testing in the cauldron of 
authoritarianism and racism.13 
 
Most notable however, was the long, adoring, and heartfelt tribute to Clutton-Brock's 
'selfless dedication and sacrifices for the cause of freedom and justice in Zimbabwe' 
paid by his 'comrade-in-arms', Robert Mugabe. 'A man of rare noble deeds, who, in 
his own relentless way, contributed immensely to the liberation of our country and 
people, a liberation which ushered in the new era of independence and democracy, as 
it destroyed in the process a system totally unjust, undemocratic, racial and 
oppressive,' declared Mugabe, emphasising the sincere respect he felt for the former 
British missionary and farmer. Yet amongst all the accolades and acclamations, one 
part of Mugabe's speech stands out. 
 
Guy Clutton-Brock stood as an isolated beacon in the midst of settler forces of 
reaction. [...] It is indeed people like him who helped us to revise our general 
view of the white man as we ceased to believe that all whites were evil, which 
view later found expression in our policy of tolerance and national 
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reconciliation, now the cornerstone of our political philosophy that has yielded 
greater political stability in our country than we would have had without it.14 
 
These words from the first President of an independent Zimbabwe signified 
something far more than a personal connection between two old fighters in the 
African cause. They demonstrated how the Zimbabwean nation was built out of the 
experiences and memories of individuals and how one person or a small group of 
people (like the non-black radicals of early Zimbabwean nationalism) could have an 
impact far beyond their numbers. Whilst the actions of the non-black radicals during 
the pre-liberation war period were insignificant compared to the white radicals in 
South Africa or the African nationalists themselves, their presence was instrumental 
for other reasons. What Mugabe's testimony showed was that racial thinking within 
Zimbabwean nationalism had been fundamentally shaped by these individuals, and 
that these changes had persevered even after independence. The Zimbabwean nation 
that emerged was as much the result of these concepts of race as it was the 
experiences of the liberation struggle. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14 Ibid. 
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